Warfare and defence Books

Book SynopsisBiological weapons have threatened U.S. national security since at least World War II. Historically, however, the U.S. military has neglected research, development, acquisition, and doctrine for biodefense. Following September 11 and the anthrax letters of 2001, the United States started spending billions of dollars per year on medical countermeasures and biological detection systems. But most of this funding now comes from the Department of Health and Human Services rather than the Department of Defense. Why has the U.S. military neglected biodefense and allowed civilian organizations to take the lead in defending the country against biological attacks? In American Biodefense, Frank L. Smith III addresses this puzzling and largely untold story about science, technology, and national security.Smith argues that organizational frames and stereotypes have caused both military neglect and the rise of civilian biodefense. In the armed services, influential ideas about kinetTrade Review[Smith] asks rhetorically, will the US military neglect the threat of cyber weapons, as it neglected for so long the threat of biological weapons? It is a good question, especially since the new director of the US National Security Agency has specifically drawn attention to the fact that there are a number of contemporary states that have the capability to completely shut down the infrastructure of the United States. It is the virtue of books like this that they make us think about these things. -- Dr. Ron Smith * New Zealand International Review *Frank L. Smith III... draws upon his many years of experience, research and expertise to present a seminal work of national importance....A highly recommended study that is also suitable for non-specialist general readers concerned with bioterrorism issues and American national security. -- Michael J. Carson * The Midwest Book Review *Table of ContentsIntroduction. American Biodefense, from Boston to Baghdad1. Science and Technology for National Security: Threats, Interests, and Ideas2. Stereotypical Neglect of Military Research, Development, and Acquisition for Biodefense3. Fatal Assumptions: Military Doctrine4. An Unlikely Sponsor? The Rise of Civilian BiodefenseConclusion. Biodefense and Beyond: The Influence of Ideas on National SecurityNotes Index

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Book SynopsisIn both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers to Bioweapons, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult, protracted, and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected results whatever the magnitude of investment. Her findings are based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of archival data and other historical documents related to various state and terrorist bioweapons programs.Bioweapons development relies on living organisms that are sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits thatTrade Review[T]his is an overall excellent book that makes a significant contribution to the study of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To date, existing research has overwhelmingly focused on the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation, while we know substantially less about the causes of chemical and biological weapons proliferation. This book represents an important and welcome step toward addressing that gap. -- Neil Narang * Political Science Quarterly *Barriers to Bioweapons provides a clear and insightful examination of what is a highly technical and complex subject matter.... The book provides a useful template for analyzing and explaining the relative successes or failures of a number of potential large-scale scientific endeavors beyond the realm of Weapons of Mass Destruction. It is a must-read for nonproliferation experts and should be a standard text for understanding biological weapons development for some time to come. -- David W. Kearn * Perspectives on Politics *Ben Ouagrham-Gormley's book is a fascinating study of the phenomenology of scientific knowledge, providing a compelling analysis of how knowledge is acquired, developed, transmitted, and, at the same time, diluted or lost as a result of organizational, social, economic, political, and ultimately very human factors that vary widely within countries and over time. -- Janne Nolan * Nonproliferation Review *In Barriers to Bioweapons, Ben Ouagrham-Gormley similarly and persuasively argues that the challenges to producing biological weapons—whether by state or non-state actors—are considerable.... The book is an attempt to demonstrate in a rigorous manner that there are significant barriers to producing bioweapons. Given the recent controversy over the publication of several papers on H5N1 influenza research, this is a timely and welcome book that challenges prevailing notions about the ease of bioweapons development. Summing Up: Highly recommended. * Choice *Table of ContentsChapter 1: The Bio-proliferation PuzzleChapter 2: The Acquisition and Use of Specialized KnowledgeChapter 3: Impediments and Facilitators of Bioweapons Developments: Organization, Management, and Exogenous FactorsChapter 4: The American Bioweapons Program: Scientific Progress, Operational FailureChapter 5: The Soviet Bioweapons Program: Failed IntegrationChapter 6: Small Bioweapons Programs and the Constraints of CovertnessChapter 7: Preventing Bioweapons Developments: Policy ImplicationsAppendix 1: American Bioweapons Program: Contractors Appendix 2: American Bioweapons Program: Approximate Budget FiguresNotes Index

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Book SynopsisWhy do some autocratic leaders pursue aggressive or expansionist foreign policies, while others are much more cautious in their use of military force? The first book to focus systematically on the foreign policy of different types of authoritarian regimes, Dictators at War and Peace breaks new ground in our understanding of the international behavior of dictators. Jessica L. P. Weeks explains why certain kinds of regimes are less likely to resort to war than others, why some are more likely to win the wars they start, and why some authoritarian leaders face domestic punishment for foreign policy failures whereas others can weather all but the most serious military defeat. Using novel cross-national data, Weeks looks at various nondemocratic regimes, including those of Saddam Hussein and Joseph Stalin; the Argentine junta at the time of the Falklands War, the military government in Japan before and during World War II, and the North Vietnamese communist regime. She findTrade ReviewDictators is an excellent book that constitutes a significant leap forward in the study of authoritarian regimes and international security. Importantly, the book reveals that not all dictators are alike.... The book deserves to be read broadly in the academy and among policymakers. Its relevance for U.S. foreign policy is clear as the United States wrangles with several different types of authoritarian governments in China, Russia, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and elsewhere. -- Alexander B. Downes * Political Science Quarterly *Dictators at War and Peace by Jessica L. P. Weeks is one of the most significant contributions to this literature. Weeks argues that not all authoritarian regimes are created equal, and this difference affects their likelihood of initiating and winning military conflicts.... Weeks's typology and analysis have laid the foundation for understanding the diversity of authoritarian international politics, and Dictators at War and Peace will undoubtedly become the standard for such analysis. -- Michael McKoy * H-Diplo *[Weeks] makes readers insightfully aware of the key differences among 'dictatorships' that may account for alternative foreign policies. With a good review of extant literature and innovative data-based and case studies on regime types and conflict behavior, she examines theories that distinguish between authoritarian leaders who nevertheless answer to significant elite constituencies and those who behave like unrestrained 'bosses' or 'strongmen'.... This study, and its main findings... are a significant contribution to the scientific study of war and peace. * Choice *Table of ContentsIntroduction1. Authoritarian Regimes and the Domestic Politics of War and Peace Audiences, Preferences, and Decisions about War Hypotheses, Implications, and Cases2. Initiating International Conflict Measuring Authoritarian Regime Type Modeling the Initiation of International Conflict Results3. Winners, Losers, and Survival Selecting Wars War Outcomes in the Past Century Outcomes of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1946–2000 The Consequences of Defeat4. Personalist Dictators: Shooting from the Hip Saddam Hussein and the 1990 Invasion of Kuwait Josef Stalin: A Powerful but Loose Cannon5. Juntas: Using the Only Language They Understand Argentina and the Falklands/Malvinas War Japan's Road to World War II6. Machines: Looking Before They Leap The North Vietnamese Wars against the US, South Vietnam, and Cambodia The Soviet Union in the Post-Stalin EraConclusion: Dictatorship, War, and PeaceAppendix Notes Works Cited Index

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Book SynopsisWhy are prisoners horribly abused in some wars but humanely cared for in others? In Life and Death in Captivity, Geoffrey P. R. Wallace explores the profound differences in the ways captives are treated during armed conflict. Wallace focuses on the dual role played by regime type and the nature of the conflict in determining whether captor states opt for brutality or mercy. Integrating original data on prisoner treatment during the last century of interstate warfare with in-depth historical cases, Wallace demonstrates how domestic constraints and external incentives shape the fate of captured enemy combatants. Both Russia and Japan, for example, treated prisoners very differently in the Russo-Japanese War of 19045 and in World War II; the behavior of any given country is liable to vary from conflict to conflict and even within the same war.Democracies may be more likely to treat their captives humanely, yet this benevolence is rooted less in liberal norms of nonviolencTrade ReviewGeoffrey Wallace suggests a new theoretical framework to examine wartime conduct and political violence in armed conflicts. * Canadian Military History *Table of ContentsIntroduction1. Repertoires of Violence against Prisoners2. The Captor's Dilemma3. Prisoners by the Numbers4. World War II, Democracies, and the (Mis)Treatment of Prisoners5. Territorial Conquest and the Katyn Massacre in PerspectiveConclusion: Explaining the Treatment of Prisoners during WarAppendix Notes References Index

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Book SynopsisHow do insurgents and governments select their targets? Which ideological discourses and organizational policies do they adopt to win civilian loyalties and control territory? Aysegul Aydin and Cem Emrence suggest that both insurgents and governments adopt a wide variety of coercive strategies in war environments. In Zones of Rebellion, they integrate Turkish-Ottoman history with social science theory to unveil the long-term policies that continue to inform the distribution of violence in Anatolia. The authors show the astonishing similarity in combatants' practices over time and their resulting inability to consolidate Kurdish people and territory around their respective political agendas. The Kurdish insurgency in Turkey is one of the longest-running civil wars in the Middle East. Zones of Rebellion demonstrates for the first time how violence in this conflict has varied geographically. Identifying distinct zones of violence, Aydin and Emrence show why Kurds and KurTrade ReviewZones of Rebellion is a slim book, but it manages to fit plenty in. It is determinedly wonkish and non-ideological, divided into sections examining the origins and tactics of both the PKK and the Turkish military. It shows how decisions taken in response to particular circumstances set the future direction of the conflict and limited the options of both players. Ultimately, this path dependence led to political stalemate. At critical junctures each side pursued policies that might seem inefficient to an outside observer. -- William Armstrong * Hurriyet Daily News *Table of ContentsIntroduction Zone Making Midfield Wars Origins of Violence Looking AheadPart I. InsurgencyChapter 1. Organization Competitive Origins Building Trust Extracting Resources The Weberian Experiment Failed Organizational InertiaChapter 2. Ideology A Fight for Independence Inviting Pressure from Abroad Bargaining with the StateChapter 3. Strategy A Border Specialist Reaching Out Paying the Price Back to BotanPart II. CounterinsurgencyChapter 4. Organization Administrative Solutions Special Rule Redistricting Abandoning the CountrysideChapter 5. Ideology Rural Bias Blaming Foreign Sponsors A Developmentalist Response The Backup Plan: Co-optationChapter 6. Strategy Locating Insurgents Sweep and Strike Curbing Civilian Unrest The No-Entry ZoneConclusion Forging Identities Path-Dependent Origins Room for ContingencyAppendix Notes Index

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Book SynopsisIn Waging War, Planning Peace, Aaron Rapport investigates how U.S. presidents and their senior advisers have managed vital noncombat activities while the nation is in the midst of fighting or preparing to fight major wars.Trade Review"Noncombat operations are central to present and future American foreign policy objectives. Aaron Rapport argues persuasively that construal level theory explains varied assessments of noncombat military operations in four different cases: Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. These intrinsically interesting case studies raise important issues relevant to current policy." -- James McAllister, Williams College, author of No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954"This is an important and original book that addresses the contingencies of policy failures and successes of the critical stage of noncombat operations in the strategic cycle of military interventions. The theoretical explanation draws on and is rooted in construal level theory from psychology. Aaron Rapport empirically tests this theory against a well-designed, robust set of case histories. This volume should not be missed by scholars and practitioners who are interested and engaged in military policy planning." -- Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem"Why is the United States often unprepared for the peace that inevitably follows war? Why are its ambitious plans for the political reconstruction or transformation of defeated countries not matched by adequate planning? Aaron Rapport's intriguing answer, well grounded in theory and history, is essential reading for analysts of decision making and of American foreign policy." -- Jack S. Levy, Board of Governors’ Professor, Rutgers UniversityTable of ContentsIntroduction: Ambitious Aims and Meager Plans1. Strategic Assessment and Noncombat Operations2. The Occupation of Germany3. "Phase IV" and the Invasion of Iraq4. An Occupation That Never Was: Korea, 1950–19515. State Building during Escalation in VietnamConclusion: Reviewing Theoretical and Policy ImplicationsNotes Index

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Book SynopsisWhy do terrorist organizations use children to support their cause and carry out their activities? Small Arms uncovers the brutal truth behind the mobilization of children by terrorist groups. Mia Bloom and John Horgan show us the grim underbelly of society that allows and even encourages the use of children to conduct terrorist activities...Trade ReviewDrawing on a wide body of case studies, the authors examine the many ways child soldiers are drawn into their roles—which, in the end, usually turn out to be as cannon fodder.... Of interest to military planners as well as workers in the humanitarian aid/NGO sphere. * Kirkus Reviews *[Arabic language review] * Hafryat *The lack of universally generalizable policy recommendations may be off-putting for those looking for easy solutions, but if describing the phenomenon is the first step to understanding it, then this work is essential reading. * Choice *Small Arms: Children and Terrorism is an important, timely, and interdisciplinary work that offers new insight into the issue of children in conflict. * H-Net H-War *Small Arms is a must-read for policymakers and planners working on counterterrorism strategy. With so little existing political science scholarship in this arena, Bloom and Horgan earn the dubious distinction of providing the most comprehensive overview of children and terrorism. * Joint Forces Quarterly *Bloom and Horgan's Small Arms: Children and Terrorism is an engagingly written, conceptually coherent contribution to scholarship around the use of children by violent extremist organizations (VEOs), with special consideration given to how these practices contrast with the use of child soldiers by other armed groups. * Terrorism & Political Violence *Bloom and Horgan have done a masterful job of building their argument and demonstrating their concepts without lingering on the worst aspects of their subject. It belongs on the shelf of any individual interested in modern conflicts and should be of enormous utility in a wide variety of undergraduate courses. * H-Net *Bloom and Horgan offer a tour de force of the critical issue of children and terrorism. Their book is a must-read for anyone interested in getting the full and disturbing picture of contemporary terrorism. * PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS *Small Arms: Children and Terrorism addresses an important issue in terrorism literature—the use of children to carry out acts of terrorism worldwide. [The book] highlights a topic rapidly growing in prevalence around the world, and future military leaders must learn how to deal with this new pandemic problem. * The US Army War College Quarterly *Table of ContentsAcknowledgments 1. What Is a Child? 2. Child Soldiers versus Children in Terrorist Groups 3. Learning to Hate: Socialization and Cultural Influences 4. Pathways to Involvement: Coercion 5. Pathways to Involvement: Consensus and Cultures of Martyrdom 6. Experiences, Apprenticeships, and Careers in Terror 7. Leaving Terrorism Behind 8. An End or a New Beginning? Notes Index

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Book SynopsisAs the U.S. experience in Iraq following the 2003 invasion made abundantly clear, failure to properly plan for risks associated with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction can have a devastating impact on the overall success of a military mission. In Waging War, Planning Peace, Aaron Rapport investigates how U.S. presidents and their senior advisers have managed vital noncombat activities while the nation is in the midst of fighting or preparing to fight major wars. He argues that research from psychologyspecifically, construal level theorycan help explain how individuals reason about the costs of postconflict noncombat operations that they perceive as lying in the distant future.In addition to preparations for Phase IV in the lead-up to the Iraq War, Rapport looks at the occupation of Germany after World War II, the planned occupation of North Korea in 1950, and noncombat operations in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Applying his insights to these cases, he finds that civilTrade Review"Noncombat operations are central to present and future American foreign policy objectives. Aaron Rapport argues persuasively that construal level theory explains varied assessments of noncombat military operations in four different cases: Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. These intrinsically interesting case studies raise important issues relevant to current policy." -- James McAllister, Williams College, author of No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954"This is an important and original book that addresses the contingencies of policy failures and successes of the critical stage of noncombat operations in the strategic cycle of military interventions. The theoretical explanation draws on and is rooted in construal level theory from psychology. Aaron Rapport empirically tests this theory against a well-designed, robust set of case histories. This volume should not be missed by scholars and practitioners who are interested and engaged in military policy planning." -- Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem"Why is the United States often unprepared for the peace that inevitably follows war? Why are its ambitious plans for the political reconstruction or transformation of defeated countries not matched by adequate planning? Aaron Rapport's intriguing answer, well grounded in theory and history, is essential reading for analysts of decision making and of American foreign policy." -- Jack S. Levy, Board of Governors’ Professor, Rutgers UniversityTable of ContentsIntroduction: Ambitious Aims and Meager Plans1. Strategic Assessment and Noncombat Operations2. The Occupation of Germany3. "Phase IV" and the Invasion of Iraq4. An Occupation That Never Was: Korea, 1950–19515. State Building during Escalation in VietnamConclusion: Reviewing Theoretical and Policy ImplicationsNotes Index

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Book SynopsisGavin challenges key elements of the widely accepted narrative about the history of the atomic age and the consequences of the nuclear...Trade ReviewNuclear Statecraft is a provocative and fascinating book. The writing is lucid, the analysis tightly woven and sophisticated, and the book's core conclusion—that much of what is said and thought about nuclear policy today remains hobbled by a pervasive ignorance of history (even, or perhaps especially, among nuclear policy experts)—is well argued and compelling. This book makes a significant contribution to the body of scholarly research about the evolution of US nuclear policy. -- Janne E. Nolan * Nonproliferation Review *Francis J. Gavin's elegant and eloquently argued Nuclear Statecraft is a useful and timely reminder to appreciate better the historical origins of the contemporary nuclear world.. [The] section dealing with Gavin’s debunking of the four myths on which nuclear alarmism is grounded—rogue states, tipping points, nuclear terrorism, and the so-called Long Peace—is worth the book’s price and should be compulsory reading for decision makers and policy practitioners everywhere. Nuclear Statecraft is a must acquisition for academic and public libraries. -- Joseph M. Siracusa * Journal of American History *Gavin not only succeeds in disentangling postwar nuclear history from the US-Soviet rivalry of the Cold War, but provides a deeper and more complex understanding of the long-term effects of nuclear weapons on Great Power relations. -- Matthew Jones * International Affairs *Gavin's project is not merely to set the rest of us straight on nuclear history so that we can 'get it right.' Rather, it is to point out that the most useful insights to nuclear weapon issues are likely found at the convergence of nuclear theory, policy, and history, with the additional caution that even a firm grasp of the former two does not imply an equally firm grasp of the latter.... To each related theory and policy discussion he imparts a useful perspective concerning both the neglect and misuse of historical data. -- Col. John Mark Mattox * Military Review *Table of Contents1. History, Theory, and Statecraft in the Nuclear Age2. The Myth of Flexible Response: American Strategy in Europe during the 1960s3. Nuclear Weapons, Statecraft, and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–19624. Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s5. Nuclear Nixon6. That Seventies Show: The Consequences of Parity Revisited7. Same as It Ever Was? Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century8. Global Zero, History, and the "Nuclear Revolution"NotesIndex

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Book SynopsisWarlords are individuals who control small territories within weak states, using a combination of force and patronage. In this book, Kimberly Marten shows why and how warlords undermine state sovereignty. Unlike the feudal lords of a previous era, warlords today are not state-builders. Instead they collude with cost-conscious, corrupt, or frightened state officials to flout and undermine state capacity. They thrive on illegality, relying on private militias for support, and often provoke violent resentment from those who are cut out of their networks. Some act as middlemen for competing states, helping to hollow out their own states from within.. Countries ranging from the United States to Russia have repeatedly chosen to ally with warlords, but Marten argues that to do so is a dangerous proposition. Drawing on interviews, documents, local press reports, and in-depth historical analysis, Marten examines warlordism in the Pakistani tribal areas during the twentieth century, inTrade ReviewA virtue of Marten's principal-agent framework is that it allows the reader to identify the state in bas-relief, the backdrop against which the warlord moves... for North American teachers looking to introduce the North Caucasus with a lively seminary discussion, I recommend assigning chapter 5, Marten’s biography of Ramzan Kadyrov—the archetype of the charismatic, media-savvy (p. 133), self-aware, celebrity gangster. He has money, weapons, sociopaths on speed-dial, political protection from great powers, and a twitter feed @RKadyrov. -- Jesse Driscoll * Political Science Quarterly *How can we understand the important phenomenon of modern-day warlords, often associated with state failure and transborder criminality even as state leaders frequently rely upon them as a source of order or peace in the most difficult of conditions? Kimberly Marten's Warlords blazes a new trail in answering this question.... This engagingly written book makes a number of major arguments,... [that are] pioneering in the study of warlordism, likely framing a debate for years to come on a subject about which there is as yet relatively little theory. -- Henry E. Hale * H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable Reviews *I highly recommend Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States for anyone studying international relations or those working in foreign policy positions in the Department of State when faced with a developing or already entrenched warlord situation. The book is relevant considering today's worldwide economic concerns and weak states’ limited capacity to control their own people and territory. -- LTC David T. Seigel * Military Review *In Warlords, Marten provides a wonderfully nuanced description of the relationship between states and warlords. Warlords are individuals who require some level of state support and protection, but ultimately undermine state capacity by controlling small pieces of territory using a combination of force and patronage. In four substantive chapters, Marten gracefully outlines the trajectory of warlordism as a function of state construction in Pakistan, Georgia, Chechnya, and Iraq. Marten displays great depth of knowledge, and her description is rife with anecdotes, insider information, and humor, making it authoritative and enjoyable to read. -- Stacey L. Hunt * International Studies Review *Marten's book is a useful and informative one. Her analysis is persuasive for the four cases she examines, and her observations are pertinent. Although warlordism is sometimes a necessary evil, a national government should eliminate the warlord as soon as possible. A warlord is dependent upon patronage, and therefore, he is vulnerable to having his network of supporters undermined. Ethnic or sectarian tension may make this more difficult, but a popular national leader operating without effective opposition is in a strong position to act. In any case, removing a warlord requires that the national government possess specific information about the network of patronage and be willing to suborn the important members of that network. Marten has presented a great deal of information and analysis in only 262 pages. I recommend her book unreservedly. -- Kevin McMullen * Infantry *Kimberly Marten has made a major theoretical and policy-relevant contribution to the field's understanding of these illusive and dangerous actors. Also, readers not only will better understand how they come to and maintain their power, but also will be equipped with a new framework for analyzing the challenges and choices confronting weak states in their efforts at consolidating modern, legal rational authority and accommodating the demands for security and economic development. -- Jack J. Porter * Comparative Political Studies *Table of Contents1. Warlords: An Introduction 2. Warlords and Universal Sovereignty 3. Ungoverned Warlords: Pakistan's FATA in the Twentieth Century 4. The Georgian Experiment with Warlords 5. Chechnya: The Sovereignty of Ramzan Kadyrov 6. It Takes Three: Washington, Baghdad, and the Sons of Iraq Conclusion: Lessons and Hypotheses

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Book SynopsisStunning shifts in the worldviews of states mark the modern history of international affairs: how do societies think aboutand rethinkinternational order and security? Japan''s opening, German conquest, American internationalism, Maoist independence, and Gorbachev''s new thinking molded international conflict and cooperation in their eras. How do we explain such momentous changes in foreign policyand in other cases their equally surprising absence?The nature of strategic ideas, Jeffrey W. Legro argues, played a critical and overlooked role in these transformations. Big changes in foreign policies are rare because it is difficult for individuals to overcome the inertia of entrenched national mentalities. Doing so depends on a particular nexus of policy expectations, national experience, and ready replacement ideas. In a sweeping comparative history, Legro explores the sources of strategy in the United States and Germany before and after the world wars, in Tokugawa Japan, and inTrade ReviewRethinking the World is sure to stir up controversy. No book that reinterprets some of the most important events in world history, offers an overarching argument for all of them, and calls both realism and liberalism into question can do otherwise. One of the hallmarks of this book is caution. Legro is even-handed in his evaluation of the evidence, cognizant of the methodological problems that he faces, and reticent about claiming too much for the role of ideas. In fact, the argument is a synthetic one in which ideas, power, and domestic politics all have a place. One of Legro's key contributions is an account of how ideas, power, and domestic politics combine in explicit and predictable ways to generate outcomes. * International Studies Review *Legro makes a compelling case that strategic beliefs cannot be reduced to strategic circumstance. He ends by reflecting on the future of the Bush 'revolution' and argues that, absent further terrorist attacks, U.S. foreign policy is likely to tack back to the post-World War II mainstream. * Foreign Affairs *Table of Contents1. Great Power Ideas and Change 2. Explaining Change and Continuity 3. The Ebb and Flow of American Internationalism 4. Germany, from Outsider to Insider 5. Overhaul of Orthodoxy in Tokugawa Japan and the Soviet Union 6. The Next Century

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Book SynopsisAllied nations often stop each other from going to war. Some countries even form alliances with the specific intent of restraining another power and thereby preventing war. Furthermore, restraint often becomes an issue in existing alliances as one ally wants to start a war, launch a military intervention, or pursue some other risky military policy while the other ally balks. In Warring Friends, Jeremy Pressman draws on and critiques realist, normative, and institutionalist understandings of how alliance decisions are made.Alliance restraint often has a role to play both in the genesis of alliances and in their continuation. As this book demonstrates, an external power can apply the brakes to an incipient conflict, and even unheeded advice can aid in clarifying national goals. The power differentials between allies in these partnerships are influenced by leadership unity, deception, policy substitutes, and national security priorities.Recent controversy over the complicTrade Review"This valuable study explores the logic of intra-alliance power relationships, looking in particular at moments when states try to use alliance ties to restrain risky military actions by their partners. In a wide-ranging survey of alliances in Europe and Asia over the last century, Pressman finds that the 'restraint motive' for alliance creation is as important as the 'mutual protection' motive."—G. John Ikenberry, Foreign Affairs"In this fascinating book, which is rich in historical detail, Jeremy Pressman shows how states use alliances to check their partners as well as their adversaries. He also explains when allies are likely to be restrained and when they are not. This is an important addition to the literature on alliances."—John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago

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Book SynopsisSince January 2004, a violent separatist insurgency has raged in southern Thailand, resulting in more than three thousand deaths. Though largely unnoticed outside Southeast Asia, the rebellion in Pattani and neighboring provinces and the Thai...Trade ReviewIn this introduction to a scandalously underreported conflict... McCargo rightly scorns the legions of post-9/11 armchair analysts who try to shoehorn every conflict with Islamic overtones into well-Googled theories of global jihad. No armchairs for this author: he researched the book by crisscrossing southern Thailand in a temperamental 1989 Mercedes, hastening back to the town of Pattani by nightfall to avoid militants' booby traps. McCargo is the real McCoy.... For McCargo, the only long-term solution combines firm action against the perpetrators of violence and 'substantive autonomy' for Thailand's three southernmost, predominantly Malay-speaking and Muslim provinces. * Time Magazine *Original, fascinating, and important.... McCargo has sifted through the details of this tragic conflict with extraordinary diligence and insight. The result is a small masterpiece of investigative rigor and balance. It is an especially welcome corrective to those tempted to see the hand of al-Qaeda in all Muslim insurgencies. * Journal of Asian Studies *Thailand, once known as one of the most stable democracies in Asia, is in political and economic crisis.... Southern Thailand now resembles a war zone.... McCargo gives a thorough explanation of why unrest began in southern Thailand, and why it has spread.... By the end of 2008, more than 3000 people had been killed in the south since the beginning of the decade. Bangkok still refuses to consider any form of real autonomy for the region and McCargo is pessimistic about the future. * London Review of Books *The well-written and researched book provides a much-needed detailed analysis of the violent conflicts in three Malay-Muslim provinces of southern Thailand—Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat.... It is a 'must-read' book for anybody interested in Thai politics. The way McCargo situates the violent conflicts in the nature of the interaction between the center and the periphery is particularly illuminating. * Southeast Asian Studies *Table of ContentsINTRODUCTION1. ISLAM2. POLITICS3. SECURITY4. MILITANTSCONCLUSIONGlossary Notes Index

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Book SynopsisCharli Carpenter explores how advocacy elites in nongovernmental and transnational organizations help determine which issues get more global policy attention than others.Trade ReviewLike all valuable books do, Lost Causes leaves us with many ideas to think about.... Carpenter has opened doors for new thinking on these and other research questions and on creative ways to marshal evidence that can answer them. -- Wayne Sandholtz * Political Science Quarterly *

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Book SynopsisFew would contest that the U.S. occupation of Iraq is a clear example of just how fraught a military occupation can become. In Occupational Hazards, David M. Edelstein elucidates the occasional successes of military occupations and their more frequent failures. Edelstein has identified twenty-six cases since 1815 in which an outside power seized control of a territory where the occupying party had no long-term claim on sovereignty. In a book that has implications for present-day policy, he draws evidence from such historical cases as well as from four current occupationsBosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraqwhere the outcome is not yet known. Occupation is difficult, in Edelstein''s view, because ambitious goals require considerable time and resources, yet both the occupied population and the occupying power want occupation to end quickly and inexpensively; in drawn-out occupations, impatience grows and resources dwindle. This combination sabotages the occupying power''s abiliTrade ReviewOccupational Hazards is one of those rare books that seamlessly blends theory, historical case studies, and policy relevance. For all of those reasons, this is a very good book. I really hope that it attracts the attention it deserves from U.S. policymakers, the ones who most need to do so before they embark on future military occupations. * Perspectives on Politics *Military occupations are inherently risky affairs. According to David Edelstein, only seven of the twenty-six international military occupations conducted since 1815 have succeeded. Occupational Hazards attempts to explain not only this high failure rate for military occupations but also what distinguishes a successful occupation from an unsuccessful one. Given the challenges the United States faces in its recent occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, this broad analysis is a welcome addition to the literature. * Military Review *This is an excellent work that is also a groundbreaking piece of scholarship. Occupation, especially after a dictatorial regime, often gives rise to nationalistic and ethnic groups who may have been oppressed and have incentive to organize and resist foreign troops. Also, without internal controls such groups may declare war on one another, hence the probability of civil strife and war. Therefore, chaos usually is the result because the occupiers want to impose new political institutions and cultural values. This is a powerful work that should be required reading in all of the military academies and war colleges. Policymakers in the Bush administration may have learned a thing or two had the book been available five or six years ago. Policymakers of the present and future should put it on their must-read list. Essential. * Choice *

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Book SynopsisA balance-of-power perspective on the formation, development, and future of the EC/EU.Trade ReviewIn this important work, Rosato attempts to explain European integration since 1945 in realist (balance of power) terms. His thorough examination of the diplomatic and archival record shows that, facing an adversary with an overwhelming military superiority (the USSR), Western European leaders saw the need to form a centralized balancing coalition able to deter the USSR event without US help (although NATO provided useful protection while the coalition was assembled).... With respect to alternative explanations... ideational transformation away from the folly of nationalism and war, as argued by Robert Kagan, Jeremy Rifkin, and others is, Rosato says, flatly contradicted by the facts.... Summing up: Essential. * Choice *Table of Contents1. Introduction 2. Explaining International Cooperation 3. Origins: Heavy-Industry Integration, 1945–1950 4. Setback: Military Integration, 1950–1954 5. Triumph: Economic Integration, 1955–1957 6. Beyond Postwar Eu rope Index

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Book SynopsisInsurgent cohesion is central to explaining patterns of violence, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency, and civil war outcomes. Cohesive insurgent groups produce more effective war-fighting forces and are more credible negotiators; organizational cohesion shapes both the duration of wars and their ultimate resolution. In Networks of Rebellion, Paul Staniland explains why insurgent leaders differ so radically in their ability to build strong organizations and why the cohesion of armed groups changes over time during conflicts. He outlines a new way of thinking about the sources and structure of insurgent groups, distinguishing among integrated, vanguard, parochial, and fragmented groups. Staniland compares insurgent groups, their differing social bases, and how the nature of the coalitions and networks within which these armed groups were built has determined their discipline and internal control. He examines insurgent groups in Afghanistan, 1975 to the present day, KTrade ReviewNetworks of Rebellion is a tour de force, providing a new theory for understanding why rebel groups have different types of internal organization, and why some hold up to the pressures of war while other collapse. The organization of rebellion is critical for understanding both patterns of violence and the ways that wars end.... It is elegantly written, well argued, and thoroughly researched. Staniland has clearly made a significant contribution to our understanding of rebellion. Moreover, this book is among the most policy-relevant works in political science at this juncture. It is not only a must read for scholars, but for practitioners trying to grasp the intricacies of insurgency, multiparty civil wars, and conflict resolution more generally. -- Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham * H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable Reviews *Paul Staniland is emerging as one of the most creative and influential scholars of political violence. His Networks of Rebellion will cement that reputation.... the book is a model of cogent theorization, inventive but systematic research design, and effective writing. It constitutes a substantial contribution to the scholarship on political violence and a milestone for field-based, comparative research.... Staniland's work is seminal. To understand civil war we need to understand insurgents, and to understand insurgents we need to look at the social foundations of insurgent organizations.... Networks of Rebellion is impressive empirically. The writing is clear and compelling. The book deserves the recognition it has received and is likely to continue to receive. -- Scott Strauss * Perspectives on Politics *Paul Staniland's Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesionand Collapse is an important contribution to the analysis ofterror networks and their motivations.It deals with a varietyof conflicts, many of which Staniland acknowledges as being under-researched, and presents clear, understandable explanations of eachorganization under review.Through detailed case studies, Staniland highlights the subtle differences between the groups, which in other studies might be discussed collectively under particular titles such as religious extremist or maynot be discussed at all if they are smaller or do not pose the largest threat—and illustrates how subtle differences can have significant implications. -- Patrick Finnegan * Parameters *Staniland's project is diligent in its methodological rigour, impressive in its empirical findings, and assertive and compelling in the theory it builds accordingly. Staniland's contribution to insurgency studies is reminiscent to how the field of critical terrorism studies emerged from scholarly dissatisfaction with the pre-existing quality of work in terrorism studies, particularly in terms of its epistemology, ontology, ethics, and praxis. His mission is ambitious, but Networks of Rebellion delivers against it and has laid the foundations of a new research agenda. -- Will Carter * Small Wars and Insurgencies *With the reported emergence of some 1,000 rebel groups in the spreading Syrian civil war and the stark contrast of those that seem organized and formidable as opposed to transitory, a careful study of insurgents' structures and networks is most timely. Staniland... focuses on whether the groups are 'horizontally' or 'vertically' integrated or relatively isolated across/within locations, collaborators, and subsidiaries.... This book nicely presents a coherent overall typology complete with extenuating circumstances of contextual and political environments within which groups operate. * Choice *Staniland's three case studies serve as comparative evidence to test the author's theory. Additionally, the case studies make valuable contributions to the study of Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. The author's personal field research supports each of the three case studies, which adds to their overall value and lends support to his argument. Serious students of insurgency, irregular warfare, strategy, international relations, and Southern Asia will value this groundbreaking study. Staniland's work is very much worth reading, especially for those who wish to understand insurgent organizations, particularly insurgent organizations in Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. -- Lt. Col. Jonathan P. Klug * Military Review *Table of Contents1. Organizing Insurgency Part I. Theorizing Rebellion 2. Insurgent Origins 3. Insurgent Change Part II. Comparative Evidence from South Asia 4. Azad and Jihad: Trajectories of Insurgency in Kashmir 5. Organizing Rebellion in Afghanistan 6. Explaining Tamil Militancy in Sri Lanka Part III. Extensions and Implications 7. "Peasants and Commissars": Communist Tides in Southeast Asia 8. Insurgency, War, and Politics

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Book SynopsisLinda Weiss attributes the U.S. capacity for transformative innovation to the strength of its national security state, a complex of agencies, programs, and hybrid arrangements that has developed around the institution of permanent defense preparedness and the pursuit of technological supremacy.Trade ReviewThis dense, powerful volume offers profound insights into the U.S. innovation system and its driving forces....It deserves close attention from anyone with an interest in innovation or America's place at the technological frontier. -- Mark Zachary Taylor * Political Science Quarterly *While America Inc.? is not a book for those desiring a normative critique of US policy, it is, instead, an invaluable analytical explanation as to how the US has been preeminent in its inexorable innovative drive to achieve and maintain its defense primacy. As such, Weiss lays out a forceful challenge to the traditional conceptualization of the US as a paradigmatic liberal capitalist state. -- Dr. Maryanne Kelton * Australian Institute of International Affairs *Table of Contents1. The National Security State and Technology Leadership The U.S. Puzzle The Argument Re-viewing the NSS–Private Sector Relationship Existing Accounts: Discounting, Sidelining, Civilianizing the State The Approach of This Book New Thinking on the American State 2. Rise of the National Security State as Technology Enterprise Emergence (1945–1957) Growth: The Sputnik Effect (1958–1968) Crisis: Legitimation and Innovation Deficits (1969–1979) Reform and Reorientation: Beginnings (1980–1989) Reform and Reorientation: Consolidation (1990–1999) Re-visioning (2000–2012) 3. Investing in New Ventures Geopolitical Roots of the U.S. Venture Capital Industry Post–Cold War Trends: New Funds for a New Security Environment4. Beyond Serendipity: Procuring Transformative Technology Technology Procurement versus R&D: The Activist Element of Government Purchasing Spin-Off and Spin-Around—Serendipitous and Purposeful Breaching the Wall: Edging Toward Military-Commercial (Re-)Integration 5. Reorienting the Public-Private Partnership Structural Changes in the Domestic Arena Reorientation: The Quest for Commercial Viability Beyond a Military-Industrial Divide: Innovating for Both Security and Commerce 6. No More Breakthroughs? Post-9/11 Decline of the NSS Technology Enterprise? Nanotechnology: A Coordinated Effort Robotics: The Drive for Drones Clean Energy: From Laggard to Leader? Caveat: A Faltering NSS Innovation Engine? 7. Hybridization and American Antistatism The Significance of Hybridization An American Tendency? Nature of the Beast: Neither "Privatization" nor "Outsourcing" Innovation Hybrids 8. Penetrating the Myths of the Military-Commercial Relationship Four Myths Laid Bare Serendipitous Spin-Off Hidden Industrial Policy Wall of Separation and Military-Industrial Complex R&D Spending Creates Innovation Leadership The Defense Spending Question: In Search of the Holy Grail? 9. Hybrid State, Hybrid Capitalism, Great Power Turning Point Comparative Institutions and Varieties of Capitalism The American State Great Power Turning Point

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Book SynopsisThis book details the history and, in many cases, the chronic inadequacies in the making of Israeli national security policy, as well as its strengths: rapid and flexible responses, generally pragmatic decision-making, and effective planning.Trade ReviewZion's Dilemmas is the most detailed analysis to date of the inner workings of Israel's national security establishment. It presents seven case studies: the two Lebanon wars (1982 and 2006); the peace processes with Egypt and the Palestinians; the unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon, in 2000, and Gaza, in 2005; and the failed Lavi fighter jet project, an ambitious attempt to build an indigenous warplane with U.S. funding, which was canceled in 1987. -- Aluf Benn * Foreign Affairs *Freilich's book, which furnishes a unique glimpse into the Israeli national security decision-making process, is sure to become the 'go to' work on the subject. It is a must read for anyone interested in how and why Israeli governments have made—and continue to make—the national security decisions that they do. -- David Rodman * Israel Affairs *How often is a reviewer assigned a book he or she can confidently predict will become not only an indispensable reference work but the essential reference point for future research on a given subject? Zion's Dilemmas is one such instance, and its author is to be congratulated for his outstanding scholarly contribution to the field of contemporary Israel studies writ large, and more specifically to the analysis of the country’s internal policymaking processes and status as a highly controversial yet formidable Middle Eastern and global state actor. * Israeli Journal of Foreign Affairs *The author... presents a very informative account of how Israel formulates its national security policy.... The book also presents an in-depth analysis of the DMP in several major case studies in Israel's national security history. -- Efraim Inbar * Political Science Quarterly *This volume is by one of the foremost analysts of Israel's national security policy (NSP).... It analyzes seven case studies dealing with NSP toward the Palestinians, Gaza, and Lebanon, and the building of the Lavi jet fighter.... Freilich argues that it is imperative for Israel to correct its NSP failures in order to meet expected strong challenges in the future. Those interested in Israel's NSP and its foreign policies will benefit greatly from this study.... Summing Up: Highly recommended. * Choice *Table of ContentsIntroductionPart I. The Setting1. Constraints and Players: The External Environment, Proportional Representation System, and National Security Establishment Israel's National Security Environment The Proportional Representation System The National Security Establishment2. The Decision-Making Process: How the System Actually Works Pathology 1: An Unplanned Process Pathology 2: A Highly Politicized Process Pathology 3: Semi-organized Anarchy; or, Is Anyone at the Helm? Pathology 4: An Uninstitutionalized Process Pathology 5: Primacy of the Defense Establishment Something Must Be Good: Strengths of the Israeli SystemPart II. The Case Studies3. Camp David I: Making Peace with Egypt, 1977–19794. The Makings of a Young Lion: The Lavi Combat Aircraft, 1980–19875. The Invasion of Lebanon, 19826. Leaving Lebanon: The Unilateral Withdrawal, 20007. Camp David II: The Israeli- Palestinian Negotiations, 1999–20008. Disengaging from Gaza, 20059. Back Again: The Second Lebanon War, 2006Part III. Final ThoughtsConclusions and Recommendations The Case Studies in Comparative Perspective Key Findings Past Attempts at Reform Failings Tolerable No Longer Future ReformsAppendix 1: The INSC Law, 2008 Appendix 2: Recommendations of the Winograd Commission and the Shahak CommitteeList of Interviews Notes Bibliography Index

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Book SynopsisJack Snyder''s analysis of the attitudes of military planners in the years prior to the Great War offers new insight into the tragic miscalculations of that era and into their possible parallels in present-day war planning. By 1914, the European military powers had adopted offensive military strategies even though there was considerable evidence to support the notion that much greater advantage lay with defensive strategies. The author argues that organizational biases inherent in military strategists'' attitudes make war more likely by encouraging offensive postures even when the motive is self-defense.Drawing on new historical evidence of the specific circumstances surrounding French, German, and Russian strategic policy, Snyder demonstrates that it is not only rational analysis that determines strategic doctrine, but also the attitudes of military planners. Snyder argues that the use of rational calculation often falls victim to the pursuit of organizational interests suchTrade ReviewOne of the best comparative surveys of the war plans and strategic thinking of the General Staffs from the Franco-Prussian War to 1914.... An ambitious and interesting book both in its historical scope and in its theoretical implications for military decision making. * Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science *Snyder has made a significant contribution to strategic thought. * Military Review *This is a penetrating account, filled with valuable theoretical insights, of the military planning in France, Germany, and Russia on the eve of the First World War. Using the analytical approach of controlled comparison, Jack Snyder examines the role of doctrinal and organizational biases in military decision making and operational planning.... Snyder is superb in detailing Russian war planning in this era, providing the best account in English on this topic. * Orbis *

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Book SynopsisSeveral hundred thousand members of the Red Army were stationed in East Germany when that state was reunited with its western counterpart. The peaceful transfer of these soldiers to their homeland produced a welcome outcome to a potentially explosive situation. Through an investigation of the strategies of German and Russian decision-makers, Celeste A. Wallander explores what conditions facilitate or hinder international cooperation in security matters.Wallander spent the months and years after the fall of the Berlin Wall interviewing officials and politicians from Germany and Russia. She reveals how these individuals assessed and responded to potential flashpoints: the withdrawal of Russian military forces from Germany, the implementation of arms control treaties, the management of ethnic and regional conflicts. She also examines the two states'' views on the enlargement of NATO.The first detailed account from both countries'' perspectives of the extraordinary contracTrade ReviewCeleste Wallander has written an excellent book, one that will appeal to Europeanists, post-Soviet scholars, and especially theorists of international relations... The issue is no longer whether institutions matter (we know they do) but how they have effects. Do they constrain state strategies or constitute core state properties? Wallander's book should be a model for both rationalists and constructivists as they debate these issues in the years ahead. -- Jeffrey T. Checkel, Universitetet i Oslo * American Political Science Review *Recommended for international and security relations collections in larger public and academic libraries. * Library Journal *Relying mainly on interviews with senior politicians and foreign and defense officials in Germany and Russia, Wallander also takes advantage of the opportunity to assemble the public record of the range of issues in German-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War. The reader will find concise, informative presentations of the following: withdrawal of Russian forces from the former East Germany, renegotiation of the CFE to accommodate Russian demands for larger forces in the troubled North Caucasus, Russia's relations with other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, problems of migration with other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, problems of migration into both countries, NATO enlargement, international aspects of Russian economic and financial reform, and (all too briefly) Russian and German policy toward the breakup of Yugoslavia....Wallander has written a fine book. -- Richard Anderson * Slavic Review *

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Book SynopsisBarry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy-that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security. Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent characteristics, its integration of military resources with political aims, and the degree of military or operational innovation it contains. He then examines these components of doctrine from the perspectives of organization theory and balance of power theory, taking into account the influence of technology and geography.Looking at interwar France, Britain, and Germany, Posen challenges each theory to explain the German Blitzkrieg, the British air defense system, and the French Army''s defensive doctrine often associated with the Maginot Line. This rigorous comparative study, in which the balance of power theory emerges as the more useful, not only allows usTrade ReviewThis is a scholarly and conceptually ambitious work which seeks to explain how military doctrine takes place and its role in 'grand strategy.' The core of the study examines military doctrines in the interwar period, discussing the German blitzkrieg and British air defense system as successes, and the French army's Maginot Line doctrine as a great failure. Posen develops many intriguing ideas and theoretical insights, and debates those of his academic peers, in a rich volume that has to be studied as well as read. * Foreign Affairs *Table of ContentsPreface1. The Importance of Military Doctrine2. Explaining Military Doctrine3. The Battles of 19404. France5. Britain6. Germany7. ConclusionsNotesSelected BibliographyIndex

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Book SynopsisFoxholes and Color Lines challenges this view, revealing both the intense political conflict at the time and the strenuous opposition to racial integration within all branches of the armed forces.Trade ReviewA first-rate account of how, over a relatively brief period, America's military establishment transformed itself. Times Literary Supplement Wonderful... This book is invaluable as armed-forces history. -- Harold Jackson Baltimore Sun Well-written, thoughtful, and incisive... A fresh look at why the armed services took so long to implement a policy imposed upon them by their civilian leaders. -- Dale E. Wilson Journal of Military History Mershon and Schlossman... provide the most penetrating and thorough account to date of the policies and tensions associated with this metamorphosis. Publishers Weekly

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Book SynopsisCountries studied include Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Angola, the Republic of the Congo, Colombia, and Afghanistan.Trade ReviewRecommended. Choice 2006 Comprehensive and well-executed examination of the multiple dimensions-political, economic, ideational and historical-that come together to spark intra-state violence and impede its revolution. -- Lee J. M. Seymour Political Studies Review 2006 An important book... I can strongly recommend it. -- Ron Smith Economics of Peace and Security Journal 2007 The book maintains a high level of scholarship, addressing the audiences from virtually every field that attempts to understand human social dynamics. -- Muhammad M. Haque Journal of Third World Studies 2008 The anthology contributes to our understanding of why some violent internal conflicts are so enduring. -- Walter W. Hill International Journal on World Peace 2009

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Book SynopsisExamines the range of implications of shifting alignments in East Asia. This title assesses economic conditions and policies within individual East Asian states. It also examines the challenge of regional cooperation from the perspectives of local players. It analyzes the implications for foreign policy in the United States and in Asia.Trade ReviewA 'must' for any college-level collection strong in Asian politics. Midwest Book Review 2008 A worthwhile read for anyone interested in recent momentum towards regionalism in East Asia. Survival 2009 Aside from its inherent appeal to American policy wonks, the volume offers some interesting thoughts about the theory and practice of multilateralism in east Asia. -- Nicola P. Contessi International Journal 2009 East Asian Multilateralism provides a comprehensive analysis of the major challenges for the establishment of a multilateral regional order. In particular interest is the additional focus on policy recommendations (for the US diplomacy). -- Alfred Gerstl East Asia Integration Studies 2009 The volume is well-organised, readable, and remarkably jargon-free and benefits from a multinational set of contributors with considerable expertise in the region. -- Brian Bridges Asian Affairs Assembles an impressive crew of American and American-based policy experts on the subject. -- Simon Tay Pacific AffairsTable of ContentsAcknowledgementsList of AbbreviationsNotes on Foreign Names and TransliterationsIntroduction Part I: Beyond the Hub and SpokesChapter 1. Critical Junctures and the Contours of Northeast Asian RegionalismChapter 2. The History and Practice of Unilateralism in East AsiaChapter 3. The Outlook for Economic Integration in East AsiaChapter 4. The New Trade Bilateralism in East AsiaPart II: Country PerspectivesChapter 5. China's Evolving Multilateralism in Asia: The Aussenpolitik and Innenpolitik ExplanationsChapter 6. China and the Impracticality of Closed RegionalismChapter 7. Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian MultilateralismChapter 8. Korean Perspectives on East Asian RegionalismPart III: Policy ImplicationsChapter 9. A New Order in East Asia?Chapter 10. The Security Architecture in Asia and American Foreign PolicyConclusionContributors Index

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Book SynopsisHagenloh's vivid and monumental account is the first to show how Stalin's peculiar brand of policing-in which criminals, juvenile delinquents, and other marginalized population groups were seen increasingly as threats to the political and social order-supplied the core mechanism of the Great Terror.Trade ReviewThe near torrent of works attempting to reconstruct and rectify the historical record of the Stalin era continues, and this one is a worthy example. -- Robert Legvold Foreign Affairs 2009 Hagenloh has written an important book on Soviet policing between Stalin's rise to power and the advent of WW II. It is a fresh, fascinating study. Choice 2009 A very serious contribution to the field. -- Paul Monk Australian Literary Review 2009 Hagenloh's insightful and provocative examination of the Soviet police-civil ( militsiia) and security (political)-fills a glaring gap in our understanding of the Stalin era... Such a study is long overdue. -- William J. Chase Russian Review 2010 This is a book that transcends disciplinary boundaries and deserves to be widely read by scholars of criminal justice. -- Matthew Light Law and Politics Book Review 2010 This is an important book, a first-class example of the current scholarship emerging from the detailed use of opened Russian archives of the Stalin era and a fascinating analysis of its machinery of policing and control. -- Mark Galeotti Europe-Asia Studies 2010 This is an excellent book, and like all good books its assertions (and assertiveness) will spark controversy. -- J. Arch Getty Slavic Review 2010 An impressive study. -- Melanie Ilic Revolutionary Russia 2010 An impressively researched and analytically ambitious monograph on the history of Stalinist policing. -- David Priestland American Historical Review 2010 Hagenloh's sophisticated and well-researched work is valuable reading. -- Alexander Hill Journal of World History 2011Table of ContentsList of TablesAcknowledgmentsA Note on TranslationGlossaryIntroduction: Soviet Policing, Social Categories, and the Great Terror1. Prerevolutionary Policing, Revolutionary Events, and the New Economic Policy2. "Chekist in Essence, Chekist in Spirit": The Soviet Police and the Stalin Revolution3. The New Order, 1932–19344. The Police and the "Victory of Socialism," 1934–19365. The Stalinist Police6. Nikolai Ezhov and the Mass Operations, 1937–19387. Policing after the Mass Operations, 1938–1941ConclusionA Note on SourcesNotesBibliographyIndex

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Book Synopsismilitary policy from the end of the Cold War through the beginning of the Obama presidency provides a clear picture of why the United States is militarily powerful but otherwise insecure.Trade ReviewA provocative thesis, with impressive statistics, charts, and numbers in support and a narrative accessible to the intelligent, informed lay reader. Choice 2010 This volume is an important contribution to a growing literature on the dysfunctional nature of national-security politics in the United States. Survival 2010Table of ContentsList of FiguresPreface1. Irrational Security2. After the Cold War: From Buildup to Bottom-Up3. What Comes Down Must Go Up: Clinton and the Politics of Military Spending4. From Ambition to Empire: Bush and Military Policy before and after 9/115. Hidden in Plain Sight: The Bush Military Buildup6. Paying the Price: From Bush to ObamaNotesIndex

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Book SynopsisThis book examines the various mechanisms through which violent conflict undermines the health and well-being of populations.Trade Review"Zaryab Iqbal provides ample empirical data to illustrate these facts and to elucidate the mechanisms by which armed conflicts affect the health of individuals."—John L. Zeller, Journal of the American Medical Association "War and the Health of Nations makes an important contribution to the literature on human security, a concept that has a great deal of appeal but lacks strong empirical underpinnings. This work helps fill that gap by examining the links between health and violent conflict - or between 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear'."—Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Professor of International Affairs,The New School"For far too long we have known far too little about the aftereffects of political violence. To date, researchers have been justifiably focused on the determinants and dynamics of large-scale conflict. Zaryab Iqbal helps inaugurate a new focus regarding the outcomes of conflict (broadly conceived) on health (also broadly conceived). War and the Health of Nations immediately contributes to our understanding of the topic as well as maps out a new direction for conflict studies, both theoretically as well as empirically. This book addresses one of the most crucial issues confronted by our age in a manner befitting the topic involved—seriously, rigorously, and elegantly."—Christian Davenport, Professor of Peace Studies and Political Science, University of Notre Dame"Social scientists are just starting to investigate the myriad ways in which armed conflict and war harms civilian populations. Combining careful theorizing with systematic cross-national empirical tests, Iqbal provides the most rigorous and comprehensive study to date of the direct and indirect negative consequences of war on public health. This book is of interest to a broad and diverse audience, including social scientists, public health experts, policy makers, and activists. If you want to better understand how human security is profoundly threatened by war, this book is a must-read."—Paul Huth, Professor & Co-Director of Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, and Editor, The Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Book SynopsisA comprehensive assessment of the multifaceted security challenges faced by the South Asian states by linking it to the weak state problem of the region.Trade Review"This timely book helps explain why South Asia suffers from such high levels of domestic and regional insecurity . . . South Asia's Weak States makes an admirable contribution. It diagnoses South Asia's problems through a strong set of conceptual and historical studies."—John Ciorciari, Perspectives on Politics"After being preoccupied with great powers for centuries, we are now attempting to come to grips with weak and failed states and their significance to regional politics. By providing a number of perspectives on weaker states in South Asia, this volume contributes to our improved understanding."—William R. Thompson, Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science, Indiana University"Most discussions of South Asia focus on the region's growing strength and promise. This volume performs a valuable service in tempering that optimism. It reminds us that, despite important advances, South Asia remains plagued by insecurity, from the state to the human level. In doing so, the volume makes a useful contribution to regional as well as to broader literatures, drawing lessons that can apply to weak states elsewhere in the world."—S. Paul Kapur, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School

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Book SynopsisThis book is a definitive, comparative review of the transformation gap between the US and the other members of NATO, and amongst the established and emerging European members.Trade Review"The scholarly research and descriptive analysis in this book are beyond reproach. The authors utilize important NATO and government source documents and top-tier scholarly journal articles and make effective use of interviews with top-level country officials in conducting their assessments. This insightful book is best read by senior European or U.S. military leaders and government officials, international relations or political science scholars, and anyone else interested in a detailed understanding of the dynamics shaping the military capabilities gap between the United States and its European NATO counterparts."—David A. Anderson, Military Review"[T]his is a valuable and substantive, if somewhat sobering stocktaking of the Alliance's progress towards military transformation."—Survival"Through a set of theoretically informed case studies of seven European countries, this volume provides new empirical insights into contemporary military transformation. It advances theory on how alliances influence transformation, and how diverse approaches to transformation impact coalition operations. Understanding the 'capability gap' between the United States and Europe—in technology, doctrine, concepts and organization—is critical for practitioners involved in current operations like Afghanistan and for those planning for the future."—Emily Goldman, United States Central Command"A Transformation Gap? represents a valuable and much needed contribution to the literature on military innovation and adaptation. The authors' exploration of NATO's transformation track record should be interest to scholar and practitioner alike."—Thomas G. Mahnken, Professor of Strategy, U.S. Naval War College"This is a must-read for politicians, military officers, and journalists on both sides of the Atlantic. This book explains and analyzes 'transformation' and its progress in NATO through six national case studies. It contains important insights for scholars, practitioners, and publics."—Grant T. Hammond, Dean, NATO Defense College

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Book SynopsisThis book examines America's evolving strategy on the international security environment, and comprehensively analyzes how different strategies position states to compete in the present and future, manage risk, and prevail despite uncertainty.Trade Review"Emily Goldman's study of grand strategy is a timely addition to the literature, one that will help both scholars and practitioners navigate the rocks and shoals as we sail through the fog of peace." -- Thomas G. Mahnken, Professor of Strategy * U.S. Naval War College *

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Book SynopsisTrade Review"This book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of state failure. The authors make new contributions to the literature in ways that are both innovative and have important policy implications. With their well thought-out analysis and discussion, they bring the key threads of the challenge of state failure together in one book."—Victor Asal, Rockefeller College, SUNY Albany"State failure is an incredibly important real world issue that has puzzled policymakers since the 1990s. This book pushes the empirical analysis of this problem forward, and is one of the best analyses of state failure currently available."—Cameron G. Thies, Arizona State UniversityTable of ContentsContents and Abstracts1Introduction chapter abstractThe first chapter introduces the book and provides an overview of its contents. In particular, it outlines the book's general argument: that state failure is associated with a range of factors pertaining to domestic politics as well as international influences, and that it is a phenomenon that is tremendously important to global security in the current international system. This chapter situates the book amid the burgeoning literature on the importance of domestic political and social phenomena for international relations and foreign policy. 2State Failure: Conceptualization and Definition chapter abstractThis chapter addresses definitional and conceptual issues in the study of state failure, and clarifies the concept for the purposes of the analyses in the book. There is confusion over the exact meaning and nature of state failure in much of the extant literature, due to weaknesses in conceptualization and measurement. The lack of definitional clarity, in turn, has lead to problems in research design, and consequently in the meaning of the findings generated by that research. This chapter reviews various measures of state failure used in academic and policy literatures, outlines the problems of conceptualization and measurement in the study of state collapse, and introduces a definition and measure that solves these problems. The working definition of state failure used in this book focuses on the complete collapse of state authority, which helps distinguish collapsed states from states that are unstable, weak, or fragile. 3Why do States Collapse?: Determinants of State Failure chapter abstractChapter three sets forth the book's theoretical framework regarding the causes of state failure, and empirically analyzes the social, political, and institutional correlates of state collapse since 1946. State failure is determined by key social and political factors both at the domestic and international level. Specifically, this analysis focuses on the influence of the type of governing institutions, states' involvement in civil and international armed conflict, various levels of domestic political turmoil, and economic development on the likelihood of state failure. The findings reveal that the risk of state failure is closely associated with armed conflict, domestic strife, and national income. 4The Duration of State Failure chapter abstractThis chapter assesses the determinants of the length of time for which states remain failed after experiencing a collapse of their central government. While a majority of failed states during the time period under study recovered from collapse within a year, some remained in a state of failure for five or six years, and a few were unable to reinstate governing institutions for up to fifteen years. In addition to the correlates included in the model of the determinants of state failure in Chapter Three, this analysis also examines the effect of the nature of pre-failure governing institutions in evaluating the duration of state failure. 5Recurrent Collapse and its Causes chapter abstractChapter Five examines the question of why some states that fail achieve a lasting recovery, while others experience a recurrence of failure, and focuses on four specific cases of recurrent state failure: Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and the Ivory Coast. A series of four comparative case studies is conducted, comparing each of these four states to similar states that experience only a single failure during the same time period. This comparison adopts a similar-systems approach, comparing states that are most similar to each other on a number of relevant dimensions. The motivation behind this choice of research design is that if similar states were able to avoid recurrent collapse, why did these four states fall prey to a second collapse? The use of comparative case analyses in this chapter complements the systematic quantitative analyses of earlier chapters. 6The Consequences of State Failure chapter abstractThis chapter assesses the negative effects of state collapse, with particular attention to the spatial diffusion of those consequences. The instability, unrest, and civil war that increase the hazard of state collapse are not limited to the failed/collapsed state; states neighboring – or located within close distance of – a failed state are also likely to experience subsequently higher levels of political instability, unrest, civil war and interstate war. This analysis also evaluates the likelihood of state failure itself diffusing to other states. The findings indicate that the more "minor" possible consequences of state failure – political unrest and instability — spread to a lesser degree than more intense forms of violence – civil and interstate war. At the same time, state failure itself does not seem to be regionally contagious. 7State Failure: Prevention and Management chapter abstractThis penultimate chapter discusses the policy implications of the book's analyses, both in terms of preventing state failure and as they relate to the management and recovery of collapsed states. The findings of these analyses are used to survey the set of policy recommendations extant in the scholarly and policy literatures, and to propose the most promising avenues of policy choice and implementation –especially in mitigating diffusion effects and in directing attention to those states with the greatest hazard of collapse. 8Conclusion chapter abstractThis concluding chapter revisits the importance of studying state failure and the place of this subject in international politics and security studies. We also identify key directions for future research on state failure. It offers some final words on the significance of appropriate definition and measurement in the study of state failure, the key role of intervention in preventing and managing state collapse, and importance of the forces of globalization in understanding state failure.

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Book SynopsisTrade Review"Patricia Weitsman's book does for 21st century alliances what Glenn Snyder did for alliance politics 20 years ago: it develops a nuanced argument about how international institutions in the form of alliances and coalitions add to and constrain states' power. It will become required reading in classes at the upper division and graduate levels dealing with International Security and/or US Foreign Policy." -- Stephen M. Saideman, Paterson Chair in International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs"Most modern wars are fought by coalitions, but we know remarkably little about the structures that have been put in place. By highlighting the tension between legitimacy and efficiency, examining several cases, developing a theory of realist institutionalism, and analyzing the implications for the American foreign policy, Weitsman has made a major contribution." -- Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics * Columbia University *"[Waging War] deserves careful and critical consideration . . . Weitsman's model makes sense. Her thinking regarding cohesion (in that it is related directly to interests rather than alliance institutions) warrants careful consideration." -- Col. Gregory Fontenot"Waging War is an important examination of the manner in which the United States has managed its war-fighting alliances and coalitions in the post-Cold War era. Patricia Weitsman argues convincingly that America's alliances, its ability to assemble coalitions of the willing, and its institutions and capacity for projecting power overseas—provided they are nurtured and carefully managed—are likely to keep it in a hegemonic position for some time to come, regardless of the increasing economic prowess of a rising China. Her examination of alliance and coalition decision-making structures, interoperability, burden-sharing, cohesion, effectiveness, costs, and legitimacy provide a wealth of lessons for U.S. policy makers navigating the treacherous national security shoals of the 21st century." -- Peter R. Mansoor * Author of Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War *"This manuscript is an important piece of scholarship that effectively argues that institutional arrangements significantly influence a state's ability to efficiently use its military power. This argument is unique in the realist and institutional literature. The theoretical arguments outlined in this book provide an important analysis tool for the IR scholar or practitioner; there is no direct competitor!" -- Daniel Baltrusaitis, Permanent Professor * National Defense College of the United Arab Emirates *"In articulating a new realist institutionalism approach, Weitsman contends that institutions are a key vehicle for countries to influence the behavior of other countries and in turn augment their national power . . . Recommended." -- A. G. Reiter * CHOICE *

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Book SynopsisTrade Review"America's post-9/11 counterinsurgencies highlight changes in the ways the nation initiates and conducts the kinds of conflicts that will challenges us through the 21st century. This excellent volume provides rich cross-disciplinary and cross-national perspectives that should influence and shape our understanding of these processes in terms of both policy and scholarship." -- David R. Segal, Director, Center for Research on Military Organization * University of Maryland *"Western societies and their governments have clearly been jolted by the feeble outcomes of two costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. To learn from both political and sociological perspectives why and how this chastening has changed Western ways of war, this is the volume to study and to teach. On this topic James Burk and his international colleagues are in a league by themselves, and this book shows why." -- Don M. Snider, Professor Emeritus * West Point *"This tightly edited work focuses on how the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, transformed subsequent Western decisions to go to war, how to fight, and how to mobilize . . . The contributors have solid credentials and include a mix of European and U.S. experts, which enriches the consideration of how 9/11 and its aftermath affects the West as a whole. A fluid style and solid argumentation throughout enhance the accessibility of the book for upper-level undergraduates as well as graduate students and professionals. Reliance on both political and sociological perspectives adds to the cross-disciplinary attractiveness of the book, as does attention to both normative and instrumental perspectives . . . Highly recommended." -- M.A. Morris * CHOICE *"How 9/11 Changed Our Ways of War is a fascinating question to which this collection of essays by International Relations scholars from both sides of the Atlantic provides a diverse and thought-provoking range of answers . . . This is a wise and thoughtful book which deserves to be read widely.—David Fisher, International Affairs"How 9/11 Changed Our Ways of War is a provocative and timely contribution to the debate about the use of force since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This thoughtful volume should spark a lively discussion and help set the terms of the debate." -- Elizabeth Kier * University of Washington *

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Book SynopsisTrade Review"Jasen Castillo's Endurance and War is a must-read for the entire national security community. Masterfully summarizing and critiquing extant explanations of military effectiveness, Castillo offers his own novel and elegant theory that makes sense of different patterns of military effectiveness using factors such as the nature of the regime and the level of autonomy of the military. His elegant theoretical framework for understanding military effectiveness will be well-received by scholars and will also find a substantial audience among policy-makers as well." -- Michael C. Desch, Chair, Department of Political Science, and Co-director, Notre Dame International Security Program * University of Notre Dame *"[This] well-written book provides . . . a new and compelling template through which to examine military effectiveness . . . [A] valuable tool for conducting in-depth analysis of adversary forces, or of one's own military forces. His book is exceptionally readable . . . It is highly recommended for both specialists in the field of military history as well as the general reader." -- Jeffrey M. Shaw * Journal of Military History *"Why do national militaries differ in their ability to fight with determination and with flexibility on the battlefield while enduring difficult strategic circumstances? Castillo proposes 'cohesion theory' as a way to answer that question; he then tests its application in seven comparable case studies drawn from various participants in WWII and the Vietnam conflict . . . Castillo then applies the theory to recent U.S. national security operations in Afghanistan and projects policy options against potential future foes such as Iran and North Korea. The work belongs in academic libraries with significant holdings in national security studies . . . Summing Up: Recommended" -- J. A. Rhodes * CHOICE *"Endurance and War is an important and innovative contribution to our understanding of military effectiveness. Jasen Castillo bucks popular views that attribute military cohesion to small-group ties or democracy, explaining instead that cohesion depends on the ability of governments to inculcate and enforce norms of absolute loyalty in society and governments' willingness to allow the military to develop strong internal bonds. Castillo persuasively argues that certain non-democratic states are likely to field the most cohesive militaries, whereas democracies face significant disadvantages in maintaining cohesion, particularly in protracted wars. Castillo's provocative arguments merit the attention of scholars and policymakers alike." -- Alexander B. Downes, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs * The George Washington University *"Castillo's theoretical framework is convincing and parsimonious. His five case studies—Germany, 1944–45; France, 1940; the Soviet Union, 1941; North Vietnam, 1965–73, and the United States, 1968–72—are meticulously researched. His argument can serve policy-makers as they assess the state of a nation's armed forces and battlefield potential, as well as that of militaries of friends and foes alike. And while Castillo's case studies are restricted to the armed forces, the overall logic of his argument can just as well be applied to other groups, for instance, terrorist organizations. Endurance and War is well written, relevant, and highly readable." * Hicham Bou Nassif,Perspectives on Politics *"Jasen Castillo has written—if not the last word on military cohesion—then an excellent book on a critically important but much neglected subject. The military effectiveness literature has been remarkably unbalanced in its focus on skill over will. Hopefully Endurance and War will begin the re-balancing of this literature. There is no doubt that every work on cohesion that follows will have to reckon with its powerful and persuasive arguments." -- Alexander B. Downes * H-Diplo roundtable *"Jasen Castillo's Endurance and War is a systematic effort to explore and explain this variation. He does so by combining a relatively parsimonious theory (based on a variety of existing literatures) with extensive empirical research. The result is illuminating and engaging." -- Austin Long * H-Diplo roundtable *"This book examines the puzzle of why some armies fight hard until the bitter end while others do not. Evaluating the expected wartime performance and endurance of an enemy's military remains a relevant task for policymakers and military planners assessing the likely outcome of war. Jasen Castillo does both groups a service with this well-written and accessible book presenting a theory of military cohesion." -- Phil Huan * H-Diplo roundtable *

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Book SynopsisTrade Review"This book provides a very fresh approach to the ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The detailed analysis on the organizational aspects of the Iraqi insurgency offers valuable insights not only for ongoing armed movements, but also for broader issues surrounding violent groups." -- Lawrence E. Cline, Center for Civil Military Relations * the Naval Postgraduate School *"Experts on armed violence have noted the growing significance of network-organized insurgencies for some time, but until Chad Serena's important new book there was no comprehensive analysis of them integrating organizational theory and empirical research. His book is a path-breaking work that should be read by both scholars and practitioners." -- Steven Metz * US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute *"Chad Serena's book makes a major contribution to our understanding of the nuts and bolts of the Iraqi insurgency, at a time when the United States is actually encountering remnants of that insurgency in the form of ISIS. He pulls back the veil on the insurgency movement with the most systematic and methodologically clear treatment to date." -- Ross Harrison * Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly *"This is a powerful and important book that offers an original and compelling interpretation of why the Iraqi insurgency failed but the Afghan insurgency has proven more resilient. The author finds the answer in the relative capacity of the two insurgencies to adapt to U.S. counter-insurgency strategy and tactics. Serena brilliantly explains how the initial strengths of the Iraqi insurgency subsequently became weaknesses that the US was able to exploit and how this has not happened in Afghanistan. The analysis is subtle and sophisticated, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses, paradoxes and contradictions, and dilemmas and tradeoffs that characterize network organizations. Overall this is a major contribution to the understanding of networked armed groups and how governments can neutralize them. Should be compulsory reading for scholars, military planners, and policy-makers." -- Phil Williams, Posvar Chair and Director of the Ridgway Center * University of Pittsburgh *"Does it take a network to defeat a network? This detailed case study of the insurgency in Iraq (and its comparison to Afghanistan) by Serena shows the reality is more complex. . . . This study, with a deep understanding of organizational theory and the practice of two major insurgencies, is both subtle and useful . . . Recommended." -- D. McIntosh * CHOICE *"Serena employs a blend of technical analysis, in his assessment of the inner workings of complex covert networks, and empirical examples, which he draws from the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. This approach is successful in providing insight into the nature of the organizational adaptation of the Iraqi insurgency as well as in laying a framework for the future study of similarly organized martial groups . . . Serena's technical descriptions of organizational inputs and outputs in the early chapters is insightful and provides an academic audience with a foundation for future study of covert martial networks similar to the Iraqi insurgency . . . It Takes More than a Network is a convincingly argued and well-written book that provides a good deal of insight into the essential functions and adaptive capability of martially oriented covert networks." -- Danny Garrett-Rempel * Journal of Military and Strategic Studies *"He meticulously breaks down the insurgency into its constituent elements in accordance with the theory—examining the inputs and outputs of an organization, its networked structures, ability to adapt and learn on the fly and other critical variables . . .The book is an interesting and conscientious attempt to apply network theory to a complex social and political phenomenon . . . [It] is a welcome addition to the literature on insurgency and most particularly on American's experiences during its irregular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a book for policy professionals, academics, and military officers alike in this issue area." -- Noa Milman * Middle East Journal *

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Book SynopsisThis book recounts and analyzes the history of one of the best-kept diplomatic and security secrets of the last half-century-the Open Skies Treaty: a treaty that allows the U.S., the Russian Federation, and over 30 other signatories to fly unarmed reconnaissance aircraft over one another's territory. First proposed by President Eisenhower in 1955, shelved by succeeding administrations, re-launched by President George H. W. Bush in 1989, and finally ratified in 2002, the Treaty has been one of the most important security instruments of the 21st century-with over 1,000 flights logged to date providing confidence for the governments, intelligence communities, and militaries of former and potential adversaries. Written by a professor and former diplomat who was deeply involved in the negotiations of the Open Skies Treaty from 1989 to 1995, this book is a meticulous work of political history that explores how Open Skies affected, and was affected by, the extraordinary times of its negotiaTrade Review"Open Skies will be of great value to anyone who deals with negotiations or agreements of an international nature. Author Peter Jones does an excellent job of supplying in-depth details and analyses of the two-year process of developing and ratifying the treat. At the same time, he fairly explains the contrasting viewpoints of the significant parties and how they were eventually overcome or resolved."—John S. Meiter, Air Force Research Institute"Peter Jones, an eminent political scientist and former Canadian Arms Control Negotiator, has written an absorbing book of scholarship covering the history of Open Skies from the time it was first proposed by President Eisenhower in 1955 to the present day . . . [T]he account is well written and comparatively easy to follow. The chronological structure, with wide-ranging notes and a good index, leads both experts and the less-informed comfortably through to the end."—Geoffrey Oxlee, Aerospace Magazine"In his Open Skies: Transparency, Confidence-Building, and the End of the Cold War, Peter Jones, a Canadian political scientist and former arms-control negotiator, takes a detailed look at the 1990–92 Open Skies negotiation. The result is an extremely well-researched and accurate book—a must-read for anyone who would like to know more about the sometimes fascinating technicalities of arms-control negotiation. "—Survival"Open Skies is a crash course on negotiations that de-mystifies the process and equips rookies and veterans alike to be much more effective negotiators. Every person assigned to a Geneva, Vienna, or New York delegation ought to read this book before reporting for their first day on the job. The book is so readable and the analysis so well done that it can be assigned for students at any level, allowing them walk a mile, indeed many miles, in Jones' uncomfortable shoes."—Amy E. Smithson, Senior Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies"The Open Skies Treaty deserves more attention given that it has played a significant role in the past and can be even more vital in the future. In this important book, Peter Jones provides a great service by offering just what is needed to place the Treaty in historical context and to highlight the potential future role for aerial monitoring."—George P. Shultz, Distinguished Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University and Former US Secretary of State"Open Skies is a meticulous account of one of the most complex multilateral arms control treaties ever negotiated. Dr. Jones skillfully describes the evolution of the Open Skies Treaty from its inception, highlighting the delicate interaction of the disparate stakeholders: diplomats, scientists, and military. An insightful and unique look into the negotiating dynamics at the end of the Cold War."—Diana Marvin, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State"The book offers a fascinating behind-the-scenes story of a NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiation just at the moment when the Soviet Union was coming apart. The bureaucratic players in both Moscow and Washington seemed unable or unwilling to recognize and act on the new set of facts, while their political masters were. As such, this book provides an invaluable case study in the linkage between national leaders and their experts; new insights into a turning point in history; a riveting portrait of multilateral diplomacy; and a suspenseful tale of how professionals interacted as the ground beneath their feet collapsed."—James Goodby, Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution"Peter Jones's Open Skies: Transparency, Confidence-Building, and the End of the Cold War explores what is perhaps an underappreciated legacy of the Cold War: that the United States, Russia, and thirty-two other nations may fly over each other's territory to conduct reconnaissance thanks to the Open Skies Treaty, which was negotiated between 1989 and 1992....Those interested in this particular period in Cold War history as well as diplomatic historians seeking to understand the challenges of conflict resolution will find a largely nuanced and complex account that has continued relevance given the heightened tensions between the two nations."—Heather P. Venable, H-War, H-Net Reviews

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Book SynopsisDefense establishments and the armed forces they organize, train, equip, and deploy depend upon the security of capital and capital flows, mechanisms that have become increasingly globalized. Military capabilities are thus closely tied not only to the size of the economic base from which they are drawn, but also to the viability of global convertibility and exchange arrangements. Although the general public has a stake in these economic matters, the interests and interpretive understandings held by policy elites matter mostin particular those among the owners or managers of capital who focus on international finance and the international monetary regimes that sustain global commerce and their capital positions. In The Dollar and National Security, Paul Viotti explores the links between global capital flows, these policy elites, and national security. After establishing the historical link between currency, gold, and security, he continues the monetary-security story by examining the inTrade Review"Recommended." -- M. H. Lesser * CHOICE *"[Paul Viotti] writes an insightful book detailing the historical role and importance of the monetary component, of the economic instrument, and of national power in providing for national security . . . The book is unique in its subject matter and scholarship. It is superbly researched, persuasive, and thought-provoking." -- David A. Anderson * Military Review *"Paul Viotti has written a book that integrates economics of international money with the politics masterfully. His grasp of both theory and empirical details will make his readers aware of the complexities of the global monetary systems. The analysis leads to a powerful case for global cooperation in monetary matters and the challenges that must be overcome." -- Haider A. Khan, Professor of Economics, University of Denver, and former Senior Adviser * UNCTAD *"Given the limits of military power alone, this study by a noted scholar of the impact of international monetary policy on security deserves close attention. Prof. Viotti understands these issues deeply and explains them clearly for the benefit of non-specialists. His book is theoretically well-grounded and extensively documented for those wishing to go into greater depth. Highly recommended." -- John Allen Williams, Professor of Political Science * Loyola University Chicago *"Former Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, has stated, 'The most significant threat to our national security is our [national] debt.' In The Dollar and National Security: The Monetary Component of Hard Power Professor Paul Viotti responds to Admiral Mullen's observation by focusing on the nexus of economic and military power, a topic that has not received as much attention as it deserves in today's increasingly globalized world. I highly recommend this book by a respected, accomplished author and teacher for both undergraduate and graduate students." -- Dan Caldwell, Distinguished Professor * Pepperdine University *

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Book SynopsisPowerful countries like the United States regularly employ economic sanctions as a tool for promoting their foreign policy interests. Yet this foreign policy tool has an uninspiring track record of success, with economic sanctions achieving their goals less than a third of the time they are imposed. The costs of these failed sanctions policies can be significant for the states that impose them, their targets, and the other countries they affect. Explaining economic sanctions' high failure rate therefore constitutes a vital endeavor for academics and policy-makers alike. Busted Sanctions seeks to provide this explanation, and reveals that the primary cause of this failure is third-party spoilers, or sanctions busters, who undercut sanctioning efforts by providing their targets with extensive foreign aid or sanctions-busting trade. In quantitatively and qualitatively analyzing over 60 years of U.S. economic sanctions, Bryan Early reveals that both types of third-party sanctions busterTrade Review"Understanding the reasons why firms 'bust' sanctions is an important part of discerning why sanctions frequently fail. Backed up by solid empirical modeling and compelling case studies, the research presented in Busted Sanctions goes a long way toward helping us grasp both the causes and consequences of sanction busting." -- David Lektzian, Associate Professor of Political Science * Texas Tech University *"This work is truly novel. Bryan Early is the first scholar to address sanction busting in a rigorous, systematic fashion—by analyzing what motivates states to engage in sanction busting, what measures they use, what the consequences of that busting are and, ultimately, what can be done to counteract them." -- A. Cooper Drury, Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science * University of Missouri *"[R]ecent history shows that US policy makers often choose to use economic sanctions against adversaries, despite ample evidence pointing to their ineffectiveness. In this book, Early seeks to explain reasons for the frequent and porlonged use of sanctions and to identify the factors limiting their effectiveness . . . Recommended." -- E. L. Whalen"[I]t would be a grave mistake to take this thoughtful, penetrating, and supple book just as an argument against using sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. It is in fact a primer filled with hard facts and harder lessons from past efforts - and mistakes - designed to show how this process can actually become more effective and productive of the intended result." -- Martin Rubin"This volume provides a valuable contribution to the literature on economic sanctions and will be of considerable interest to scholars and practitioners in international trade policy, international political economy, and international relations." -- Anton D. Lowenberg * Journal of Economic Literature *Table of ContentsContents and Abstracts1Introduction: Why Busted Sanctions Lead to Broken Sanctions Policies chapter abstractThis chapter offers an overview of why U.S. policy makers employ economic sanctions, the wide range of adverse effects that sanctions have, and the poor track record of success that sanctions have had. It explains how economic sanctions affect their targets and incentivize different types of responses from third-party states that vary from cooperating with them to actively undermining them. The chapter then summarizes the theory of sanctions busting, explaining why extensive sanctions busters emerge and how their sanctions-busting aid and trade impact the effectiveness of sanctioning efforts. The chapter then discusses the mixed-method research design that will be used to evaluate the theory of sanctions busting and describes the book's findings in brief. 2What Are Sanctions Busters? chapter abstractThis chapter explains how economic sanctions incentivize their targets to try to forge extensive commercial ties with small numbers of third-party states and to seek out the patronage of benefactors willing to provide them with extensive aid packages. It describes the role that sanctions busters can play in undermining sanctioning efforts via their aid and trade and explains why past approaches have been unable to systematically account for these effects. The chapter draws on the South African and North Korean sanctions episodes to illustrate the motives that appear to drive aid-based versus traded-based sanctions busting and presents distinct profiles for the types of states most likely to become aid-based sanctions busters and trade-based sanctions busters. 3Assessing the Consequences of Sanctions Busting chapter abstractThis chapter develops the theory of sanctions busting's explanation of how trade-based sanctions busters and target states' foreign aid flows influence the outcomes of sanctions episodes. It is hypothesized that sanctions imposed against states that have the support of trade-based sanctions busters are less likely to be successful. It is also hypothesized that target states' sensitivity to changes in their foreign aid flows means that sanctions will be less successful against states experiencing gains in their foreign aid flows and more successful against states experiencing declines in their foreign aid flows. These hypotheses are evaluated via a statistical analysis of ninety-six episodes of U.S.-imposed economic sanctions from 1950 through 2002. The results offer strong support for the hypotheses, indicating that trade-based sanctions busters and foreign aid flows each exert separate, potent effects on sanctions outcomes. 4For Profits or Politics? Why Third Parties Sanctions-Bust via Trade and Aid chapter abstractThis chapter develops the theory of sanctions busting's explanation for why third-party states become aid-based sanctions busters or trade-based sanctions busters in a given sanctions episode. It explains that trade-based sanctions busting is driven primarily by the commercial interests of third-party states to exploit the lucrative trading opportunities created by sanctions, whereas aid-based sanctions-busting is primarily motivated by third-party governments' political interests in preventing the sanctions against a target from succeeding. It is argued that third-party governments will prefer to employ trade-based sanctions busting if that option is feasible because that approach is profitable instead of costly. The chapter poses a suite of hypotheses to test the theory's predictions concerning which states will engage in aid-based and trade-based sanctions busting. 5Sanctions Busting for Profits: How the United Arab Emirates Busted the U.S. Sanctions against Iran chapter abstractThis chapter examines how and why trade-based sanctions-busting relationships are fostered. It evaluates the trade-based sanctions-busting relationship that formed between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran after the United States sanctioned Iran in 1979. The chapter examines the formation and evolution of the sanctions-busting relationship during the period that preceded the military alliance the UAE formed with the United States (1979–1994) and period that followed the creation of their alliance (1995–2005). The analysis reveals insights into how the emirate of Dubai emerged as the leading venue for conducting sanctions-busting trade with Iran. The chapter also illustrates how even American firms used Dubai to circumvent the U.S. government's sanctions. Its postscript analyzes how recent changes in U.S. sanctions policies (2006–2013) have finally begun to succeed in curbing the sanctions busting taking place on Iran's behalf in the UAE and other countries. 6Assessing Which Third-Party States Become Trade-Based Sanctions Busters chapter abstractThis chapter conducts a statistical analysis of the factors associated with trade-based sanctions busting. It tests whether the hypothesized factors affecting trade profitability influence which third-party states become trade-based sanctions busters. It reexamines the same ninety-six episodes of U.S.-imposed sanctions evaluated in Chapter 3 but this time looks at which third-party states sanctions-busted on behalf of the target states. The results offer strong support for the sanctions-busting theory's hypotheses, indicating that cross-national differences in the factors affecting the profitability of trading with sanctioned states largely determine which third-party states become trade-based sanctions busters. The results indicate that countries with large, open economies that are proximate to and have preexisting commercial ties with target states are significantly more likely to engage in trade-based sanctions busting, as are countries allied with the United States and/or the target state. 7Sanctions Busting for Politics: Analyzing Cuba's Aid-Based Sanctions Busters chapter abstractThis chapter examines the role that aid-based sanctions busting has played in sustaining Cuba since the United States first sanctioned it in 1960 and why several countries have offered Cuba their patronage. It analyzes whether the aid-based sanctions-busting support that China and the Soviet Union offered to Cuba during the Cold War and that China and Venezuela offered it following the Cold War's conclusion were consistent with the sanctions-busting theory's hypothesized conditions. The evidence from these cases generally offers support for the theory, but the analysis of China case reveals that third-party states can occasionally employ both aid-based and trade-based sanctions-busting strategies. The narrative also presents detailed insights into the diplomatic efforts undertaken by U.S. policy makers to discourage trade-based sanctions busting on Cuba's behalf and those undertaken by Fidel Castro to woo the support of aid-based sanctions busters. 8Implications and Conclusions chapter abstractThis chapter offers a summary analysis of the overarching findings of the book and explores their implications for policy makers and the broader study of economic statecraft. It summarizes the overarching threat that sanctions busting poses to the effectiveness of sanctioning efforts and offers a number of recommendations about how policy makers can best respond to them. It is argued that while sanctions busters will continue to represent an endemic challenge to sanctioning efforts, they pose problems that can be anticipated and, in some cases, mitigated if properly understood. The chapter concludes by examining how future research can build on the insights garnered from the book.

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Book SynopsisTrade Review"Why do U.S. efforts to coerce weak states work only half the time? Why does a particular form of coercion called coercive diplomacy fail two thirds of the time? Why do the weak resist in the face of overwhelming U.S. power? In this fine study, Phil Haun develops a novel theory of asymmetric coercion and answers these important questions." -- Robert Art, Herter Professor of International Relations * Brandeis University *Table of ContentsContents and Abstracts1Introduction chapter abstractThis chapter introduces the question of why the United States so often fails to coerce weak states. Coercion is defined as the threat of force or restricted use of force to convince a target to comply with a challenger's demands. In asymmetric interstate conflict a powerful challenger chooses between accommodation, brute force or coercion. The chapter includes a table and summary statistics for the thirty asymmetric crises between the United States and weak states since World War II. The chapter considers conventional non-rational and rational explanations for coercion failure and introduces an alternative explanation based on a weak state's survival concerns. The chapter concludes by reflecting on why the United States would knowingly make coercive demands that threaten survival and offers an explanation based on the desire to lower the diplomatic and political costs of going to war. 2A Theory of Asymmetric Interstate Coercion chapter abstractThis chapter develops a theory of asymmetric interstate coercion. A coercive strategy includes compellent or deterrent demands, punishment or denial threats, and costly signals. The determinants of coercion success are measured, coercive diplomacy is considered where the use of force is only threatened, and the relationship between economic sanctions and coercion is discussed. A model of asymmetric coercion is developed where demands, threats and costly signals are determined by the powerful challenger and in response the weak target chooses whether to resist or concede. In equilibrium, a coercive strategy should only be adopted when the target is expected to concede. The coercion range depicts the set of successful coercive demands for which the challenger prefers coercion to accommodation or brute force and the target prefers concession to resistance. The chapter concludes by discussing rational and non-rational explanations for why coercion might still fail. 3Survival and Coercion Failure chapter abstractThis chapter considers why powerful states issue high level demands of weak states. Given a high probability of victory a powerful challenger must expect high level concessions to prefer coercion to brute force. When demands threaten the sovereignty of the weak state, however, it is likely to resist. The unitary actor assumption for the weak state is relaxed to also consider the survival concerns of its regime and regime leadership. Rationally, a powerful challenger should not coerce when demands threaten a target's survival. However, when the costs of coercion are low and when there is uncertainty whether the target will concede then it may make sense to coerce while preparing for war. Also, if the external costs for adopting a brute force strategy are high, then first having the United Nations Security Council issue coercive resolutions may decrease the diplomatic and political costs for later going to war. 4The United States vs. Iraq: The Gulf and Iraq Wars chapter abstractThis chapter considers two crises between the United States and Iraq. In the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, the United States adopted coercive strategies which threatened the survival of Saddam's regime and the Iraqi state. These crises test the limits for what coercion can achieve and examine the tradeoffs between coercive and brute force strategies. In both crises, U.S. administrations chose coercive strategies they did not intend to have succeed in order to then implement the brute force strategies they preferred. These two crises thus provides insight into the key questions addressed by this book as to why the United States so often chooses coercion, why coercion so often fails as weak states resist, and, knowing this, why the U.S decision makers still prefer coercive strategies. 5The United States vs. Serbia: Bosnia and Kosovo chapter abstractThis chapter examines two crises of the US against the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia in 1992 and 1999, respectively. In both cases, coercive diplomacy failed but coercion ultimately succeeded. The first crisis arose over actions in the Bosnian Civil War from 1992 to 1995, whereby the United States finally coerced the Bosnian Serbs into accepting a peace agreement but could never compel them to give up territory until it had already been taken by force. The second crisis arose over Serbia's treatment of Kosovar Albanians and concluded when Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic finally conceded Kosovo after a 78-day NATO air campaign. He conceded, however, only when the expected economic costs to Serbia from the air campaign outweighed the political value of maintaining control of Kosovo. This crisis is a rigorous test of the survival hypothesis as Serbia eventually conceded homeland territory while it still retained the means to resist. 6The United States vs. Libya: El Dorado Canyon, Pan Am Flight 103, and WMD chapter abstractThis chapter considers three cases between the United States and Libya from 1981 until 2003. Libya's support of international terrorism triggered a crisis for the United States, culminating in the El Dorado Canyon air raid in April 1986. Coercion ultimately failed because of the mismatch between demands and threats as an isolated Reagan administration could not maintain the credible threat of force. The second case commenced with the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988. It concluded with the extradition of two Libyan officials in 1999 to stand trial at The Hague. Another crisis commenced in September of 2002 when British Prime Minister Tony Blair, with the backing of George W. Bush, made overtures to Muammar Qaddafi to resume negotiations over Libya's WMD. The case concluded in December 2003 when Qaddafi abandoned Libya's nuclear, biological and chemical ambitions. 7Conclusion chapter abstractThis chapter summarizes the book's main argument that the United States, because of its power advantage, has an incentive to make large coercive demands of weak states that if conceded threaten the survival of the state, the regime or its leadership. Due to international norms to first seek negotiated settlements prior to war, the U.S. has an incentive to go to the UN and adopt a coercive strategy the U.S. does not believe will, or does not want to succeed, to obtain justification and support for a brute force war. Alternative explanations based on non-rational behavior, uncertainty, and commitment problems help to explain why crises arise and why coercive diplomacy fails, but does not provide insight into when coercion is likely to succeed or fail. The book concludes with implications for U.S. foreign policy.

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Book SynopsisPowerful countries like the United States regularly employ economic sanctions as a tool for promoting their foreign policy interests. Yet this foreign policy tool has an uninspiring track record of success, with economic sanctions achieving their goals less than a third of the time they are imposed. The costs of these failed sanctions policies can be significant for the states that impose them, their targets, and the other countries they affect. Explaining economic sanctions' high failure rate therefore constitutes a vital endeavor for academics and policy-makers alike. Busted Sanctions seeks to provide this explanation, and reveals that the primary cause of this failure is third-party spoilers, or sanctions busters, who undercut sanctioning efforts by providing their targets with extensive foreign aid or sanctions-busting trade. In quantitatively and qualitatively analyzing over 60 years of U.S. economic sanctions, Bryan Early reveals that both types of third-party sanctions busterTrade Review"Understanding the reasons why firms 'bust' sanctions is an important part of discerning why sanctions frequently fail. Backed up by solid empirical modeling and compelling case studies, the research presented in Busted Sanctions goes a long way toward helping us grasp both the causes and consequences of sanction busting." -- David Lektzian, Associate Professor of Political Science * Texas Tech University *"This work is truly novel. Bryan Early is the first scholar to address sanction busting in a rigorous, systematic fashion—by analyzing what motivates states to engage in sanction busting, what measures they use, what the consequences of that busting are and, ultimately, what can be done to counteract them." -- A. Cooper Drury, Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science * University of Missouri *"[R]ecent history shows that US policy makers often choose to use economic sanctions against adversaries, despite ample evidence pointing to their ineffectiveness. In this book, Early seeks to explain reasons for the frequent and porlonged use of sanctions and to identify the factors limiting their effectiveness . . . Recommended." -- E. L. Whalen"[I]t would be a grave mistake to take this thoughtful, penetrating, and supple book just as an argument against using sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. It is in fact a primer filled with hard facts and harder lessons from past efforts - and mistakes - designed to show how this process can actually become more effective and productive of the intended result." -- Martin Rubin"This volume provides a valuable contribution to the literature on economic sanctions and will be of considerable interest to scholars and practitioners in international trade policy, international political economy, and international relations." -- Anton D. Lowenberg * Journal of Economic Literature *Table of ContentsContents and Abstracts1Introduction: Why Busted Sanctions Lead to Broken Sanctions Policies chapter abstractThis chapter offers an overview of why U.S. policy makers employ economic sanctions, the wide range of adverse effects that sanctions have, and the poor track record of success that sanctions have had. It explains how economic sanctions affect their targets and incentivize different types of responses from third-party states that vary from cooperating with them to actively undermining them. The chapter then summarizes the theory of sanctions busting, explaining why extensive sanctions busters emerge and how their sanctions-busting aid and trade impact the effectiveness of sanctioning efforts. The chapter then discusses the mixed-method research design that will be used to evaluate the theory of sanctions busting and describes the book's findings in brief. 2What Are Sanctions Busters? chapter abstractThis chapter explains how economic sanctions incentivize their targets to try to forge extensive commercial ties with small numbers of third-party states and to seek out the patronage of benefactors willing to provide them with extensive aid packages. It describes the role that sanctions busters can play in undermining sanctioning efforts via their aid and trade and explains why past approaches have been unable to systematically account for these effects. The chapter draws on the South African and North Korean sanctions episodes to illustrate the motives that appear to drive aid-based versus traded-based sanctions busting and presents distinct profiles for the types of states most likely to become aid-based sanctions busters and trade-based sanctions busters. 3Assessing the Consequences of Sanctions Busting chapter abstractThis chapter develops the theory of sanctions busting's explanation of how trade-based sanctions busters and target states' foreign aid flows influence the outcomes of sanctions episodes. It is hypothesized that sanctions imposed against states that have the support of trade-based sanctions busters are less likely to be successful. It is also hypothesized that target states' sensitivity to changes in their foreign aid flows means that sanctions will be less successful against states experiencing gains in their foreign aid flows and more successful against states experiencing declines in their foreign aid flows. These hypotheses are evaluated via a statistical analysis of ninety-six episodes of U.S.-imposed economic sanctions from 1950 through 2002. The results offer strong support for the hypotheses, indicating that trade-based sanctions busters and foreign aid flows each exert separate, potent effects on sanctions outcomes. 4For Profits or Politics? Why Third Parties Sanctions-Bust via Trade and Aid chapter abstractThis chapter develops the theory of sanctions busting's explanation for why third-party states become aid-based sanctions busters or trade-based sanctions busters in a given sanctions episode. It explains that trade-based sanctions busting is driven primarily by the commercial interests of third-party states to exploit the lucrative trading opportunities created by sanctions, whereas aid-based sanctions-busting is primarily motivated by third-party governments' political interests in preventing the sanctions against a target from succeeding. It is argued that third-party governments will prefer to employ trade-based sanctions busting if that option is feasible because that approach is profitable instead of costly. The chapter poses a suite of hypotheses to test the theory's predictions concerning which states will engage in aid-based and trade-based sanctions busting. 5Sanctions Busting for Profits: How the United Arab Emirates Busted the U.S. Sanctions against Iran chapter abstractThis chapter examines how and why trade-based sanctions-busting relationships are fostered. It evaluates the trade-based sanctions-busting relationship that formed between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran after the United States sanctioned Iran in 1979. The chapter examines the formation and evolution of the sanctions-busting relationship during the period that preceded the military alliance the UAE formed with the United States (1979–1994) and period that followed the creation of their alliance (1995–2005). The analysis reveals insights into how the emirate of Dubai emerged as the leading venue for conducting sanctions-busting trade with Iran. The chapter also illustrates how even American firms used Dubai to circumvent the U.S. government's sanctions. Its postscript analyzes how recent changes in U.S. sanctions policies (2006–2013) have finally begun to succeed in curbing the sanctions busting taking place on Iran's behalf in the UAE and other countries. 6Assessing Which Third-Party States Become Trade-Based Sanctions Busters chapter abstractThis chapter conducts a statistical analysis of the factors associated with trade-based sanctions busting. It tests whether the hypothesized factors affecting trade profitability influence which third-party states become trade-based sanctions busters. It reexamines the same ninety-six episodes of U.S.-imposed sanctions evaluated in Chapter 3 but this time looks at which third-party states sanctions-busted on behalf of the target states. The results offer strong support for the sanctions-busting theory's hypotheses, indicating that cross-national differences in the factors affecting the profitability of trading with sanctioned states largely determine which third-party states become trade-based sanctions busters. The results indicate that countries with large, open economies that are proximate to and have preexisting commercial ties with target states are significantly more likely to engage in trade-based sanctions busting, as are countries allied with the United States and/or the target state. 7Sanctions Busting for Politics: Analyzing Cuba's Aid-Based Sanctions Busters chapter abstractThis chapter examines the role that aid-based sanctions busting has played in sustaining Cuba since the United States first sanctioned it in 1960 and why several countries have offered Cuba their patronage. It analyzes whether the aid-based sanctions-busting support that China and the Soviet Union offered to Cuba during the Cold War and that China and Venezuela offered it following the Cold War's conclusion were consistent with the sanctions-busting theory's hypothesized conditions. The evidence from these cases generally offers support for the theory, but the analysis of China case reveals that third-party states can occasionally employ both aid-based and trade-based sanctions-busting strategies. The narrative also presents detailed insights into the diplomatic efforts undertaken by U.S. policy makers to discourage trade-based sanctions busting on Cuba's behalf and those undertaken by Fidel Castro to woo the support of aid-based sanctions busters. 8Implications and Conclusions chapter abstractThis chapter offers a summary analysis of the overarching findings of the book and explores their implications for policy makers and the broader study of economic statecraft. It summarizes the overarching threat that sanctions busting poses to the effectiveness of sanctioning efforts and offers a number of recommendations about how policy makers can best respond to them. It is argued that while sanctions busters will continue to represent an endemic challenge to sanctioning efforts, they pose problems that can be anticipated and, in some cases, mitigated if properly understood. The chapter concludes by examining how future research can build on the insights garnered from the book.

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Book SynopsisTrade Review"Kawato draws on 12 case studies to determine the past and future policy impacts of protests against U.S. military bases in Asia. Analyzing major demonstrations from 1945 to the present, he outlines the conditions under which protest is most and least likely to succeed in influencing base policy." -- Survival"Murders, rapes, deadly accidents, environmental destruction and land seizures by U.S. forces based in Asian countries for more than half a century have fueled the protest movements this book describes and evaluates for their effectiveness. Yuko Kawato provides a thorough, yet concise history of U.S. military bases in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and a cogent analysis of how the governments of these countries and the U.S. respond to organized protests over the problems they cause." -- Steve Rabson, Professor Emeritus of East Asian Studies * Brown University *"A novel, far-reaching, and important comparative assessment of Asian opposition to U.S. forward deployment policies across the post-war period. Contains concrete and useful suggestions for American policy response as well." -- Kent Calder, Director, Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies * SAIS/Johns Hopkins University *Table of ContentsContents and AbstractsIntroduction chapter abstractThis chapter presents the theoretical arguments about when, how, and how much protests influence U.S. military base policy. First, the chapter explains what base politics is and who the main actors are. Second, it introduces protesters' arguments against base policies which refer to antiwar, antimilitarism, sovereignty, human rights, antinuclear, and environmental norms. Third, the chapter discusses the causal processes through which protests influence policy. 1) Policy change through persuasion is more likely when normative arguments do not contradict policy-makers' knowledge and beliefs, and when policy-makers think protest organizations are credible. Enabling domestic institutions are necessary for persuasion to translate into policy change. 2) When protesters fail to persuade policy-makers but generate incentives for policy change, policy-makers compromise and change policy in a limited way. 3) When policy-makers decide against policy change, they can offer symbolic concessions to protests. 1Response to Protests in Okinawa Under the U.S. Administration, 1945–1972 chapter abstractThis chapter examines two cases of protest against U.S. military base policy in Okinawa. First, it presents the American response to protests in the 1950s. The United States administered Okinawa since the end of World War II and implemented a land policy that facilitated the establishment of military bases. Local residents opposed the policy that included compensation which they believed was grossly inadequate and forcible land expropriation if they refused to sign leases. The second case is from between the early 1960s and Okinawa's reversion to Japan in 1972. Protesters demanded a reversion to Japan without American military bases. In both cases, protesters' arguments—referring to human rights, sovereignty, antiwar, antimilitarism, and antinuclear norms—failed to persuade policy-makers. The first case did not lead to policy change but policy-makers decided to make symbolic concessions. The second case resulted in a limited policy change through compromise. 2Response to Protests in Okinawa, 1995–1996 and 2009–2010 chapter abstractThis chapter first examines the protests in the mid-1990s which demanded a revision of the Status of Forces Agreement and a reduction of U.S. bases. Protesters' arguments failed to persuade policy-makers, but protesters generated incentives for a limited policy change within a context in which Tokyo and Washington tried to strengthen their alliance. Second, the chapter explains the policy outcome on the relocation of Futenma Air Station in 2010. Protesters' normative arguments, in addition to other types of arguments from local and national politicians, persuaded Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio that Futenma should be relocated to another prefecture or abroad. Protesters referred to antiwar, antimilitarism, and environmental norms, and complained that Okinawa already had more bases than other prefectures. However, due to bureaucratic resistance, Hatoyama was unable to change the plan to relocate Futenma to Henoko in northern Okinawa. The United States also refused to change the existing plan. 3Response to Protests in South Korea, 2000–2007 chapter abstractThis chapter examines five cases. Protests led to a revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in 2001 on criminal custody and environmental protection. Seoul and Washington enabled the transfer of the custody of American suspects to Korea after indictment, but with conditions. The governments did not change environmental policy on base but included environmental provisions in the SOFA as a symbolic concession to protesters. In 2002–2003, protesters demanded Korean jurisdiction over cases involving U.S. military personnel on duty. The governments offered a SOFA implementation agreement as a symbolic concession. The chapter then explains land expropriation in Pyeongtaek for base expansion despite large protests. Persuasion failed and the governments proceeded with the planned expansion. Finally, the chapter analyses the U.S. military's renewed effort to prevent military personnel's involvement in prostitution. 4Response to Protests in the Philippines, 1964–1965 and 1972–1979 chapter abstractThis chapter analyzes two protests against the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in the Philippines. In 1964–1965, protesters demanded that the Philippines be granted expanded rights to exercise criminal jurisdiction in order to protect its sovereignty. In the late 1960s and the 1970s, protesters asked for a closure of military bases. Under the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, whom the United States supported to maintain military bases, protesters asked for base closure by referring to democracy, sovereignty, human rights, and antinuclear norms. Persuasion failed in both cases. In 1965 Philippine and American policy-makers offered a limited policy change to defuse Philippine domestic pressures while ensuring American military effectiveness. In 1979 domestic opposition to the MBA did not lead to policy change, but policy-makers offered symbolic concessions to cultivate a nationalist image for Marcos. 5Persuasion and the Closure of U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines, 1991 chapter abstractThis chapter discusses the Philippine Senate's decision in 1991 to close all U.S. military bases in the country. The Military Bases Agreement between the United States and the Philippines was expiring, and this gave the Philippines a unique opportunity to consider whether it would continue to host U.S. military bases or not. American and Philippine negotiators created a treaty to extend the American military presence, but a 12–11 vote in the Philippine Senate defeated the treaty. Two senators voted against the treaty for non-normative reasons. Normative arguments against military bases—which emphasized sovereignty, democracy, human rights, and antinuclear norms—persuaded the ten remaining senators who voted against the treaty. People whom these senators considered credible persuaded them. Domestic institutions including the 1987 Philippine constitution and antinuclear legislation made possible the translation of the senators' persuasion into the policy outcome. Conclusion chapter abstractThe Conclusion summarizes the findings and offers recommendations to policy-makers and activists. Recommendations to policy-makers include: 1) do not wait until large protests break out to respond to local grievances about the American military presence; 2) develop a greater partnership with local governments; 3) continue to reduce the U.S. military footprint in host states; and 4) engage in a better public relations effort. Recommendations to activists include: 1) because persuasion takes time, focus on public education to mold future leaders' attitudes toward base policies; 2) prioritize the mobilization of large protests to pressure policy-makers to change policy, over lobbying policy-makers to persuade them; 3) work with organizations that policy-makers perceive as credible; and 4) encourage host states to improve domestic laws and practices that are relevant to base policy. The chapter also proposes some issues for further research.

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Book SynopsisTrade Review"This powerful and comprehensive look at security in the Arabian Gulf and the US role in creating and sustaining it should be mandatory reading for policy makers. Geoffrey Gresh has written an up-to-the-minute account of how our key friends in the region view their security not only in the Gulf, but the world. Superb!" -- Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret) * former NATO Supreme Allied Commander and Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University *"This book is not just a comprehensive history of the military-strategic relationship between the U.S. and Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) but also a complex analysis of internal and external factors (such as regime survival and state-society relations) that influence the conduct of the GCC towards the American military presence in the Gulf. A welcome addition to security studies broadly defined and which takes the local level seriously." -- Fawaz A. Gerges, Emirates Chair of Contemporary Middle Eastern Studies * London School of Economics *"Geoffrey Gresh's book, Gulf Security and the U.S. Military, comes at a crucial time when the Middle East is roiling. U.S. bases have served the interests of those in and out of the Gulf. They are affected by domestic politics as much as they are affected by regional politics. Going back to the establishment of U.S. bases in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Oman and bringing the reader up to date Gresh gives the reader a vital perspective through which to analyze the U.S. role in the Gulf in these turbulent times. This is essential reading for those interested in US policy in the Gulf, regional and energy politics." -- Lenore G. Martin, Professor and Chair Department of Political Science and International Studies, Emmanuel College and Associate, Center for Middle Eastern Studies * Harvard University *"Overall, the analysis provided in the book is extremely valuable to US policy makers and officers in charge of American bases in those regions, as they will find important insights and inspirations from Gresh's book. The lessons from this book can also be of great interest to policy advisors concerned with how the United States today can help countries in the Gulf regions to enhance their national security facing the severe threats from the rise of Islamic State (ISIS) and to reduce the risk of increasing internal security threats for those countries." -- Junyuan Rao * Naval Historical Foundation *"In Gulf Security and the US Military, Geoffrey F. Gresh makes an important contribution to studies of American overseas military basing policy and US security assistance; he also adds to an increasingly rich literature on the strategic significance of the Persian Gulf to America's global security . . . Geoffrey Gresh's new book is an excellent start to what is certain to be an important and long-running national security debate." -- Russ Burgos * Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly *"I do not know of any book that goes into this level of detail about the specific events in the long process by which the US replaced the British as the primary external power in the Gulf. It provides a piece to the puzzle vital for understanding the hot-and-cold strategic duets the United States has played with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, and other allies in the region." -- Peter Dombrowski, Professor of Strategy * the US Naval War College *"[The book] provides useful lessons learned for those involved with current and future negotiations with any Gulf nation. Every USAF colonel and above who thinks he or she may be involved in such decisions should read this book. It is an essential primer, written in such a way as to be scholarly, yet comprehensible . . . The insight into all that has gone into the 'base life' one will experience and perhaps off-base privileges is certainly worth the effort and time to read this book." -- Wayne L. Shaw * Air Force Research Institute *"[T]he dearth of studies highlighting the history and politics of US basing in the Middle East, and the Gulf Coast region in particular, remains surprising given the great strategic importance of this area. Geoffrey Gresh's Gulf Security and the US Military: Regime Survival and the Politics of Basing is therefore a welcome addition to the literature. To my knowledge, it is the first in-depth account of base politics devoted to this region . . . Scholars, policymakers, and general readers will have much to learn from this fine book." -- Andrew Yeo * H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews *Table of ContentsContents and AbstractsIntroduction: Gulf national security and the politics of Basing chapter abstractThis chapter provides a theoretical and strategic overview of the U.S. military basing presence in the Gulf from the Second World War to the present. It lays a framework for examining the history of the U.S. military in the Gulf by placing the book within the larger base politics literature, in addition to providing a broad overview on the global evolution of U.S. military basing following the Second World War. Base politics and basing access for military forces is one of the oldest enduring features of international relations among nations and empires. The central question posed here is when and why did base politicization occur in Gulf Arab host nations. External and internal security dynamics linked to a host regime's survival are the main drivers influencing Gulf Cooperation Council nations either to accept or expel the U.S. military from local bases. 1Oil and War chapter abstractThis chapter sets the stage for how the United States came to establish its first military base in the region, while placing the Gulf in its larger strategic and global context. As the United States became more entangled in the Second World War, the U.S. military grew adamant about securing base installations to support its war efforts. Additionally, the U.S. military needed easy access to the valuable oil resources of the Gulf to buoy its operations abroad. Political pressure from U.S. oil companies operating in the Gulf also helped convince the U.S. government to pursue a more active regional strategy to safeguard significant U.S. investments and other regional assets. The first establishment of a base at Dhahran would be crucial at the end of the war to assist with postwar construction efforts in Europe and Pacific Asia. 2Negotiating a Foothold chapter abstractThis chapter explores the origins of the U.S. military's complex relationship with the Gulf Arab monarchies, especially with the Saud royal family, following the Second World War. A more permanent U.S. military basing presence was never an inevitable conclusion and depended upon a combination of shifting national security dynamics and U.S. military and economic aid packages. This chapter examines the key domestic opposition groups influenced by pan-Arab nationalism that threatened the monarchy versus external security factors, including threats emanating from the Hashemite Kingdom and a rising Soviet Union. Though pan-Arab nationalism played a certain role in stimulating domestic instability in Saudi Arabia, three separate regional factors played a more influential role in determining the Saud monarchy's decision to permit the continued U.S. military basing presence: Hashemite threats to invade the kingdom, the ongoing Buraimi Oasis crisis between Great Britain and the Trucial Shaykhdoms, and the Suez Canal crisis. 3Regime Survival and the U.S. Military chapter abstractThis chapter examines the events that led to the eventual basing termination and expulsion of the U.S. military from its Saudi bases in 1962. With fewer external security concerns by the early 1960s, the Saud monarchy turned its attention to domestic politics and rising concerns regarding Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's influence over pan-Arab national groups in the kingdom. By the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, domestic security concerns grew to a new high as the U.S. military's presence exacerbated attacks on the legitimacy of a monarchy under mounting domestic pressure. Opposition groups portrayed the United States as an imperial occupying force, helping erode the power and damage the image of the monarchy domestically. The Saud monarchy appeared concerned about its survival and its association with the U.S. military and terminated its long-term basing contract in the spring of 1962. 4A Light Footprint in Bahrain chapter abstractAfter declaring independence in 1971, Bahrain signed a basing agreement with the United States, prompted by external security fears associated with Iran's desire to annex the tiny island nation. But when the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973 with the U.S. supporting Israel in the war, Bahrainis violently voiced their outrage over the U.S. naval presence. In late 1973, the Bahraini government announced that the U.S. naval basing agreement would be terminated. The U.S. lost its homeport at Jufair, but it was able to negotiate the maintenance of a light footprint including the presence of an administrative support unit for U.S. naval regional logistics. This chapter examines both the domestic security challenges faced by the Khalifas during this period and the politics involved in the homeport expulsion. 5Sultan Qaboos and Operation Eagle Claw chapter abstractThis chapter examines Oman's relations with the U.S. military after the 1979 U.S. expulsion from Iran. Oman acts as a valuable historical case study that illuminates important lessons learned about what can work when negotiating for basing access with a host nation under heightened domestic pressure. Oman's Sultan Qaboos had long faced internal opposition that stemmed from the Dhofar rebellion of the 1960s and early 1970s. His fears were exacerbated when it became known that, unbeknownst to Sultan Qaboos, President Carter had violated Omani sovereignty in executing a secret rescue mission, codenamed Eagle Claw, to free U.S. hostages held captive by Iranian revolutionaries in Tehran at the U.S. Embassy. After lengthy negotiations and the subsequent increase in U.S. military and economic aid incentives, including promises of a less visible and low-profile military, the U.S. was able to maintain its military basing access in Oman. 6A Saudi Sandstorm: Rivalry, Revolution, and terrorism chapter abstractThis chapter studies the process that led to the Saudi decision to reestablish a U.S. military basing presence in 1990. Though Saudi Arabia maintained its partnership with the U.S. military throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. was not given control of local bases after 1962 until the First Gulf War. The external threat posed by Iraq was the main driver behind convincing the Saud monarchy to allow a U.S. military basing presence. From 1990 to 2003, the kingdom confronted major domestic security challenges, including several terrorist attacks motivated by the U.S. military basing presence, but it was not until Saddam Hussein was finally removed in 2003 that the U.S. military was asked to terminate its basing presence. Iran also posed less of a threat to the kingdom since U.S. military bases surrounded Iran on both its eastern and western borders, including in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Conclusion: The GCC Today and Lessons learned for the U.S. Military chapter abstractThe conclusion assesses the current and future U.S. military Gulf presence following its Saudi departure, as well as the present challenges ushered in by regional violence since 2011. The U.S. military maintains a significant presence across the Arabian Peninsula but it must now confront a new and emerging dynamic where most GCC countries have begun to diversify their political, military, economic, technological, and security partnerships with countries other than the United States. Many GCC nations have turned in recent years to the East to emerging powers such as China, Russia, and India to assist with their national security and economic needs. Nonetheless, understanding the dynamics of base politicization in a host nation remains important today and studying base politics more broadly helps explain when and why basing access may go awry for future policymakers and scholars of the region.

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Book SynopsisThis book examines the experiences of a range of countries in the conflict in Afghanistan, with particular focus on the demands of operating within a diverse coalition of states. After laying out the challenges of the Afghan conflict in terms of objectives, strategy, and mission, case studies of 15 coalition memberseach written by a country expertdiscuss each country's motivation for joining the coalition and explore the impact of more than 10 years of combat on each country's military, domestic government, and populace. The book dissects the changes in the coalition over the decade, driven by both external factorssuch as the Bonn Conferences of 2001 and 2011, the contiguous Iraq War, and politics and economics at homeand internal factors such as command structures, interoperability, emerging technologies, the surge, the introduction of counterinsurgency doctrine, Green on Blue attacks, escalating civilian casualties, and the impact of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and NGOs. InTrade Review"I consider this to be an extremely important book, helpful to both the general reader and to specialists in other areas. It is the rare book that assesses US policy in three conflict-torn countries, and provides copious background, context, historical review, and lessons learned. Highly recommended."—Dan Caldwell, Pepperdine University"Coalition challenges in Afghanistan is a brilliant exposition of the heart of global security challenges in the 21st century. The center of gravity of the coalition in Afghanistan is the coalition of 50 nations—this book helps us understand the complexity of maintaining such a structure in the rigors of combat."—Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret), Supreme Allied Commander at NATO 2009-2013 and Dean at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University"Gale A. Mattox and Stephen M. Grenier have brought together an outstanding group of scholars to evaluate the varied contributions of the full range of nations that fought in Afghanistan. This volume fills an important gap in our understanding of America's longest war."—Thomas G. Mahnken, Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security, U.S. Naval War College"With their edited volume, Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan, Gale Mattox and Stephen Grenier have made a valuable contribution to the growing literature on the Afghan campaign—and its disappointments This book is written as a valedictory analysis of Afghanistan and as such it succeeds admirably. Yet the true significance of the collection may lie in the fact that while the West has apparently chosen to end a war by withdrawing conventional combat troops, the struggle continues to this day."—Anthony King, International AffairsTable of ContentsContents and Abstracts1Introduction: Framing the War in Afghanistan chapter abstractThis chapter outlines the motivations that influenced a country's decision to join the coalition's campaign to stabilize Afghanistan. In addition, the chapter assesses the coalition's performance since 2001 by examining how well each country employed its military, diplomatic, or economic capabilities. Whether it was to demonstrate solidarity with the US or to avenge the deaths of their citizens during the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, several countries joined the coalition to defeat al Qaeda and bring Osama bin Laden to justice. Contributing nations conducted a wide-range of air, ground, and naval combat operations while others focused on delivering a distinctive capability that addressed a specific operational gap. When the interests of contributing members did not align, the coalition often failed to achieve its political and military objectives. 2Afghanistan: The Reluctant Partner, Building a State in a Time of War chapter abstractThis chapter examines the role of the Afghan state in the country's war effort. Kabul is often treated as a non-entity – a set of institutions acted upon by outsiders. The Afghan government is often seen by international actors as no more than traditional networks of patronage, yet there is also an elusive Afghan state attempting to exert itself. The conflicts inside the Afghan government are many-layered and opaque. Outcomes in Afghanistan are products of the interaction of these competing influences. International actors undermined state-building efforts in favor of parochial war aims, and traditional networks have subverted governance through corruption and modernization efforts has often flouted the culture and will of rural Afghans, focusing disproportionately on desires of the urban citizenry. 3Warlords and the Coalition in Afghanistan chapter abstractThis chapter focuses on the relationships between ISAF contributing nations and Afghan warlords between 2001 and 2014. It shows how the latter have instrumentalized the cross-cutting agendas of the former to maximize their autonomy and shape the state-building process. It focuses on two typical warlords, General Dostum, the Uzbek leader of Northern Afghanistan, and Ismail Khan, the self-proclaimed "Amir of Western Afghanistan," and their ability to adapt to new environments, shape shift, and eventually survive, both physically and politically. It explains how these non-state armed actors have developed their own kind of diplomacy and taken advantage of the heterogeneity of the international community to resist Kabul's homogenizing pressure and remain relevant after 2001. Overall, this chapter demonstrates how warlords keep wielding influence in the midst of a state-building project that promotes the construction of bureaucratic institutions. 4United States: Examining America's Longest War chapter abstractThis chapter argues that the United States military, through a series of intentional and unintentional actions, hindered the creation of an effective Afghan National Army (ANA). The absence of an effective ANA was a key reason the security situation steadily deteriorated, eventually becoming so dire that in 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates relieved General David McKiernan, the commander of all US and coalition troops in Afghanistan, and President Obama ordered a "top-to-bottom" policy review. American military officials put parochial interests ahead of Afghanistan's security needs and harmed the nascent ANA by working with local militia forces, using US Army National Guard units to train the ANA, and creating specialized units within the ANA. These actions undermined the ANA's combat effectiveness, harmed the legitimacy of the fledgling Afghan government, and served as a catalyst for corruption and patronage. 5Canada: The Evolution of a New Canadian Way of War chapter abstractCanada's Afghanistan war experience differed from previous conflicts in one very significant fashion – national implementation of an integrated governmental approach to military operations. This "whole of government" (WoG) approach defined Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, particularly between 2006 and 2011 in the southern province of Kandahar. This chapter examines the development of this WoG methodology and provides a perspective on evolving Canadian approaches to the use of its instruments of national power in the twenty-first century. 6El Salvador: Exporting Security in the National Interest chapter abstractThis chapter argues El Salvador's President Mauricio Funes sought to improve his relationship with the El Salvador Armed Forces by strengthening his country's ties with the US. The steady flow of illegal narcotics and weapons through the Central American isthmus caused an epidemic of gang-related violence. Funes needed the military's support to fight the gangs, but distrust between his leftist administration and the ESAF stood in the way of a coordinated response. He stunned political observers when he dismissed his own political party's concerns and joined with conservative legislators to approve the deployment of El Salvadoran troops to Afghanistan. The US responded by providing the troops with advanced training and equipment for use in Afghanistan, and against transnational criminal organizations operating in El Salvador. This strengthened El Salvadoran-American relations, improved Funes' standing with the ESAF, and helped San Salvador develop a better-coordinated government response against criminal entities. 7Federal Republic of Germany: The Legacy of the War in Afghanistan chapter abstractA member of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Germany has been the third largest contributor to the Afghan mission for over a decade and has committed the largest force second only to the United States for the Resolute Support post-2014 phase. For Germany this commitment by the Bundeswehr has reflected its commitment to Afghan development and has marked significant milestone in German responsibilities as an alliance member. Given its past decisions with respect to participation in conflict, the longer- implications of this role are less clear. There is no doubt that the leadership, training, and operational experience during the Afghanistan mission have been unprecedented for the country and its readiness for future deployments has significantly increased. But while its role in Afghanistan has given the Bundeswehr operational experience, it remains unclear if the country is ready for a more forward leaning international role for Germany in the future. 8The United Kingdom: Innocence lost in the War in Afghanistan chapter abstractThis chapter examines why a military campaign for which the British government had such high hopes, and which domestic public opinion initially supported, has led to major divisions within the UK and questions over its worth. The first part examines the first phase of Britain's Afghan War. It looks at the reasoning behind the government's decision to engage in combat in Afghanistan and then analyzes the initial campaign from 2001-2005. The second part reviews the second phase of the war. It considers the government's decision to make the case for NATO to escalate its involvement to Southern and Eastern Afghanistan and the subsequent deployment of British forces principally to Helmand. The third part reflects on the wider impact of the Afghan War for and on the UK. 9France: "Friend, ally but not aligned": vigilant pragmatism in Afghanistan chapter abstractGiven that the Afghan campaign has often put great strain on US-European relations, it is of particular interest to consider the French example, traditionally the most unruly European NATO ally. After a historical overview, and looking at French contributions to ANA training, COIN and "civ-mil" policies, this article examines how the relationship between France and NATO has changed as a result of its 13 years-long engagement in Afghanistan. It argues that instead of driving France and the US further apart (as might have been expected during the crises in 2006/07), the campaign has actually reinforced many ties and contributed to a normalization of sorts, even though a great deal of ambiguity still characterizes the relationship. 10The Netherlands: To Fight, or not to Fight chapter abstractThis chapter highlights how a smaller power struggled with the political, military and financial pressures of sustained expeditionary operations and the dissonance that emerges as domestic political considerations clash with the military-operational reality. The Netherlands joined the coalition to rebuild its international standing and highlight the political and defense reforms it instituted after Dutch peacekeepers failed to prevent the 1995 murder of refugees in Srebrenica, a United Nations declared "safe area" in Bosnia. Since the Netherlands was dependent on the NATO collective security umbrella, the mission in Afghanistan provided an opportunity to increase its credibility within the Alliance and to strengthen the Dutch-American defense relationship. Dutch counterinsurgency operations in Uruzgan province proved politically contentious due to the combat involved, which ultimately became the pretext for the collapse of the government in 2010. 11The Visegrad Four: Achieving Long Term Security through Alliance Support chapter abstractThis chapter focuses on the participation and contribution of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. The Visegrad Four's participation in ISAF, first and foremost, was rooted in the perception that it was NATO's key military operation. Each regarded ISAF's success as a key strategic interest critical to their goal of the continued viability of NATO, the cornerstone of their security. ISAF participation solidified the reputations of each as solid NATO "security providers." The chapter also examines how ISAF participation affected each state's military capabilities and ongoing efforts for military modernization and reform in the post-communist era. Perhaps, most importantly for all, NATO carried out the ISAF mission and remains intact to carry on its newfound global character. 12Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: The British, Dutch, German and French Cases chapter abstractThis chapter examines how European allies of the United States applied COIN in Afghanistan by examining the experiences of the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and France. For several years after NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) in 2003, the United Kingdom struggled to relearn its forgotten COIN doctrine and strategy, while the Germans and French disputed how much NATO should engage in civilian reconstruction work. The Dutch kept a low-profile in this dispute while pursuing their own 'Dutch approach' in their area of responsibility. These divergences meant that ISAF was hobbled by an ad hoc patchwork of objectives without a clear consensus on a common strategy when confronted with the dual missions of nation-building and counterinsurgency. 13North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Transformation Under Fire chapter abstractThe events of September 11, 2001 prompted NATO into action when it invoked Article V (collective defense) for the first time and subsequently led to the formation of the International Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan (ISAF). The following chapter provides a chronological analysis of the Alliance's thirteen-year involvement in the war in Afghanistan and examines the various strategic and political adjustments made by the now 28-member alliance. After its initially low profile, NATO expanded its activities throughout Afghanistan and assumed more and more combat missions. At first conceived of as primarily stabilization operations, ISAF's mission would eventually involve kinetic operations associated with counterinsurgency and counter terrorism. Although the Alliance made tremendous progress in adapting its strategy and tactics to an increasingly dangerous and challenging environment, the mission also exposed serious divisions and weaknesses as Brussels struggled with coordinating the national preferences and divergent capabilities of its member states. 14Jordan and the United Arab Emirates: Arab Partners in Afghanistan chapter abstractMost accounts of the campaign in Afghanistan overlook the role of Jordan or the UAE. In official tallies and military terms their contributions have been miniscule and symbolic at best. Unlike others, neither has historically significant strategic interests in Afghanistan, and it would have been logical to free-ride on the already powerful coalition. But the fact that these countries publically joined the coalition highlights the complex reasons countries contributed to the campaign and illustrates remarkable flexibility in the form and substance of coalition burden sharing. We argue that their role must be considered in the context of their security environment, their relationship with the United States, and the larger pursuit of securing their interests against the threat of radical Islam, bolstering a national identity premised on more moderate interpretations of Islam, providing important diplomatic and strategic assets to the coalition. 15Japan: A New Self-Defense Force Roleor Not? chapter abstractThis chapter examines Japan's contribution to the international coalition in Afghanistan. Tokyo supported coalition naval operations in the Indian Ocean to restore its credibility after the international community criticized Japan for exercising "checkbook diplomacy" during the 1991 Persian Gulf War when it contributed $13 billion to offset coalition expenses instead of deploying military forces to the region. If Japan had again assisted with only financial assistance, the Japan-United States alliance could have been undermined and Japanese national security threatened. 16Australia: Terrorism, Regional Security and the US Alliance chapter abstractThis chapter argues that Australia joined the international coalition to remove al Qaeda from their bases in Afghanistan; foster regional stability; and bolster the strength of Australia's US alliance by supporting the US in its pursuit of al-Qaeda. Australia supported action in Afghanistan to remove the al Qaeda threat and to deny that transnational organization and affiliated networks sanctuary to plan, arm and train in Afghanistan. Australian government was also concerned about al-Qaeda's impact on Australia's regional security. Lastly, Australian policy makers have sought to maintain US regional presence, bolster Australia's alliance stocks, and enhance the possibility of reciprocity from the larger power in alliance relations. 17New Zealand: Fostering the U.S.-New Zealand Relationship chapter abstractNever large in a quantitative sense, New Zealand's military deployment to Afghanistan is notable for its length and diplomatic significance. New Zealand's experience of casualties was the reverse of most, with the majority of New Zealand combat deaths coming in the last years of the Provincial Reconstruction Team's deployment to Bamiyan. The most domestically controversial part of New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan, the Special Forces, was ironically often the most welcomed by its coalition partners. New Zealand's long commitment in Afghanistan formed a crucial element in the improving US-NZ security relationship, elements of which had been largely suspended since the mid-1980s. Afghanistan also provided the temporary glue for closer New Zealand-NATO links. 18Pakistan: A Tale of Two Allies chapter abstractThe role of Pakistan as an ally in the war on terror is unique. Unlike other allies discussed in this volume, Pakistan has not contributed military forces or other resources to support Coalition operations inside Afghanistan. This chapter argues that the Pakistani military forces play roles that affect Coalition operation in Afghanistan in several ways, both positive and negative. First, Pakistani military and paramilitary forces man the border outposts on the Durand Line, monitoring and at least theoretically constraining movement by militants across the border. Second, Pakistan's intelligence services have monitored and arrested members of certain militant groups that threaten the Coalition in Afghanistan, and that potentially threaten the homelands of Coalition partners. Third, and much more controversially, Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies provide sanctuary, shelter, and support for militant groups that actively fight the Coalition. 19Russia: Friend or Foe on Afghanistan? chapter abstractThis chapter argues that Russia shared the coalition's goal of creating a stable Afghanistan to reduce the flow of illegal narcotics and the spread of Islamist extremism, but Moscow also embraced the contradictory policy of calling for US and International Security Assistance Force troops to depart Afghanistan. Russia provided coalition forces with detailed intelligence gained during Soviet military operations in the 1980s, and it worked with several Central Asian nations to permit coalition non-lethal supplies to be transported through their countries along three supply routes that collectively formed the Northern Distribution Network. 20Going Forward.Lessons Learned chapter abstractThe chapter reviews similarities and differences in the Afghanistan conflict 2001-2014 drawn from the experiences of 13 selected country case studies involved in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 2 neighboring countries, and Afghanistan. It concludes that addressing identified challenges in NATO's first role outside Europe has strengthened the alliance in many respects. Less certain is the alliance preparedness for future conflicts. The cooperation and collaboration of 50 diverse nations (NATO members as well as non-members) that evolved during the Afghanistan operations – at times bumpy, at times surprisingly smooth – set a new standard for future operations from which much can be learned. However, the road ahead will be difficult for Afghanistan and incorporating lessons learned for NATO and its coalition allies will be challenging.

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Book SynopsisThis book examines the experiences of a range of countries in the conflict in Afghanistan, with particular focus on the demands of operating within a diverse coalition of states. After laying out the challenges of the Afghan conflict in terms of objectives, strategy, and mission, case studies of 15 coalition memberseach written by a country expertdiscuss each country's motivation for joining the coalition and explore the impact of more than 10 years of combat on each country's military, domestic government, and populace. The book dissects the changes in the coalition over the decade, driven by both external factorssuch as the Bonn Conferences of 2001 and 2011, the contiguous Iraq War, and politics and economics at homeand internal factors such as command structures, interoperability, emerging technologies, the surge, the introduction of counterinsurgency doctrine, Green on Blue attacks, escalating civilian casualties, and the impact of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and NGOs. InTrade Review"I consider this to be an extremely important book, helpful to both the general reader and to specialists in other areas. It is the rare book that assesses US policy in three conflict-torn countries, and provides copious background, context, historical review, and lessons learned. Highly recommended."—Dan Caldwell, Pepperdine University"Coalition challenges in Afghanistan is a brilliant exposition of the heart of global security challenges in the 21st century. The center of gravity of the coalition in Afghanistan is the coalition of 50 nations—this book helps us understand the complexity of maintaining such a structure in the rigors of combat."—Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret), Supreme Allied Commander at NATO 2009-2013 and Dean at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University"Gale A. Mattox and Stephen M. Grenier have brought together an outstanding group of scholars to evaluate the varied contributions of the full range of nations that fought in Afghanistan. This volume fills an important gap in our understanding of America's longest war."—Thomas G. Mahnken, Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security, U.S. Naval War College"With their edited volume, Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan, Gale Mattox and Stephen Grenier have made a valuable contribution to the growing literature on the Afghan campaign—and its disappointments This book is written as a valedictory analysis of Afghanistan and as such it succeeds admirably. Yet the true significance of the collection may lie in the fact that while the West has apparently chosen to end a war by withdrawing conventional combat troops, the struggle continues to this day."—Anthony King, International AffairsTable of ContentsContents and Abstracts1Introduction: Framing the War in Afghanistan chapter abstractThis chapter outlines the motivations that influenced a country's decision to join the coalition's campaign to stabilize Afghanistan. In addition, the chapter assesses the coalition's performance since 2001 by examining how well each country employed its military, diplomatic, or economic capabilities. Whether it was to demonstrate solidarity with the US or to avenge the deaths of their citizens during the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, several countries joined the coalition to defeat al Qaeda and bring Osama bin Laden to justice. Contributing nations conducted a wide-range of air, ground, and naval combat operations while others focused on delivering a distinctive capability that addressed a specific operational gap. When the interests of contributing members did not align, the coalition often failed to achieve its political and military objectives. 2Afghanistan: The Reluctant Partner, Building a State in a Time of War chapter abstractThis chapter examines the role of the Afghan state in the country's war effort. Kabul is often treated as a non-entity – a set of institutions acted upon by outsiders. The Afghan government is often seen by international actors as no more than traditional networks of patronage, yet there is also an elusive Afghan state attempting to exert itself. The conflicts inside the Afghan government are many-layered and opaque. Outcomes in Afghanistan are products of the interaction of these competing influences. International actors undermined state-building efforts in favor of parochial war aims, and traditional networks have subverted governance through corruption and modernization efforts has often flouted the culture and will of rural Afghans, focusing disproportionately on desires of the urban citizenry. 3Warlords and the Coalition in Afghanistan chapter abstractThis chapter focuses on the relationships between ISAF contributing nations and Afghan warlords between 2001 and 2014. It shows how the latter have instrumentalized the cross-cutting agendas of the former to maximize their autonomy and shape the state-building process. It focuses on two typical warlords, General Dostum, the Uzbek leader of Northern Afghanistan, and Ismail Khan, the self-proclaimed "Amir of Western Afghanistan," and their ability to adapt to new environments, shape shift, and eventually survive, both physically and politically. It explains how these non-state armed actors have developed their own kind of diplomacy and taken advantage of the heterogeneity of the international community to resist Kabul's homogenizing pressure and remain relevant after 2001. Overall, this chapter demonstrates how warlords keep wielding influence in the midst of a state-building project that promotes the construction of bureaucratic institutions. 4United States: Examining America's Longest War chapter abstractThis chapter argues that the United States military, through a series of intentional and unintentional actions, hindered the creation of an effective Afghan National Army (ANA). The absence of an effective ANA was a key reason the security situation steadily deteriorated, eventually becoming so dire that in 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates relieved General David McKiernan, the commander of all US and coalition troops in Afghanistan, and President Obama ordered a "top-to-bottom" policy review. American military officials put parochial interests ahead of Afghanistan's security needs and harmed the nascent ANA by working with local militia forces, using US Army National Guard units to train the ANA, and creating specialized units within the ANA. These actions undermined the ANA's combat effectiveness, harmed the legitimacy of the fledgling Afghan government, and served as a catalyst for corruption and patronage. 5Canada: The Evolution of a New Canadian Way of War chapter abstractCanada's Afghanistan war experience differed from previous conflicts in one very significant fashion – national implementation of an integrated governmental approach to military operations. This "whole of government" (WoG) approach defined Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, particularly between 2006 and 2011 in the southern province of Kandahar. This chapter examines the development of this WoG methodology and provides a perspective on evolving Canadian approaches to the use of its instruments of national power in the twenty-first century. 6El Salvador: Exporting Security in the National Interest chapter abstractThis chapter argues El Salvador's President Mauricio Funes sought to improve his relationship with the El Salvador Armed Forces by strengthening his country's ties with the US. The steady flow of illegal narcotics and weapons through the Central American isthmus caused an epidemic of gang-related violence. Funes needed the military's support to fight the gangs, but distrust between his leftist administration and the ESAF stood in the way of a coordinated response. He stunned political observers when he dismissed his own political party's concerns and joined with conservative legislators to approve the deployment of El Salvadoran troops to Afghanistan. The US responded by providing the troops with advanced training and equipment for use in Afghanistan, and against transnational criminal organizations operating in El Salvador. This strengthened El Salvadoran-American relations, improved Funes' standing with the ESAF, and helped San Salvador develop a better-coordinated government response against criminal entities. 7Federal Republic of Germany: The Legacy of the War in Afghanistan chapter abstractA member of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Germany has been the third largest contributor to the Afghan mission for over a decade and has committed the largest force second only to the United States for the Resolute Support post-2014 phase. For Germany this commitment by the Bundeswehr has reflected its commitment to Afghan development and has marked significant milestone in German responsibilities as an alliance member. Given its past decisions with respect to participation in conflict, the longer- implications of this role are less clear. There is no doubt that the leadership, training, and operational experience during the Afghanistan mission have been unprecedented for the country and its readiness for future deployments has significantly increased. But while its role in Afghanistan has given the Bundeswehr operational experience, it remains unclear if the country is ready for a more forward leaning international role for Germany in the future. 8The United Kingdom: Innocence lost in the War in Afghanistan chapter abstractThis chapter examines why a military campaign for which the British government had such high hopes, and which domestic public opinion initially supported, has led to major divisions within the UK and questions over its worth. The first part examines the first phase of Britain's Afghan War. It looks at the reasoning behind the government's decision to engage in combat in Afghanistan and then analyzes the initial campaign from 2001-2005. The second part reviews the second phase of the war. It considers the government's decision to make the case for NATO to escalate its involvement to Southern and Eastern Afghanistan and the subsequent deployment of British forces principally to Helmand. The third part reflects on the wider impact of the Afghan War for and on the UK. 9France: "Friend, ally but not aligned": vigilant pragmatism in Afghanistan chapter abstractGiven that the Afghan campaign has often put great strain on US-European relations, it is of particular interest to consider the French example, traditionally the most unruly European NATO ally. After a historical overview, and looking at French contributions to ANA training, COIN and "civ-mil" policies, this article examines how the relationship between France and NATO has changed as a result of its 13 years-long engagement in Afghanistan. It argues that instead of driving France and the US further apart (as might have been expected during the crises in 2006/07), the campaign has actually reinforced many ties and contributed to a normalization of sorts, even though a great deal of ambiguity still characterizes the relationship. 10The Netherlands: To Fight, or not to Fight chapter abstractThis chapter highlights how a smaller power struggled with the political, military and financial pressures of sustained expeditionary operations and the dissonance that emerges as domestic political considerations clash with the military-operational reality. The Netherlands joined the coalition to rebuild its international standing and highlight the political and defense reforms it instituted after Dutch peacekeepers failed to prevent the 1995 murder of refugees in Srebrenica, a United Nations declared "safe area" in Bosnia. Since the Netherlands was dependent on the NATO collective security umbrella, the mission in Afghanistan provided an opportunity to increase its credibility within the Alliance and to strengthen the Dutch-American defense relationship. Dutch counterinsurgency operations in Uruzgan province proved politically contentious due to the combat involved, which ultimately became the pretext for the collapse of the government in 2010. 11The Visegrad Four: Achieving Long Term Security through Alliance Support chapter abstractThis chapter focuses on the participation and contribution of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. The Visegrad Four's participation in ISAF, first and foremost, was rooted in the perception that it was NATO's key military operation. Each regarded ISAF's success as a key strategic interest critical to their goal of the continued viability of NATO, the cornerstone of their security. ISAF participation solidified the reputations of each as solid NATO "security providers." The chapter also examines how ISAF participation affected each state's military capabilities and ongoing efforts for military modernization and reform in the post-communist era. Perhaps, most importantly for all, NATO carried out the ISAF mission and remains intact to carry on its newfound global character. 12Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: The British, Dutch, German and French Cases chapter abstractThis chapter examines how European allies of the United States applied COIN in Afghanistan by examining the experiences of the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and France. For several years after NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) in 2003, the United Kingdom struggled to relearn its forgotten COIN doctrine and strategy, while the Germans and French disputed how much NATO should engage in civilian reconstruction work. The Dutch kept a low-profile in this dispute while pursuing their own 'Dutch approach' in their area of responsibility. These divergences meant that ISAF was hobbled by an ad hoc patchwork of objectives without a clear consensus on a common strategy when confronted with the dual missions of nation-building and counterinsurgency. 13North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Transformation Under Fire chapter abstractThe events of September 11, 2001 prompted NATO into action when it invoked Article V (collective defense) for the first time and subsequently led to the formation of the International Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan (ISAF). The following chapter provides a chronological analysis of the Alliance's thirteen-year involvement in the war in Afghanistan and examines the various strategic and political adjustments made by the now 28-member alliance. After its initially low profile, NATO expanded its activities throughout Afghanistan and assumed more and more combat missions. At first conceived of as primarily stabilization operations, ISAF's mission would eventually involve kinetic operations associated with counterinsurgency and counter terrorism. Although the Alliance made tremendous progress in adapting its strategy and tactics to an increasingly dangerous and challenging environment, the mission also exposed serious divisions and weaknesses as Brussels struggled with coordinating the national preferences and divergent capabilities of its member states. 14Jordan and the United Arab Emirates: Arab Partners in Afghanistan chapter abstractMost accounts of the campaign in Afghanistan overlook the role of Jordan or the UAE. In official tallies and military terms their contributions have been miniscule and symbolic at best. Unlike others, neither has historically significant strategic interests in Afghanistan, and it would have been logical to free-ride on the already powerful coalition. But the fact that these countries publically joined the coalition highlights the complex reasons countries contributed to the campaign and illustrates remarkable flexibility in the form and substance of coalition burden sharing. We argue that their role must be considered in the context of their security environment, their relationship with the United States, and the larger pursuit of securing their interests against the threat of radical Islam, bolstering a national identity premised on more moderate interpretations of Islam, providing important diplomatic and strategic assets to the coalition. 15Japan: A New Self-Defense Force Roleor Not? chapter abstractThis chapter examines Japan's contribution to the international coalition in Afghanistan. Tokyo supported coalition naval operations in the Indian Ocean to restore its credibility after the international community criticized Japan for exercising "checkbook diplomacy" during the 1991 Persian Gulf War when it contributed $13 billion to offset coalition expenses instead of deploying military forces to the region. If Japan had again assisted with only financial assistance, the Japan-United States alliance could have been undermined and Japanese national security threatened. 16Australia: Terrorism, Regional Security and the US Alliance chapter abstractThis chapter argues that Australia joined the international coalition to remove al Qaeda from their bases in Afghanistan; foster regional stability; and bolster the strength of Australia's US alliance by supporting the US in its pursuit of al-Qaeda. Australia supported action in Afghanistan to remove the al Qaeda threat and to deny that transnational organization and affiliated networks sanctuary to plan, arm and train in Afghanistan. Australian government was also concerned about al-Qaeda's impact on Australia's regional security. Lastly, Australian policy makers have sought to maintain US regional presence, bolster Australia's alliance stocks, and enhance the possibility of reciprocity from the larger power in alliance relations. 17New Zealand: Fostering the U.S.-New Zealand Relationship chapter abstractNever large in a quantitative sense, New Zealand's military deployment to Afghanistan is notable for its length and diplomatic significance. New Zealand's experience of casualties was the reverse of most, with the majority of New Zealand combat deaths coming in the last years of the Provincial Reconstruction Team's deployment to Bamiyan. The most domestically controversial part of New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan, the Special Forces, was ironically often the most welcomed by its coalition partners. New Zealand's long commitment in Afghanistan formed a crucial element in the improving US-NZ security relationship, elements of which had been largely suspended since the mid-1980s. Afghanistan also provided the temporary glue for closer New Zealand-NATO links. 18Pakistan: A Tale of Two Allies chapter abstractThe role of Pakistan as an ally in the war on terror is unique. Unlike other allies discussed in this volume, Pakistan has not contributed military forces or other resources to support Coalition operations inside Afghanistan. This chapter argues that the Pakistani military forces play roles that affect Coalition operation in Afghanistan in several ways, both positive and negative. First, Pakistani military and paramilitary forces man the border outposts on the Durand Line, monitoring and at least theoretically constraining movement by militants across the border. Second, Pakistan's intelligence services have monitored and arrested members of certain militant groups that threaten the Coalition in Afghanistan, and that potentially threaten the homelands of Coalition partners. Third, and much more controversially, Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies provide sanctuary, shelter, and support for militant groups that actively fight the Coalition. 19Russia: Friend or Foe on Afghanistan? chapter abstractThis chapter argues that Russia shared the coalition's goal of creating a stable Afghanistan to reduce the flow of illegal narcotics and the spread of Islamist extremism, but Moscow also embraced the contradictory policy of calling for US and International Security Assistance Force troops to depart Afghanistan. Russia provided coalition forces with detailed intelligence gained during Soviet military operations in the 1980s, and it worked with several Central Asian nations to permit coalition non-lethal supplies to be transported through their countries along three supply routes that collectively formed the Northern Distribution Network. 20Going Forward.Lessons Learned chapter abstractThe chapter reviews similarities and differences in the Afghanistan conflict 2001-2014 drawn from the experiences of 13 selected country case studies involved in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 2 neighboring countries, and Afghanistan. It concludes that addressing identified challenges in NATO's first role outside Europe has strengthened the alliance in many respects. Less certain is the alliance preparedness for future conflicts. The cooperation and collaboration of 50 diverse nations (NATO members as well as non-members) that evolved during the Afghanistan operations – at times bumpy, at times surprisingly smooth – set a new standard for future operations from which much can be learned. However, the road ahead will be difficult for Afghanistan and incorporating lessons learned for NATO and its coalition allies will be challenging.

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Book SynopsisUsing innovative and standard archaeological analyses of bullets and cartridges, eyewitness accounts and other primary sources, the battle at Little Big Horn is reappraised. The author argues the end came amid terror and disarray with no determined fighting and little firearm resistance.

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Book SynopsisBoth history and memoir, The Flight tells the story of Richard W. ‘Dick’ Bridges's heroic service in World War II. This is a story not only about World War II and the bravery of a unique group of soldiers, but also about fathers and sons, what can get lost in the gulf between generations, and how patience and understanding can bridge that gap.

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