Microeconomics Books
MD - Duke University Press How Would You Like to Pay
Book SynopsisIn this primer on the history of money, Bill Maurer explores the implications of how technology is changing how we use money and argues that understanding and considering how we would like to pay gives us insight into determining how we would like to live.Trade Review"In the end, How Would You Like to Pay? is of interest less for what it says about the future (the author makes no predictions -- which, given the Isis debacle, seems prudent) than for how it encourages the reader to pay attention to nuances of the present. It’s a primer of the anthropological imagination -- and a reminder that money is too important a matter to leave to the economists." -- Scott McLemee * Inside Higher Ed *"This little book is the exact size it needed to be to explore the array of new payment methods, currencies and other money technology innovations that have erupted over the past decade, alongside with more accessible and cheaper smartphone, tablet and other communications and computing technologies.... Entering electronic money contracts without understanding the problems and solutions they represent is risky both for the isolated farmer in Kenya and for a Silicon Valley executive, so both would benefit from this book." -- Anna Faktorovich * Pennsylvania Literary Journal *"As an anthropologist, Bill Maurer has spent the past two decades researching the cultural and social dynamics of money. In his latest book, he manages to condense his life’s research into one gripping, bite-sized read that is accessible to a diverse range of readers from the artist and software programmer to the financial regulator or economist." -- Scott Burns * The Independent Review *"Maurer’s latest book is a . . . highly accessible introduction to the complex topic of payment systems. Written in an engagingly informal style accompanied by eye-catching photographs, it is an excellent teaching resource that will surely become a standard feature of reading lists in undergraduate courses in economic anthropology and the anthropology of finance and money." -- John Cox * Anthropological Forum *"Maurer’s volume is beautifully produced and pocket-sized, with lots of sharp illustrations in full colour and generous spacing.... Maurer’s book is for anyone interested in the future of money. That is a lot of people. It aims to surprise readers by approaching money in ways that are at once counter-intuitive and familiar." -- Keith Hart * Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute *"Bill Maurer’s short, pocket-sized, succinct, lively, and sharply clear book on a vast and varied topic—the history and practice of monetary payments, worldwide—works like a skillfully cut gemstone. Keep turning, keep noticing new facets of the complexly brilliant entity that is money, as perceived and crafted for accessible view by an expert in reaching a wide and varied audience." -- Jane I. Guyer * Journal of Anthropological Research *Table of ContentsAcknowledgments vii Introduction. Who This Book Is For 1 1. Disruptions in Money 17 2. What Is Money? 37 3. Two Scenarios: A Day in the Money Life 51 4. The Evolution of Money 63 5. Use Cases for Money 79 6. What's in Your Wallet? 95 7. What Can You Do with a Mobile Phone? 107 8. Airtime 119 9. Monetary Repertoires 129 For Further Reading 145 Index 153
£71.10
Duke University Press How Would You Like to Pay
Book SynopsisIn this primer on the history of money, Bill Maurer explores the implications of how technology is changing how we use money and argues that understanding and considering how we would like to pay gives us insight into determining how we would like to live.Trade Review"In the end, How Would You Like to Pay? is of interest less for what it says about the future (the author makes no predictions -- which, given the Isis debacle, seems prudent) than for how it encourages the reader to pay attention to nuances of the present. It’s a primer of the anthropological imagination -- and a reminder that money is too important a matter to leave to the economists." -- Scott McLemee * Inside Higher Ed *"This little book is the exact size it needed to be to explore the array of new payment methods, currencies and other money technology innovations that have erupted over the past decade, alongside with more accessible and cheaper smartphone, tablet and other communications and computing technologies.... Entering electronic money contracts without understanding the problems and solutions they represent is risky both for the isolated farmer in Kenya and for a Silicon Valley executive, so both would benefit from this book." -- Anna Faktorovich * Pennsylvania Literary Journal *"As an anthropologist, Bill Maurer has spent the past two decades researching the cultural and social dynamics of money. In his latest book, he manages to condense his life’s research into one gripping, bite-sized read that is accessible to a diverse range of readers from the artist and software programmer to the financial regulator or economist." -- Scott Burns * The Independent Review *"Maurer’s latest book is a . . . highly accessible introduction to the complex topic of payment systems. Written in an engagingly informal style accompanied by eye-catching photographs, it is an excellent teaching resource that will surely become a standard feature of reading lists in undergraduate courses in economic anthropology and the anthropology of finance and money." -- John Cox * Anthropological Forum *"Maurer’s volume is beautifully produced and pocket-sized, with lots of sharp illustrations in full colour and generous spacing.... Maurer’s book is for anyone interested in the future of money. That is a lot of people. It aims to surprise readers by approaching money in ways that are at once counter-intuitive and familiar." -- Keith Hart * Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute *"Bill Maurer’s short, pocket-sized, succinct, lively, and sharply clear book on a vast and varied topic—the history and practice of monetary payments, worldwide—works like a skillfully cut gemstone. Keep turning, keep noticing new facets of the complexly brilliant entity that is money, as perceived and crafted for accessible view by an expert in reaching a wide and varied audience." -- Jane I. Guyer * Journal of Anthropological Research *Table of ContentsAcknowledgments vii Introduction. Who This Book Is For 1 1. Disruptions in Money 17 2. What Is Money? 37 3. Two Scenarios: A Day in the Money Life 51 4. The Evolution of Money 63 5. Use Cases for Money 79 6. What's in Your Wallet? 95 7. What Can You Do with a Mobile Phone? 107 8. Airtime 119 9. Monetary Repertoires 129 For Further Reading 145 Index 153
£24.29
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Public Microeconomics Efficiency and Equity in
Book SynopsisThe analysis found in Public Microeconomics is simple and operational, conducive to computationally easy examples and exercises. This textbook is ideally suited to graduate and upper-level undergraduate courses ineconomics, political science, policy and philosophy.Table of ContentsContents: Preface Foreword to Students 1. Introduction 2. Private Goods Without Externalities 3. Externalities 4. Public Goods 5. Public Utilities 6. Uncertainty and Asymmetrical Information Index
£106.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Handbook on the Economics of Leisure
Book SynopsisThis interdisciplinary Handbook combines both mainstream and heterodox economics to assess the nature, scope and importance of leisure activities.Table of ContentsContents: Introduction 1. Overview of the Economics of Leisure Samuel Cameron PART I: ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF LEISURE 2. On Economics, Leisure and Much More Alessandro Balestrino 3. Towards a Bourdieusian Economics of Leisure Andrew B. Trigg 4. Leisure and Subjective Well-being Victoria Ateca-Amestoy PART II: WORK/LEISURE BALANCE 5. The Economics of Sleep and Boredom Samuel Cameron 6. Half Full or Half Empty: The Economics of Work–Life Balance Samuel Cameron and Mark Fox 7. Working from Home: Leisure Gain or Leisure Loss? Samuel Cameron and Mark Fox 8. Contradictions of Capitalism in Health and Fitness Leisure Simeon Scott PART III: PEOPLE AND PLACES AS LEISURE 9. Dating as Leisure Véronique Flambard, Nicolas Vaillant and François-Charles Wolff 10. Home Improvements Peter E. Earl and Ti-Ching Peng 11. Reconsidering the Silk Road: Tourism in the Context of Regionalism and Trade Patterns Karen Jackson PART IV: SPECTATING AND EVENTS 12. Leisure Tribe-onomics Darragh O’Reilly 13. The Significance of Commercial Music Festivals Gretchen Larsen and Stephanie Hussels 14. The Rise and Decline of Drive-in Cinemas in the United States Mark Fox and Grant Black 15. Entertainment and Economic Contributions of the Indian Hindi Movie Industry Rajesh K. Pillania and Subhojit Banerjee 16. Leisure Time, Cinema and the Structure of Household Entertainment Expenditure, 1890–1940 Gerben Bakker 17. Long-run Trends and Factors in Attendance Patterns in Sport: Australian Football League, 1945–2009 Liam J.A. Lenten 18. The Changing Demands of Leisure Time: The Emergence of Twenty20 Cricket David Paton and Andrew Cooke PART V: DIVERSIONS AND PERVERSIONS 19. The Economics of the Video-gaming Leisure Market Joe Cox 20. Competitive Forces in the US Recreational Vehicle Industry Mark Fox, Lane David and Grant Black 21. Magazines Gillian Doyle 22. The Impact of New Technology on Leisure Networks Vincent G. Fitzsimons 23. Girls Just Want to Have Fun? Internet Leisure and Women’s Empowerment in Jordan Deborah L. Wheeler and Lauren Mintz 24. Sexual Leisure Markets Alan Collins Index
£51.25
The Peterson Institute for International Economics Behind the Open Door Foreign Enterprises in the
Book Synopsis
£22.50
Harvard University Press Trade and Markets in Byzantium
£60.31
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Decisions Preferences and Heuristics
Book SynopsisThis enlightening book comprehensively maps the current state of economic psychology and behavioural economics. Exploring key concepts, topics and models in the field, it is also a launching pad for future research and provides useful insights on how good personal and professional decisions can be made, advancing microeconomic discourse.Trade Review‘Decisions, Preferences, and Heuristics provides a timely update of the relation between psychology and economics: It introduces a fresh vision that takes the evolved mind seriously rather than as a source of violations of utility models, and presents heuristics as smart tools for decision-making in the real world, where optimization is mostly a fiction. In this fascinating book, Pere Mir-Artigues shifts the discourse of microeconomic theory closer to the reality of actual decision-making.’ -- Gerd Gigerenzer, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, GermanyTable of ContentsContents: Preface and acknowledgements 1. Introduction 2. Brief history of the relationship between economics and psychology 3. The decision-making process 4. Elements for the analysis of economic decisions 5. Patterns, methods and algorithms for decision-making 6. Decision-making in the consumption of goods and services 7. Summing up References Index
£100.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in
Book SynopsisWritten in a comprehensive yet accessible style, this Handbook introduces readers to a range of modern empirical methods with applications in microeconomics, illustrating how to use two of the most popular software packages, Stata and R, in microeconometric applications.Table of ContentsContents: Introduction to the Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Empirical Microeconomics ix Nigar Hashimzade and Michael A. Thornton PART I ECONOMETRIC METHODS IN MICROECONOMICS 1 Linear dynamic panel data models 2 Ryo Okui 2 Spatial autoregressive nonlinear models in R with an empirical application in labour economics 23 Anna Gloria Billé 3 Econometric analyses of auctions: a selective review 42 Tong Li and Xiaoyong Zheng 4 An introduction to flexible methods for policy evaluation 82 Martin Huber PART II HOUSEHOLDS, BUSINESSES AND SOCIETIES 5 Econometric models of fertility 113 Alfonso Miranda and Pravin K. Trivedi 6 Measuring discrimination in the labour market 155 Emmanuel Duguet 7 Microeconomic models for designing and evaluating tax-transfer systems 195 Ugo Colombino 8 Bounds on counterfactuals in semiparametric discrete-choice models 223 Khai X. Chiong, Yu-Wei Hsieh and Matthew Shum 9 Bank performance analysis 238 Natalya Zelenyuk and Valentin Zelenyuk 10 Empirical methods in social epidemiology 280 Christopher F. Baum PART III POLICY EVALUATION AND CAUSALITY 11 Policy evaluation using causal inference methods 294 Denis Fougère and Nicolas Jacquemet 12 Regression discontinuity designs in policy evaluation 325 Otávio Bartalotti, Marinho Bertanha and Sebastian Calonico 13 Measuring the effect of health events in the labour market 359 Emmanuel Duguet PART IV NETWORKS AND BIG DATA IN MICROECONOMICS 14 Exploring social media: Twitteronomics and beyond 388 Tho Pham, Piotr Śpiewanowski and Oleksandr Talavera 15 Econometrics of networks with limited access to network data: a literature survey 416 Pedro C.L. Souza 16 Machine learning for causal inference: estimating heterogeneous treatment effects 438 Vishalie Shah, Noemi Kreif and Andrew M. Jones PART V STATA AND R IN MICROECONOMETRIC APPLICATIONS 17 Stochastic frontier analysis in Stata: using existing and coding new commands 489 Oleg Badunenko 18 Modern R workflow and tools for microeconometric data analysis 518 Giovanni Baiocchi 19 Robust inference in panel data microeconometrics, using R 564 Giovanni Millo 20 Econometric estimation of the “Constant Elasticity of Substitution” function in R: the micEconCES package 596 Arne Henningsen, Géraldine Henningsen and Gergő Literáti Index 641
£48.40
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Teaching Principles of Microeconomics
Book SynopsisTrade Review‘Maier and Ruder compile a valuable collection that will have broad appeal to educators interested in rethinking their approach to the Principles of Microeconomics courses. It distinguishes itself from existing volumes in that it includes multiple paradigms, explores updating content, and brings issues of diversity and inclusion to the forefront. Chapters reviewing more traditional pedagogies (such as cooperative learning and experiments) are presented with a fresh perspective and complemented with chapters describing newer approaches (using social media).’ -- KimMarie McGoldrick, University of Richmond, US‘Maier and Ruder provide an essential guide to those who are interested in revising the syllabus for Introductory Microeconomics. It provides concrete suggestions for course focus, course content, and pedagogy. The component essays are well researched, well written, and challenge the reader to consider a variety of alternatives to “chalk and talk.”’ -- Michael K. Salemi, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, US‘Want to become a better teacher of economics? Mark Maier and Phil Ruder, along with an all-star set of contributors, reimagine introductory economics. Dive in, soak up all of the wisdom, and cleanse yourself from 20th century misconceptions of how and what to teach.’ -- Dirk Mateer, University of Texas at Austin, USTable of ContentsContents: 1 Improving the Principles of Microeconomics course 1 Phil Ruder and Mark Maier PART I TRADITIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 2 The deep work of teaching essential Microeconomic Principles 8 Gail M. Hoyt 3 Considerations for the textbook selection process in Principles of Microeconomics 25 Erin A. Yetter 4 Asynchronicity, access, and content: teaching economics in a shifting landscape 44 Belinda Archibong, Olivia Bobrownicki, Rajiv Sethi, and Homa Zarghamee 5 The issues approach to teaching Principles of Microeconomics 59 Wendy A. Stock 6 Revising the traditional Microeconomics course: engaging students via problem-based, positive, paradigmatic pluralism 74 Geoffrey E. Schneider PART II UPDATING COURSE CONTENT 7 Where is the “behavioral” in Introductory Microeconomics? 88 Simon D. Halliday and Emily C. Marshall 8 Suggestions for incorporating sustainability into Principles of Microeconomics 108 Jack Reardon PART III INCLUSIVE TEACHING 9 Promoting inclusivity in Principles of Microeconomics 124 Jennifer Imazeki 10 Creating an anti-racist pedagogy in Principles of Microeconomics 136 Mary J. Lopez and Fernando Lozano 11 Feminist approaches in the Introductory Microeconomics course 152 Pratistha Joshi Rajkarnikar 12 Promoting gender diversity in Introductory Microeconomics 166 Martha Olney PART IV PEDAGOGY 13 Writing in the Introductory Microeconomics course 180 Nathan D. Grawe and George Cusack 14 Taking advantage of structured peer interaction: cooperative learning in the Principles of Microeconomics course 202 Scott P. Simkins, Mark Maier, and Phil Ruder 15 Teaching with experiments in the Introductory Microeconomics course 217 Tisha L.N. Emerson 16 Teaching the Introductory Microeconomics course with social media 230 Abdullah Al-Bahrani, Darshak Patel, and Brandon Sheridan 17 Teaching Introductory Microeconomics online 243 Steven Greenlaw 18 Using Excel to teach Principles of Microeconomics 257 Humberto Barreto Index
£30.35
John Wiley & Sons Inc The Power to Compete
Book SynopsisIf you''re as interested in Japan as I am, I think you''ll find that The Power to Compete is a smart and thought-provoking look atthe future of a fascinating country. - Bill Gates, 5 Books to Read This Summer Father and son entrepreneur and economist search for Japan''s economic cure The Power to Compete tackles the issues central to the prosperity of Japan and the world in search of a cure for the Japan Disease. As founder and CEO of Rakuten, one of the world''s largest Internet companies, author Hiroshi Mikitani brings an entrepreneur''s perspective to bear on the country''s economic stagnation. Through a freewheeling and candid conversation with his economist father, Ryoichi Mikitani, the two examine the issues facing Japan, and explore possible roadmaps to revitalization. How can Japan overhaul its economy, education system, immigration, public infrastructure, and hold its own with China? Their ideas include applyingTable of ContentsIntroduction Japan Again ix Chapter 1 The Power to Innovate 1 Japan Again 1 The Keys to Revitalizing Japan 4 Keidanren’s Raison Dêtre 7 The Nature of Innovation 11 Schumpeter’s Contribution 15 Building Infrastructure 19 Business Innovation 23 Summary 27 Chapter 2 The Power to Operate 29 Workforce Fluidity 29 Privatization 33 Lifetime Employment 37 Escaping Lifetime Employment 40 Immigration Problems 43 Why English Needs to Be a Common Language in Japan 45 Growing the Population 50 Summary 53 Chapter 3 The Power in Questioning Abenomics 55 History of Abenomics 55 Independence in Finance 59 The Optimal Inflation Rate 62 Halting the Rise of Interest Rates 65 What to Do About Our 1-Quadrillion-Yen Debt 67 The Pros and Cons of Abenomics 70 Summary 75 Chapter 4 The Power of the Low-Cost State 77 The High Cost of Governance 77 How to Reform the High-Cost Structure 83 Addressing the Japanese Disease 87 The United States and Individualism 92 The Impotent Bureaucracy 95 Internationalizing the Bureaucracy 99 Creating Think Tanks 103 Political Appointees 106 What It Will Take to Improve the Bureaucracy 109 Summary 111 Chapter 5 The Power to Succeed Overseas 113 The Decline in the Number of Students Studying Abroad 113 Escaping from the Galapagos Effect 118 The Future of Journalism 121 Media in the Internet Era 125 The Importance of Liberal Arts 131 Ryoichi Mikitani’s Experiences Abroad 134 Summary 137 Chapter 6 The Power to Educate 139 Uniform Japanese Education 139 The Education of the Mikitani Family 141 What the Education System Needs 146 Higher Education 151 What People Study in University 154 The Founding of Rakuten 157 The Evaluation System for Teachers 160 The Need for Strategy in the Japanese Education System 162 Summary 168 Chapter 7 The Power to Build Brand Japan 169 Brand Power 169 The Demonstration Effect 174 Brand Value at the National Level 178 Foreign Nationals Working in Japan 183 Making Japan Attractive to Foreign Nationals 186 Japan and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 189 Summary 195 Conclusion What is the Power to Compete? 197 Japan Uniquely Incorporates and Interprets Cultures 197 Competitiveness as a Platform 200 The Global Logistics Revolution 202 Summary 205 Epilogue 207 Acknowledgments 211 Index 213
£17.09
John Wiley & Sons Inc Microeconomics For Dummies UK
Book SynopsisYour one-stop guide to understanding Microeconomics Microeconomics For Dummies (with content specific to the UK reader) is designed to help you understand the economics of individuals. Using concise explanations and accessible content that tracks directly to an undergraduate course, this book provides a student-focused course supplement with an in-depth examination of each topic. This invaluable companion provides clear information and real-world examples that bring microeconomics to life and introduces you to all the key concepts. From supply and demand to market competition, you''ll understand how the economy works on an individual level, and how it affects you every day. Before long, you''ll be conversant in consumers, costs, and competition. Microeconomics is all about the behaviour of individual people and individual firms. It sounds pretty straightforward, but it gets complicated early on. You may not be an economist, but if you''re a business student at Table of ContentsIntroduction 1 Part I: Getting Started with Microeconomics 5 Chapter 1: Discovering Why Microeconomics Is a Big Deal 7 Chapter 2: Considering Consumer Choice: Why Economists Find You Fascinating! 17 Chapter 3: Looking at Firm Behaviour: What They Are and What They Do 31 Part II: Doing the Best You Can: Consumer Theory 43 Chapter 4: Living a Life without Limits 45 Chapter 5: Considering the Art of the Possible: The Budget Constraint 55 Chapter 6: Achieving the Optimum in Spite of Constraints 67 Part III: Uncovering the Alchemy of Firms’ Inputs and Outputs 85 Chapter 7: Working with Different Costs and Cost Curves 87 Chapter 8: Squeezing Out Every Last Drop of Profit 105 Chapter 9: Supplying the Demanded Information on Supply and Demand 117 Chapter 10: Dreaming of the Consumer’s Delight: Perfect Competition 137 Part IV: Delving into Markets, Market Failure and Welfare Economics 149 Chapter 11: Stepping into the Real World: Oligopoly and Imperfect Competition 151 Chapter 12: Appreciating the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics 167 Chapter 13: Controlling Markets with a Monopoly 179 Chapter 14: Examining Market Failure: Pollution and Parks 197 Chapter 15: Understanding the Dangers of Asymmetric Information 209 Part V: Thinking Strategically: Life Is Just a Game! 219 Chapter 16: Playing Games with Economic Theory 221 Chapter 17: Keeping Things Stable: The Nash Equilibrium 239 Chapter 18: Knowing How to Win at Auctions 249 Chapter 19: Deciphering the Signals: Threats and Benefits 261 Part VI: The Part of Tens 271 Chapter 20: Meeting Ten Great Microeconomists 273 Chapter 21: Ten Top Tips to Take Away 281 Glossary 289 Index 295
£16.99
John Wiley & Sons Inc Footballs Secret Trade
Book SynopsisA no-holds-barred exposé on the financialtransactionsof the world''s favourite sport The transfer fees clubs pay to sign top players now top 4 billion a year but much of the money has been flowing out of the game. A small group of wealthy investors including Russian oligarchs, English racehorse owners and a former billionaire gold miner have seized the opportunity to enter this booming market. Some have moved in on the territory of banks and lent money to clubs in exchange for a share in fees generated by Cristiano Ronaldo, Neymar and dozens more of today''s stars. Others have acquired obscure teams to get a piece of the pie. Even as the global financial crisis sent fortunes tumbling this select group found a profitable place to park their money. The size of the transfer market has continued to rise - it increased seven-fold in value the last two decades, more than the FTSE share index. Between them, these wealthy investors haveamasseTable of ContentsPrologue 1 1 The Son of Jesús 9 2 The Chess Champion 23 3 The British Tax Exile 41 4 An East End Scandal 53 5 The Prime Minister’s Men 67 6 The 100-to-1 Shot 79 7 The Switzerland of South America 93 8 “Todo Pasa” 107 9 Buenos Aires to Manchester 121 10 “I Want 40% for the Boy” 137 11 The Pharmacist’s Medicine 151 12 Working on a Dream 161 13 The Baur au Lac 175 14 The End Game? 187 Epilogue 199 Bibliography 207 Acknowledgments 209 About the Authors 211 Index 213
£19.55
John Wiley & Sons Inc Value for Money
Book SynopsisWritten by two of the world''s most well-known ROI (Return on Investment) gurus, this guide is indispensable for anyone involved in showing the value of money for projects and programs in governments, non-governmental organizations, nonprofits, and businesses. These range from human capital programs to marketing initiatives, technology implementations, systems integrations, quality and lean processes, public health initiatives, procurement procedures, public relations events, risk management policies, economic development programs, corporate social responsibility projects, public policy programs, branding activities, innovation programs, customer satisfaction projects, and everything in between. In a step-by-step process, the book shows how to measure the success of projects and programs, including measuring impact and ROI (Return on Investment). This book also shows how to forecast the value of the project in advance and how to collect data during and after project implementTable of ContentsPraise for Value for Money v Foreword xxv Preface xxvii Value is Changing… xxvii Need for a New Approach xxviii The ROI Methodology: The Enhanced Logic Model xxix We Can’t Measure Our Way to Success xxx Flow of the Book xxxi Acknowledgements xxxv Authors xxxviii 1 The Value Evolution 1 The Value Shift 4 Why Now? 8 Challenges Along the Way 16 Final Thoughts 19 2 Six Ways to Show Value for Money 21 Six Ways to Show Value for Money 25 Barriers to Showing Value for Money 32 Final Thoughts 38 3 Needed: An Enhanced Logic Model 39 A Review of Models 42 Concerns about Current Models 47 How Does Your Current Model Stack Up? 60 Requirements for the Value for Money: A Measurement Process 64 ROI Methodology 65 Terminology: Projects, Solutions, Participants 66 Final Thoughts 67 4 Introducing the ROI Methodology 69 Types of Data 70 The Initial Analysis 75 Using Design Thinking to Deliver and Measure Results 77 The ROI Process Model 78 Operating Standards and Philosophy 87 Implementing and Sustaining the Process 87 Benefits of this Approach 88 Final Thoughts 91 5 Start with Why: Align Programs with the Business 93 Impact Measures are Critical 96 The Challenge 97 The Alignment Model 98 Payoff Needs 99 Business Needs 109 Final Thoughts 118 6 Make it Feasible: Select the Right Solution 119 Performance Needs 122 The Performance Dialogue 122 Use Analysis Techniques 125 Learning Needs 131 Preference Needs 134 Matching Solutions to Needs 135 The Matrix Diagram 136 Selecting Solutions for Maximum Payoff 138 Final Thoughts 140 7 Expect Success: Design for Results 141 The Power of Expectations 144 Defining the Success of Programs 147 Designing for Results at Each Level 149 Developing Objectives at Multiple Levels 152 The Power of Objectives 160 Defining Roles and Responsibilities 162 Planning the Evaluation 166 Final Thoughts 172 8 Make it Matter: Design for Input, Reaction, and Learning 173 Communicating with Results in Mind 174 Changing the Role of Participants 177 Creating Expectations 178 Think ROI 181 Design Input for Results 183 Design Reaction for Results 187 Design Learning for Results 193 Data Collection for Input, Reaction, and Learning 194 Timing of Data Collection 197 Final Thoughts 199 9 Make it Stick: Design for Application and Impact 201 Data Collection for Application and Impact 204 Monitoring Business Performance Data 219 Selecting the Appropriate Method for Each Level 222 Timing of Data Collection 224 Built-In Application Tools 226 Involving the Participants’ Manager or Significant Other 230 Final Thoughts 235 10 Make it Credible: Isolate the Effects of the Program 237 The Importance of Pinpointing the Contribution 240 Preliminary Issues 242 Quantitative and Research Isolation Methods 244 Qualitative Isolation Methods 254 Select the Method 263 Final Thoughts 264 11 Make it Credible: Convert Data to Monetary Value 265 The Importance of Monetary Value 267 Key Steps in Converting Data to Money 270 Standard Monetary Values 272 When Standard Values are Not Available 281 Selecting the Technique 290 Final Thoughts 295 12 Make it Credible: Identify the Intangibles 297 Why Intangibles are Important 299 Measuring and Analyzing Intangibles 304 Final Thoughts 313 13 Make it Credible: Capture Costs of the Program and Calculate ROI 315 The Importance of Costs and ROI 319 Fundamental Cost Issues 320 Specific Costs to Include 325 Cost Tabulation in Action 328 The ROI Calculation 333 Other ROI Measures 342 Final Thoughts 343 14 Tell the Story: Communicate Results to Key Stakeholders 345 The Importance of Communicating Results 352 Principles of Communicating Results 355 The Process for Communicating Results 357 Step 1: Analyze Reason for Communication 359 Step 2: Plan for Communication 359 Step 3: Select Audience 360 Step 4: Develop Reports 363 Step 5: Select Media 363 Step 6: Present Information 370 Step 7: Analyze Reaction 378 Final Thoughts 379 15 Optimize Results: Use Black Box Thinking to Increase Funding 381 Process Improvement is the Key: Black Box Thinking 383 Making Adjustments in Programs 387 The Timing of Changes 390 Increasing ROI 393 Influencing Allocation 396 Final Thoughts 400 16 Forecast the ROI 401 The Importance of Forecasting ROI 407 The Trade-Offs of Forecasting 411 Pre-Program ROI Forecasting 413 Forecasting with a Pilot Program 422 ROI Forecasting with Reaction Data 423 Forecasting Guidelines 427 Final Thoughts 429 17 Make it Work: Sustaining the Change to a Results-Based Process 431 Overcoming Resistance 433 Assess the Climate 434 Develop Roles and Responsibilities 434 Establish Goals and Plans 436 Revise Guidelines and Procedures 438 Prepare the Team 440 Initiate ROI Studies 441 Prepare the Management Team 442 Remove Obstacles 443 Monitor Progress 445 Final Thoughts 446 References 447 Appendix A 459 Appendix B 467 Appendix C 471 Index 473
£91.76
John Wiley and Sons Ltd Construction Microeconomics
Book SynopsisCONSTRUCTION MICROECONOMICS Unique and comprehensive reference describing microeconomic approaches, theories, and models adapted to and developed for the construction industry Construction Microeconomics provides comprehensive coverage of microeconomics applied to the construction industry, focusing on construction clients, who initiate construction projects, and on contractors who transform the ideas and plans of clients into infrastructure and buildings. With the help of microeconomic theory, it tries to answer questions about decision-making by clients, contractors, and governments with respect to projects in the built environment. It includes discussions of alternative theories to mainstream microeconomics, such as new institutional economics, behavioral economics, and the capability approach. Applications from the construction sector including land supply, sustainability, industrialization, and lean construction are provided to ground the theory in practical construction. In ConstTable of ContentsForeword by Gerard de Valence xix Preface xxi References xxvi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Navigating the Maze of Economic Literature 2 1.1.1 Economics 2 1.1.2 Microeconomics 3 1.1.3 Macroeconomics 4 1.1.4 Construction Economics 4 1.2 Tools and Presentations 5 1.2.1 Definitions 5 1.2.2 Economic Scholars 6 1.2.3 Assumptions 6 1.2.4 Case Studies 6 1.2.5 Observations 7 1.2.6 Summaries 7 1.3 Methodological Approach 8 1.3.1 Laws and Regularities 8 1.3.2 Focus and Goals 11 1.3.3 Descriptive and Normative Economics 12 1.4 Theoretical Background 13 1.4.1 Industrial Economics 13 1.4.2 New Institutional Economics 14 1.4.3 Game Theory 15 1.4.4 Auction Theory 16 1.4.5 Behavioral Economics 16 1.4.6 Economics of Information 17 1.4.7 Law and Economics 17 1.5 What You Can and Cannot Expect 17 1.6 Audience 19 1.6.1 Students 19 1.6.2 Lecturers 19 1.6.3 Academics 19 1.6.4 Contractors 19 1.6.5 Owners 20 1.6.6 Policymakers 20 1.7 Structure of the Text 20 1.7.1 Basic Economic Principles 20 1.7.2 Consumers in Perfectly Competitive Markets 21 1.7.3 Producers in Perfectly Competitive Markets 21 1.7.4 Interaction in Perfectly Competitive Markets 21 1.7.5 Imperfect Markets 22 1.7.6 Factor Markets 22 1.7.7 Information, Risk, and Uncertainty 22 1.7.8 Game Theory and Auctions 23 1.7.9 Construction Sector 23 1.7.10 Theory of the Owner 23 1.7.11 Theory of the Contractor 24 1.7.12 Construction Goods 24 1.7.13 Construction Markets 24 1.7.14 Contracting 25 1.7.15 Market Imperfections 25 1.7.16 Government 25 1.7.17 Public Construction Goods 26 1.7.18 Conclusion 26 1.7.19 Synopsis 26 References 27 Part I Microeconomics 31 2 Basic Economic Principles 33 2.1 Consensual Ideas 35 2.2 Scarcity and Choice 36 2.3 Decision-Making 39 2.3.1 Opportunity Costs 39 2.3.2 Incentives 40 2.3.3 Marginal Decisions 41 2.4 Markets 41 2.5 Trade and Comparative Advantage 44 2.6 Government 47 References 48 3 Consumers in Perfectly Competitive Markets 51 3.1 Perfectly Competitive Markets 53 3.2 Consumer Behavior 55 3.2.1 Budget Constraint 55 3.2.2 Preferences and Utility Functions 56 3.2.3 Utility Maximization 60 3.3 Demand Curve 62 3.4 Further Reading 64 References 65 4 Producers in Perfectly Competitive Markets 67 4.1 Producer Behavior 68 4.2 Production Theory 70 4.2.1 Technology 71 4.2.2 Production Functions 75 4.2.2.1 Classical Production Function 77 4.2.2.2 Neoclassical Production Function 79 4.2.2.3 Limitational Production Function 82 4.2.2.4 Technological Change (Innovation) and Learning 83 4.3 Cost Theory 85 4.3.1 Cost Curves for Classical Production Functions 86 4.3.2 Cost Curves for Neoclassical Production Functions 88 4.3.3 Cost Curves for Limitational Production Functions 89 4.3.4 Simplified Cost Function with Constantly Increasing Variable Costs 89 4.3.5 Long-Run Cost Curves 91 4.4 Supply Curve 92 4.4.1 Short-Run Supply Curve of a Firm 92 4.4.2 Long-Run Supply Curve of a Firm 94 4.4.3 Market Supply Curve 94 References 95 5 Interaction in Perfectly Competitive Markets 97 5.1 Equilibrium Price and Quantity 99 5.2 Comparative Statics 101 5.3 Elasticities of Demand and Supply 102 5.4 Consumer and Producer Surplus 106 5.5 Time-Dependent Supply Curves and Market Outcomes 107 5.5.1 Very-Short-Run Supply Curve 108 5.5.2 Short-Run Supply Curve 108 5.5.3 Long-Run Supply Curve 109 5.6 Welfare 110 5.7 Efficiency and Equity 112 References 113 6 Imperfect Markets 115 6.1 Monopoly 117 6.1.1 Normal Monopolies 118 6.1.2 Natural Monopolies 120 6.2 Monopolistic Competition 121 6.3 Monopsony 124 6.4 Oligopoly 125 References 126 7 Factor Markets 129 7.1 Factor Supply of Households 131 7.1.1 Labor Supply 131 7.1.2 Capital Supply 133 7.2 Factor Demand of Firms 135 7.3 Demand and Supply on Factor Markets 137 References 137 8 Uncertainty, Risk, and Information 139 8.1 Uncertainty and Risk 140 8.1.1 Risk Attitudes 141 8.1.2 Risk Strategies 142 8.1.3 Transaction Cost Theory 144 8.2 Information 146 8.2.1 Satisficing Model of Decision-Making 146 8.2.2 Asymmetric Information 149 8.2.2.1 Principal–Agent Theory 149 8.2.2.2 Market Breakdown Due to Asymmetric Information 149 8.2.2.3 Hidden Characteristics and Adverse Selection 150 8.2.2.4 Hidden Intentions and Holdup 151 8.2.2.5 Hidden Action and Moral Hazard 152 8.2.3 Property Rights Theory 153 References 153 9 Game Theory and Auctions 155 9.1 Game Theory 156 9.1.1 Basics of Game Theory 157 9.1.2 Static Games with Complete Information 159 9.1.3 Dynamic Games with Complete Information 160 9.2 Auctions 161 9.2.1 Basics of Auctions 161 9.2.2 English and Vickrey Auctions 163 9.2.3 Dutch Auctions and Sealed-Bid Auctions 164 9.2.4 Competitive Bidding 164 References 167 Part II Applied Construction Microeconomics 169 10 Construction Sector 171 10.1 Definition 172 10.2 Economic Contribution 174 10.2.1 Value-Added Concept 174 10.2.2 Investment Concept 176 10.2.3 Multiplier Concept 177 10.3 Actors in the Construction Sector 179 10.3.1 Market Demand 181 10.3.2 Market Supply 183 10.4 Summary of the Construction Sector 185 References 186 11 Theory of the Owner 189 11.1 The Owner as an Entity 190 11.1.1 Terminology 190 11.1.2 Images and Prejudices 191 11.1.3 Organization 192 11.2 Tasks of the Owner 194 11.3 Behavior of the Owner 195 11.3.1 Consumers Buying Construction Goods 195 11.3.2 Producers Buying Construction Goods 196 11.4 Information of the Owner 197 11.5 Developing a Contract 198 11.6 Procurement of a Contractor 199 11.7 Supervision of the Construction Process 202 11.8 Summary 203 References 203 12 Theory of the Contractor 205 12.1 The Contractor as an Entity 205 12.1.1 Cooperation 206 12.1.2 Organization 207 12.2 Tasks of the Contractor 208 12.3 Behavior of the Contractor 209 12.3.1 Strategy 211 12.3.2 Legal Organization 212 12.3.3 Growth of the Firm 214 12.4 Information of the Contractor 215 12.5 Bidding 216 12.6 Contractor Pricing 217 12.7 Production 220 12.7.1 General Characteristics 220 12.7.2 Production Determinants 222 12.7.2.1 Production Line, Work Shop, Site Construction, Parallel, or Variable Production 222 12.7.2.2 Automatization 224 12.7.2.3 Mass or Single-Item Production 225 12.7.2.4 Continuous and Discontinuous Production 225 12.7.2.5 Summary of Production Types 226 12.7.3 Production Functions and Cost Curves 228 12.7.4 Production Decisions 233 12.8 Summary 234 References 234 13 Construction Goods 237 13.1 Goods and Services 237 13.1.1 Heterogeneity 238 13.1.2 Construction Goods as Transitional Performance Bundles 240 13.1.3 Construction Goods as Contract Goods 242 13.1.4 Construction Goods as Investment 244 13.1.5 Construction Goods as Services 244 13.1.6 Summary of the Characteristics of Construction Goods 246 13.2 Typology of Construction Goods 247 13.2.1 Approach to Developing a Typology 248 13.2.2 Conceptualization 248 13.2.2.1 Choice of Dimensions 249 13.2.2.2 Typical Cases 250 13.2.2.3 Typology 250 13.2.3 Applications 253 13.2.3.1 Market Entry 253 13.2.3.2 Optimum Firm Size 253 13.2.3.3 Strategic Planning 255 13.3 Summary 256 References 256 14 Construction Markets 259 14.1 Characteristics of Markets 259 14.2 Particularities of Construction Markets 261 14.2.1 Goods 261 14.2.2 Owners 262 14.2.3 Markets 262 14.2.4 Summary 263 14.3 Analysis of Construction Markets 263 14.3.1 Heterogeneity 265 14.3.1.1 Observation 266 14.3.1.2 Theory 266 14.3.1.3 Organization 266 14.3.1.4 Structure 266 14.3.1.5 Specialization 267 14.3.1.6 Law 267 14.4 Owners 268 14.5 Contractors 268 14.5.1 Supply 268 14.5.2 Information 269 14.6 Geography of Construction Markets 270 14.6.1 Regional Markets 271 14.6.2 National Markets 274 14.6.3 International Markets 279 14.6.4 Multinational Markets 280 14.6.5 Global Players and Global Markets 283 14.7 Entry and Exit Barriers 285 14.7.1 Effects of the Business Cycle 286 14.7.2 Number of Exits and Entries 290 14.8 Summary 292 References 293 15 Contracting 297 15.1 Construction Goods 298 15.2 Construction Markets 300 15.3 Owner’s Demand 301 15.4 Contractor’s Supply 302 15.5 Construction Contracts 303 15.6 Contracting Market Design 305 15.7 Pricing of Construction Contracts 307 15.7.1 Marginal Cost Decisions Versus Markup Pricing 308 15.7.2 Auctioning 310 15.7.2.1 Construction Goods and Auctions 310 15.7.2.2 Auction Designs 312 15.7.3 Sealed-Bid Auctions 315 15.7.3.1 Pricing in Sealed-Bid Auctions 316 15.7.3.2 Pricing bias 316 15.7.3.3 Information Bias 317 15.7.3.4 Uncertainty Bias 318 15.7.3.5 Technology Advance 319 15.8 Supply and Demand in Construction 319 15.9 The Owner as Monopsonist 320 15.10 Bargaining for the Contract Price 322 15.11 Change Orders and Claims 325 15.12 Summary 326 References 327 16 Market Imperfections 329 16.1 Imperfect Information 329 16.2 Externalities 331 16.3 Collusion and Corruption 334 16.3.1 Collusion 334 16.3.1.1 Naturally Caused Collusion 336 16.3.1.2 Artificially Caused Collusion 337 16.3.2 Corruption 338 16.4 Mechanics or Ethics of Collusion 340 16.5 Conclusion 341 References 342 17 Government 343 17.1 Government as Actor on Markets 344 17.2 Taxes and Subsidies 346 17.3 Regulations 348 17.4 Interest Rates 350 17.5 Inflation 353 References 354 18 Public Goods 355 18.1 Characteristics of Private Goods 356 18.1.1 Rivalry 357 18.1.2 Excludability 358 18.2 Theory of Public Goods 359 18.2.1 Demand of a Public Good Based on Utility 360 18.2.2 Demand for a Public Good Based on Willingness to Pay 361 18.3 Free Riding 362 18.4 Cost–Benefit Analysis 363 18.5 Construction Goods as Public Goods 363 18.6 Strategic Misrepresentation and Optimism Bias 364 References 365 19 Conclusion 367 19.1 Methodical Context 367 19.2 Owners 369 19.3 Contractors 370 19.4 Construction Goods 371 19.5 Construction Markets 371 19.6 Contracting 373 References 374 Index 375
£67.50
John Wiley and Sons Ltd Microeconomics for Public Managers
Book SynopsisNonprofit firms and public institutions are both like and unlike private for-profit firms; this book concentrates on using economic analysis to understand the ways in which NFP enterprises make decisions about which goods and services to provide, how they allocate resources to provide them, and how they decide to whom they should be made available.Trade Review“I think this book begins to fill a serious gap in the market. Many students are turned off by economics because they don't see its applicability for their jobs. This book makes economics relevant to the NFP manager." Robert T. Greenbaum, Ohio State University “This book does a fine job meeting the needs of Public Administration students.” John Graham, Rutgers University “The Keatings’ approach of using cost-benefit analysis as a capstone is for the best, since it gets students to use what they have learned about markets and the information contained in market prices, and what they have learned about market failure, in a unified application.” Michael Rushton, Indiana University “The exercises are a lot more useful for public management students than the ones in standard economics textbooks. They are the kind I end up writing for myself.” John McPeak, Syracuse UniversityTable of ContentsOrganizational Alternatives Part I: Institutional Setting Chapter 1. Managerial Economics in Public and Nonprofit Administration: An Overview Chapter 2. Characteristics of the Government and Private Nonprofit Sectors Part II: Consumer Theory and Public Goods Chapter 3. Demand and Supply Chapter 4. Estimating Client Choice Chapter 5. Market Failure and Public Choice Part III: Production Theory and Public Administration Chapter 6. Production and Costs Chapter 7. Market Structure in Government and Nonprofit Industries Chapter 8. Selecting the Right Niche and Setting Client Fees Chapter 9. Strategic Goals: If Not Profit, What? Part IV: Input Markets and Cost-Benefit Analysis Chapter 10. Employing Labor and Capital Chapter 11. Cost-Benefit Analysis Index
£28.45
MP-WBK World Bank Group Publ Hidden Debt
Book SynopsisThis flagship report for South Asia maps the financial risks from contingent liabilities in South Asian countries and provide policy recommendation to improve management of financial risks at the level of the sovereign, state-owned enterprises.
£37.76
Cornell University Press Traders in Motion
Book SynopsisWith essays covering diverse topics, from seafood trade across the Vietnam-China border, to street traders in Hanoi, to gold shops in Ho Chi Minh City, Traders in Motion spans the fields of economic and political anthropology, geography, and sociology to illuminate how Vietnam''s rapidly expanding market economy is formed and transformed by everyday interactions among traders, suppliers, customers, family members, neighbors, and officials.The contributions shed light on the micropolitics of local-level economic agency in the paradoxical context of Vietnam''s socialist orientation and its contemporary neoliberal economic and social transformation. The essays examine how Vietnamese traders and officials engage in on-the-ground contestations to define space, promote or limit mobility, and establish borders, both physical and conceptual. The contributors show how trading experiences shape individuals'' notions of self and personhood, not just as economic actors, but also in termsTrade ReviewThis edited volumen successfully presents its arguments and analyses with clear contextualization aand well-organized theoretical frameworks... I highly reccomend this book * Sojourn *Inarguably an exceptional collection on Vietnam's contemporary political economy, the book provides a comprehensive and critical update of how post socialism and neo- liberalism interplay (and clash) in Vietnam, and how powerful macrostructures and ideologies shape, and in return, become shaped by grassroots actors through their everyday practices. * Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography *
£97.20
Stanford University Press Black Culture, Inc.: How Ethnic Community Support
Book SynopsisA surprising and fascinating look at how Black culture has been leveraged by corporate America. Open the brochure for the Alvin Ailey American Dance Theater, and you'll see logos for corporations like American Express. Visit the website for the Apollo Theater, and you'll notice acknowledgments to corporations like Coca Cola and Citibank. The Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial and the National Museum of African American History and Culture, owe their very existence to large corporate donations from companies like General Motors. And while we can easily make sense of the need for such funding to keep cultural spaces afloat, less obvious are the reasons that corporations give to them. In Black Culture, Inc., Patricia A. Banks interrogates the notion that such giving is completely altruistic, and argues for a deeper understanding of the hidden transactions being conducted that render corporate America dependent on Black culture. Drawing on a range of sources, such as public relations and advertising texts on corporate cultural patronage and observations at sponsored cultural events, Banks argues that Black cultural patronage profits firms by signaling that they value diversity, equity, and inclusion. By functioning in this manner, support of Black cultural initiatives affords these companies something called "diversity capital," an increasingly valuable commodity in today's business landscape. While this does not necessarily detract from the social good that cultural patronage does, it reveals its secret cost: ethnic community support may serve to obscure an otherwise poor track record with social justice. Banks deftly weaves innovative theory with detailed observations and a discerning critical gaze at the various agendas infiltrating memorials, museums, and music festivals meant to celebrate Black culture. At a time when accusations of discriminatory practices are met with immediate legal and social condemnation, the insights offered here are urgent and necessary. Trade Review"Patricia Banks has turned her critical eye on corporate support for Black cultural institutions as a PR move to trumpet their commitment to social justice. Banks is an astute observer of the world of philanthropy and a superb writer. A compelling read, this book will be an instant classic."—Frank Dobbin, author of Inventing Equal Opportunity"This groundbreaking volume by the premier scholar examining race, art, and cultural economy could not be timelier for understanding the workings of contemporary capitalism and diversity branding. With its scholarly rigor, grounded fieldwork and analysis, this book is a necessary and beautiful must-read for anyone who cares about justice."—Arlene Dávila, author of Latinos, Inc."Black Culture, Inc. is a brilliant contribution to the burgeoning literature on how race shapes organizations. Surveying a wide range of corporate giving to Black cultural institutions—from the National Museum of African American History and Culture to Afropunk—Banks provides a balanced account of its benefits and the potential costs that giving extracts from Black communities."—Victor Ray, The University of Iowa"Many of us rarely think about the connections between race, organizations, and culture, but Patricia Banks's innovative concept of 'diversity capital' shows why we should. Her illuminating book reveals that while today's companies demonstrate their commitment to racial equity with donations to black cultural initiatives, this corporate largesse is more complicated than we might realize."—Adia Harvey Wingfield, author of Flatlining"In this strongly argued and beautifully written book, Banks provides a conceptual framework for understanding the racial politics of organizational behavior. Her concept of 'diversity capital' is rooted in classical sociological theory but pushes that scholarship forward to make it more relevant today. This analysis will be foundational for future work on race and organizations."—Shyon Baumann, co-author of Foodies"Essential reading for anyone curious about why major American corporations seem so intent on 'giving back' to Black cultural institutions. This significant book turns corporate sponsorships into objects of scrutiny, showing how they project an often disingenuous corporate image of caring not only about Black culture but also about Black people."—Ellen Berrey, author of The Enigma of Diversity "Patricia A. Banks makes a vital contribution to sociological theory, illuminating how Black cultural patronage is harnessed by corporations as a tool of financial and cultural power, often with pernicious implications for the same communities who are exploited for their diversity appeal. An important, penetrating analysis."—Linsey McGoey, author of No Such Thing as a Free Gift"As businesses and organizations strive to prove their commitments to equity and inclusion, Black Culture, Inc. provides a nuanced corrective to corporate narratives. Alongside the rich and detailed empirical analysis, the conceptualization of 'diversity capital' is a crucial intervention with relevance across the social sciences."—Dave O'Brien, author of Culture is Bad For You"Black Culture, Inc. is an important book. In connecting corporate sponsorship of Black cultural institutions with urgent issues of racial justice, Banks demonstrates the wide, and often disturbing, ramifications of corporate efforts to increase their 'diversity capital.' Packed with scholarly insights, relevant case studies, and vivid anecdotes, this engaging book should be read by scholars, practitioners, students, and anyone interested in Black cultural institutions and how American corporations use cultural philanthropy."—Victoria D. Alexander, author of Sociology of the Arts"Theoretically rich and empirically jaw-dropping, Black Culture, Inc. is a timely look at the connection between corporate America and ethnoracial identity. Patricia Banks, one of the nation's keenest observers of race and culture, offers a rich, sophisticated, and accessible analysis of how corporations attempt to cultivate unauthentic Black identity. Banks gives readers an insider's look at the arenas – museums, concerts, and cultural festivals – where corporations tie themselves to Black culture and Black people. Black Culture, Inc. is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the contours, complexity, and ironies of race in the United States today."—Tomás R. Jiménez, Stanford University"In Black Culture Inc.: How Ethnic Community Support Pays for Corporate America, Patricia A. Banks provides a dynamic analysis of tensions, power struggles, and pairings between the pursuit of profit and the promise of socio-political change. This book is written in an inviting and informative way that blends insightful scholarly analysis with critical commentary on a variety of contemporary examples of advertising, media, marketing, and branding activity."—Francesca Sobande, Ethnic and Racial StudiesTable of Contents1. Diversity Capital 2. The Racial Return 3. Racism Rehab 4. Cultivating Consumers 5. The Party of the Year 6. Gospel and the Golden Arches 7. #AfropunkWeSeeYou 8. Branding Diversity
£19.79
John Wiley and Sons Ltd Should We Abolish Household Debts?
Book SynopsisWe live in a culture of credit. As wages have stagnated, we’ve seen a dramatic surge in private borrowing across the western world; increasing numbers of households are sucked into a hopeless vortex of spiralling debt, fuelled by exploitative lending. In this book Johnna Montgomerie argues that the situation is chronically dysfunctional, both individually and collectively. She shows that abolishing household debts can put an end to austerity and to the unsustainable forward march of debt-dependent growth. She combines astute economic analysis with the elements of an accessible guide to practical policy solutions such as extending unconventional monetary policy to the household sector, providing pragmatic and affordable refinancing options, and writing off the most pernicious elements of household debt. This framework, she contends, can help us to make our economy fairer and to tackle both the housing crisis and accelerating inequality.Trade Review"Abolishing household debt is heresy to the politicians who brought us bank bailouts and austerity. Johnna Montgomerie explains why so many families in Britain are dependent on borrowing and offers concrete proposals for ending the debt-fuelled growth."—Paul Mason, journalist and author "In this book, Johnna Montgomerie demonstrates that an apparently radical idea, abolishing household debt, is just common sense. Buy it, read it, tell others to do the same."—John Weeks, Coordinator of the Progressive Economy Forum "It is not often that I read a non-fiction book that is an easy read, explains complex economic concepts with metaphors that are simple enough to understand, and make perfect sense. Should we abolish household debts? by Johnna Montgomerie is such a book."—Financial Times "Concise, informative."—Morning Star
£33.25
Bristol University Press What Do Corporations Want
Book Synopsis
£71.99
Emerald Publishing Limited Auctions
Book SynopsisThis is the sixth volume in the series discussing advances in applied microeconomics. It covers issues such as efficiency in auctions when bidders have private information about competitors, lift-lining, the general double auction mechanism, and lottery qualification auctions.
£78.99
Boydell & Brewer Ltd Globalization and Catching-Up in Transition
Book SynopsisGlobalization and post-communist transition are currently two of the most important economic issues. Kolodko considers the links between them, and the way forward for post-socialist economies. Kolodko, former finance minister of Poland, considers the links between issues of globalization and post-communist transition, the two most important economic features of the turn of the century. He discusses the pattern of economic growth and contraction of the past fifty years, and reviews the options for the next half century. He accounts for the severity of the transitional recession in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as a result of both the legacies of the past and current policy mistakes, but demonstrates how structural reforms and gradual institutional building have enabled some post-socialist economies to recover. He proposes that, within the wider context of globalization, several of these emerging market economies will be able to catch up with the more advanced industrial countries, but emphasizes the need for quality growth policies and continuing coordination between development strategies and efforts toward structural reform. Grzegorz W. Kolodko is John C. Evans Professor in European Studies at the University of Rochester, and Director of TIGER -- Transformation, Integration and Globalization Economic Research -- at the Leon Kozminski Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management [WSPiZ].Table of ContentsIntroduction Globalization and Postsocialist Transformation Transitional Recession and the Great Depression of the 1990s Different Paths of Contractions, Recovery and Growth Policy Response and the Role of Institution-building Market Imperfections and the New Role of the Government Small versus Big Government and the Quest for Equitable Growth External Shocks and the Catching-up Process Passive Scenarios and Active Policies for the 21st Century Policy Conclusions
£76.00
Information Age Publishing The Socio-Economic Approach to Management
Book SynopsisThis volume is part of the ongoing collaboration between the RMC series and the Socio-Economic Institute for Firms and Organizations (ISEOR), a French intervention-research think tank co-directed by Henri Savall and Véronique Zardet. Building on an earlier collaboration on the ISEOR approach – Socio-Economic Intervention in Organizations: The Intervener-Researcher and the SEAM Approach to Organizational Analysis (IAP, 2007) – Buono and Savall bring together over 30 talented intervener-researchers to explore and examine the ongoing evolution of the Socio-Economic Approach to Management (SEAM).This volume revisits the application of SEAM in the context of intervention challenges in the wake of the recent economic crisis and the disruptivechange that has taken hold across the world. The basic foundation of SEAM – built on the idea of strategic patience, the need to undertake holistic intervention in organizations, and the challenge to get organizational members to listen to themselves (through what they refer to as the mirror effect) – has remained the same. In response to economic and organizational pressures in the current environment, however, there has been a concomitant emphasis on helping client organizations achieve short-term results while still maintaining focus on the long term. Many ideas that have become part of the current discourse within ISEOR today were not as explicitly addressed in the initial volume – from the destructive effect of the Taylorism-Fayolism-Weberism (TFW) virus, to the need to focus on ways to ensure the sustainability of a SEAM intervention, the growing importance of collaborative interactions between external and internal consultants, and the growing importance of cocreating knowledge with client firms and organizations.
£49.95
Information Age Publishing The Socio-Economic Approach to Management
Book SynopsisThis volume is part of the ongoing collaboration between the RMC series and the Socio-Economic Institute for Firms and Organizations (ISEOR), a French intervention-research think tank co-directed by Henri Savall and Véronique Zardet. Building on an earlier collaboration on the ISEOR approach – Socio-Economic Intervention in Organizations: The Intervener-Researcher and the SEAM Approach to Organizational Analysis (IAP, 2007) – Buono and Savall bring together over 30 talented intervener-researchers to explore and examine the ongoing evolution of the Socio-Economic Approach to Management (SEAM).This volume revisits the application of SEAM in the context of intervention challenges in the wake of the recent economic crisis and the disruptivechange that has taken hold across the world. The basic foundation of SEAM – built on the idea of strategic patience, the need to undertake holistic intervention in organizations, and the challenge to get organizational members to listen to themselves (through what they refer to as the mirror effect) – has remained the same. In response to economic and organizational pressures in the current environment, however, there has been a concomitant emphasis on helping client organizations achieve short-term results while still maintaining focus on the long term. Many ideas that have become part of the current discourse within ISEOR today were not as explicitly addressed in the initial volume – from the destructive effect of the Taylorism-Fayolism-Weberism (TFW) virus, to the need to focus on ways to ensure the sustainability of a SEAM intervention, the growing importance of collaborative interactions between external and internal consultants, and the growing importance of cocreating knowledge with client firms and organizations.
£87.40
CABI Publishing Agricultural Markets in a Transitioning Economy:
Book SynopsisThis book presents major challenges and opportunities facing agriculture sectors in the wake of the transition from a planned to market economy. Using Albania as a case study, it examines the shift from communism to free markets and the lasting effects of such change on agricultural production and education. Using primary research sources to give readers an accurate portrayal of the path that lies ahead for many developing countries, the book also looks at the future of agriculture in transitioning economies.Table of Contents1: Agriculture in Changing Economies 2: Agriculture & Land Reform 3: Agricultural Institutions in Transition 4: Albania’s Agricultural Industry 5: Production 6: Processing 7: Distribution 8: Quality Assurance and Food Safety 9: Consumer Preferences 10: Trade 11: The Agricultural Sector: Trends and Projections 12: The Effects of EU Integration 13: The Importance of Research and Extension Going Forward
£98.68
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Microfoundations Reconsidered: The Relationship
Book SynopsisMost macroeconomists agree that we live in the age of microfoundations. The recent worldwide financial crisis may have emboldened critics of this microfoundational orthodoxy, but it remains the dominant view that macroeconomic models must go beyond supply and demand functions to the level of individual decision-making, taking into account the general dynamic environment where agents live. Microfoundations Reconsidered seeks to reassess how the relationship of micro and macroeconomics evolved over time. The highly regarded contributors to the book argue that the standard narrative of microfoundations is likely to be unreliable. They therefore re-examine the history of the relationship of microeconomics and macroeconomics, starting from their emergence as self-consciously distinct fields within economics in the early 1930s. They seek to go beyond the conventional history that is often told and written by practicing economists. From different perspectives they challenge the association of microfoundations with Robert Lucas and rational expectations and offer both a more complete and a deeper reading of the relationship between micro and macroeconomics. Microfoundations Reconsidered is a valuable addition to the macroeconomic research literature. It is ideally suited to students, scholars, researchers, and practitioners with an interest in macro and microeconomics and the history of economics. Contributors: M. De Vroey, P. Garcia Duarte, D.W. Hands, K.D. Hoover, R. Leonard, G.T. Lima, P.E. MirowskiTrade Review‘. . . this book is very well done. The coverage is in-depth and serious, coming from several different angles methodologically and historically. All the essays are thoughtful and well informed, the net result, indeed, to make clear the foundations of the microfoundations-to-macro approach and its various forms and complications. Deeply informative and mot worthy of serious attention and consideration in this well-edited and -written book.' -- J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., Journal of the History of Economic ThoughtTable of ContentsContents: Foreword John B. Davis Introduction: Privileging Micro Over Macro? A History of Conflicting Positions Pedro Garcia Duarte and Gilberto Tadeu Lima 1. Microfoundational Programs Kevin D. Hoover 2. From Foundational Critique to Fictitious Players: The Curious Odyssey of Oskar Morgenstern Robert Leonard 3. The Rise and Fall of Walrasian Microeconomics: The Keynesian Effect D. Wade Hands 4. The Cowles Commission as an Anti-Keynesian Stronghold 1943–54 Philip E. Mirowski 5. Microfoundations: A Decisive Dividing Line between Keynesian and New Classical Macroeconomics? Michel De Vroey 6. Not Going Away? Microfoundations in the Making of a New Consensus in Macroeconomics Pedro Garcia Duarte Index
£100.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Market Platforms, Industrial Clusters and Small
Book SynopsisThe emergence of specialized markets has profoundly improved the means of market access, enriched the driving forces of value chains, and changed the business environment for small firms in the developing world. This ground-breaking book summarizes the experience of specialized markets in a systematic manner. Specialized markets are a unique product of China's economic transition. They are marketplaces located in industrial clusters, specializing in the wholesale of local commodities and related goods. Ding Ke reveals that, despite their seemingly primitive form, specialized markets appeared in many of the modern industrial sectors and were paradoxically upgraded and expanded as these clusters developed. He argues that specialized markets have also formed solid linkages with marketplaces in various cities in China and in other developing economies. A powerful, emerging market-oriented distribution system has thus appeared. Based on thorough fieldwork covering ten years, and using the novel theory of the platform, this book clarifies the unique development logic of specialized markets. Specialized markets have thoroughly changed the business environment for SMEs in developing countries and greatly enriched the general understanding concerning SME development. This book will prove invaluable for SME, Chinese economy and platform researchers. Management scientists and managers in multinational firms focusing on bottom-of-the-pyramid markets will also find plenty of interesting information in this enlightening compendium.Published in association with the Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO Trade ReviewDing Ke's rich accounts of specialized markets will make for stimulating reading, not only for readers in Chinese economy but also for a broad range of readers in regional planning. --The Developing EconomiesTable of ContentsContents: Introduction 1. Specialized Markets and Small Business Dynamics in China 2. Analytical Framework 3. The General Situation in the “Province of Markets” 4. Local Government and Platform Governance in Yiwu 5. The Specialized Market System in the Daily Necessities Industry: An Observation from Yiwu Market 6. Overseas Linkages of Specialized Markets 7. Producer–Distributor Relationships in Yiwu Market 8. Local Government and Inter-Platform Competition 9. The Logic of Quantitative Expansion and Qualitative Upgrading in the Market Platform Mode Cluster 10. The Typology of Apparel Clusters in China 11. Conclusion Bibliography Index
£99.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Economic Analyses of Social Networks
Book SynopsisThis comprehensive two-volume set brings together important contributions providing fundamental economic analyses of social networks and the central roles they play in many facets of our lives. The first volume consists of classic articles that model network formation and games on networks, as well as those on the identification of peer effects from an econometric viewpoint. The second volume provides empirical analyses of network effects on labor, education, development, crime and industrial organization, as well as some laboratory and field experiments.This set of indispensable papers, with an original introduction by the editors, will prove an essential tool to researchers, scholars and practitioners involved in this field.Trade Review'The economic importance of social interactions not mediated by the market has long been recognized. However, it is only the emergence of network analysis that has supplied a useful method of study. The editors have performed a signal service by their anthology of important articles. They have covered all the major studies and represented well the rapid emergence of a new and important field, to which they have been among the most significant contributors.' -- Kenneth Arrow, Stanford University, USTable of ContentsContents: Volume I: Theory ACKNOWLEDGMENTS INTRODUCTION Matthew O. Jackson and Yves Zenou PART I MODELS OF NETWORK FORMATION 1. Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson (1988), ‘Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value’ 2. Matthew O. Jackson and Asher Wolinsky (1996), ‘A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks’ 3. Bhaskar Dutta and Suresh Mutuswami (1997), ‘Stable Networks’ 4. Venkatesh Bala and Sanjeev Goyal (2000), ‘A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation’ 5. William A. Brock and Steven N. Durlauf (2001), ‘Discrete Choice with Social Interactions’ 6. Matthew O. Jackson and Alison Watts (2002) ‘The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks’ 7. Matthew O. Jackson and Alison Watts (2002), ‘On the Formation of Interaction Networks in Social Coordination Games’ 8. Bhaskar Dutta, Sayantan Ghosal and Debraj Ray (2005), ‘Farsighted Network Formation’ 9. Frank H. Page Jr., Myrna H. Wooders and Samir Kamat (2005), ‘Networks and Farsighted Stability’ 10. Matthew O. Jackson and Brian W. Rogers (2007), ‘Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends: How Random are Social Networks?’ 11. Sergio Currarini, Matthew O. Jackson and Paolo Pin (2009), ‘An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation’ PART II MODELS OF GAMES AND BEHAVIOR ON NETWORKS 12. Robert B. Myerson (1977), ‘Graphs and Cooperation in Games’ 13. Rohit Parikh and Paul Krasucki (1990), ‘Communication, Consensus and Knowledge’ 14. Venkatesh Bala and Sanjeev Goyal (1998), ‘Learning from Neighbours’ 15. Stephen Morris (2000), ‘Contagion’ 16. Michael Suk-Young Chwe (2000), ‘Communication and Coordination in Social Networks’ 17. Peter M. Demarzo, Dimitri Vayanos and Jeffrey Zwiebel (2003), ‘Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions’ 18. Margarida Corominas-Bosch (2004), ‘Bargaining in a Network of Buyers and Sellers’ 19. Coralio Ballester, Antonio Calvó-Armengol and Yves Zenou (2006), ‘Who’s Who in Networks: Wanted: The Key Player’ 20. Yann Bramoullé and Rachel Kranton (2007), ‘Public Goods in Networks’ 21. Matthew O. Jackson and Leeat Yariv (2007), ‘Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network Games’ 22. Dunia López-Pintado (2008), ‘Diffusion in Complex Social Situations’ 23. Andrea Galeotti, Sanjeev Goyal, Matthew O. Jackson, Fernando Vega-Redondo and Leeat Yariv (2010), ‘Network Games’ 24. Benjamin Golub and Matthew O. Jackson (2010), ‘Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds’ 25. Andrea Galeotti and Sanjeev Goyal (2010), ‘The Law of the Few’ 26. Antonio Cabrales, Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Yves Zenou (2011), ‘Social Interactions and Spillovers’ 27. Daron Acemoglu, Munther A. Dahleh, Ilan Lobel and Asuman Ozdaglar (2011), ‘Bayesian Learning in Social Networks’ 28. Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale, Shachar Kariv and Thomas Palfrey (2011), ‘Network Architecture, Salience and Coordination’ 29. Jeanne Hagenbach and Frédéric Koessler (2010), ‘Strategic Communication Networks’ PART III ECONOMETRICS 30. Charles F. Manski (1993), ‘Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem’ 31. Lung Fei Lee (2007), ‘Identification and Estimation of Econometric Models with Group Interactions, Contextual Factors and Fixed Effects’ 32. Yann Bramoullé, Habiba Djebbari and Bernard Fortin (2009), ‘Identification of Peer Effects Through Social Networks’ Volume II: Applications ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AN INTRODUCTION BY THE EDITORS APPEARS IN VOLUME I PART I LABOUR AND EDUCATION 1. Mark S. Granovetter (1973), ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’ 2. Scott A. Boorman (1975), ‘A Combinatorial Optimization Model for Transmission of Job Information Through Contact Networks’ 3. James D. Montgomery (1991), ‘Social Networks and Labor-Market Outcomes: Toward an Economic Analysis’ 4. Giorgio Topa (2001), ‘Social Interactions, Local Spillovers and Unemployment’ 5. Antoni Calvó-Armengol (2004), ‘Job Contact Networks’ 6. Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Matthew O. Jackson (2004), ‘The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality’ 7. Yannis M. Ioannides and Linda Datcher Loury (2004), ‘Job Information Networks, Neighbourhood Effects, and Inequality’ 8. Patrick Bayer, Stephen L. Ross and Giorgio Topa (2008), ‘Place of Work and Place of Residence: Informal Hiring Networks and Labor Market Outcomes’ 9. Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Eleonora Patacchini and Yves Zenou (2009), ‘Peer Effects and Social Networks in Education’ PART II DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 10. Kaivan Munshi (2003), ‘Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U.S. Labor Market’ 11. Jackline Wahba and Yves Zenou (2005), ‘Density, Social Networks and Job Search Methods: Theory and Application to Egypt’ 12. Oriana Bandiera and Imran Rasul (2006), ‘Social Networks and Technology Adoption in Northern Mozambique’ 13. Marcel Fafchamps and Susan Lund (2003), ‘Risk-sharing Networks in Rural Philippines’ PART III CRIME 14. Edward L. Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote and José A. Scheinkman (1996), ‘Crime and Social Interactions’ 15. Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Yves Zenou (2004), ‘Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior’ 16. Coralio Ballester, Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Yves Zenou (2010), ‘Delinquent Networks’ 17. Eleonora Patacchini and Yves Zenou (2012), ‘Juvenile Delinquency and Conformism’ PART IV INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 18. Rachel E. Kranton and Deborah F. Minehart (2001), ‘A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks’ 19. Sanjeev Goyal and Sumit Joshi (2003), ‘Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly’ 20. Sanjeev Goyal and José Luis Moraga-González (2001), ‘R&D Networks’ 21. Brian Uzzi (1996), ‘The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect’ PART V EXPERIMENTS 22. Gary Charness, Margarida Corominas-Bosch and Guillaume R. Fréchette (2007), ‘Bargaining and Network Structure: An Experiment’ 23. Dean Karlan, Markus Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat and Adam Szeidl (2009), ‘Trust and Social Collateral’ 24. Jacob K. Goeree, Arno Riedl and Aljaž Ule (2009), ‘In Search of Stars: Network Formation Among Heterogeneous Agents’ 25. Jacob K. Goeree, Margeret A. McConnell, Tiffany Mitchell, Tracey Tromp and Leeat Yariv (2010), ‘The 1/D Law of Giving’ PART VI OTHER APPLICATIONS 26. James E. Rauch (1999), ‘Networks Versus Markets in International Trade’ 27. Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale (2000), ‘Financial Contagion’ 28. Federico Echenique and Roland G. Fryer, Jr. (2007), ‘A Measure of Segregation Based on Social Interactions’
£739.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Microeconomics of Interactive Economies:
Book SynopsisThis thorough reconstruction of microeconomics 'post-2008' provides economic students with a new way of real-world understanding and strategic qualification that will be better appreciated by their future employers and any professional practice. It will prove essential for economic students and other social science programs at a graduate level. This accessible and engaging textbook includes: A survey of the most famous core models of modern microeconomics including the neoclassical approach and its heterodox critiques - Sraffian, Institutionalist, Post-Keynesian and Mirowskian An introduction to complexity thinking in economics An introduction to game theory An introduction to the methods of complex computer simulation An introduction to strategic behavior An newly integrated approach to real-world and complexity economics, rather than focusing on neoclassical ('perfect') market equilibrium 'plus a thousand recent extra things on top'. See the companion website - www (dot) microeconomics (dot) us - for teaching material, readings, exams and as a general guide to explore issues raised in the book.Trade Review’This microeconomics textbook by Wolfram Elsner provides a timely alternative for understanding the micro roots of uncertainty, complexity and crisis. The evolutionary and institutional perspective sheds new light on contemporary issues such as clusters, networks, innovation and coordination. By reading this textbook, teachers, students and practitioners will open their minds to new economic thinking.’ -- Ping Chen, Peking University, Beijing, Fudan University, Shanghai, China and author of Economic Complexity and Equilibrium Illusion’Here, at last, we have the ideal textbook for microeconomics from an evolutionary and institutional perspective. Wolfram Elsner does nothing less than reconstruct the principles of microeconomics for a world of interactive business networks, change and innovation, crisis and uncertainty, as well as coordination problems and cooperative joint ventures. The publication of this book is a landmark event in microeconomics.’ -- Phillip A. O'Hara, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Australia and President-Elect of AFEE, 2012Table of ContentsContents: Preface – Microeconomics in Times of Crisis: A ‘Post-2008’ Textbook, its Aims and Scope Didactics – How to Work with this Textbook 1. Introduction to the Microeconomics of Interactive Economies 2. Methods for Analyzing Interactive Economies: An Introduction to Game Theory 3. Problem Structures and Processes of Interactive Economies 4. Real-World Markets: Hierarchy, Size, Power, and Direct Interdependence 5. Ideal Neoclassical Market and General Equilibrium 6. Critique of the Neoclassical ‘Perfect Market’ Economy and Alternative Price Theories 7. Methods for Analyzing Complex Processes: An Introduction to Computer Simulation 8. Recent Core Models of Complexity Microeconomics 9. A Universe of Economies: Interdependence and Complexity, System Trajectories, Chaos, and Self-Organization References Index
£38.90
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Public Microeconomics: Efficiency and Equity in
Book SynopsisThis book contains a concise, simple, yet precise discussion of externalities, public goods and insurance. Rooted in the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics and in noncooperative equilibrium, it employs elementary calculus. The book presents established theory in novel ways, and offers the tools for the application of the social welfare criteria of efficiency and equity to environmental economics, networks, bargaining, political economy, and the pricing of public goods and public utilities.This innovative, user-friendly textbook will be of use over a broad range of disciplines. The applications found here include international global-warming issues (North vs. South model), and bargaining over externalities (Coase's theorem). This text also introduces the Wicksell-Lindahl model in its original form, which depicts the parliamentary negotiation between representative parties and provides an effective introduction to political economy. Later, these ideas are applied to the pricing of an excludable public good, revealing the theoretical connection between public utility pricing and the pricing of excludable public goods.The text integrates three forms of discourse: verbal, graphical, and formal. Elementary calculus is frequently used, allowing for clarity and precision; qualities that are often missing in conventional textbooks. The main text considers a finite number of consumers and appendices cover the continuum mathematical model, which is implicit in the references to the 'marginal consumer' found in traditional texts.The analysis found in Public Microeconomics is simple and operational, conducive to computationally easy examples and exercises. This textbook is ideally suited to graduate and upper-level undergraduate courses ineconomics, political science, policy and philosophy.Contents: Preface Foreword to Students 1. Introduction 2. Private Goods Without Externalities 3. Externalities 4. Public Goods 5. Public Utilities 6. Uncertainty and Asymmetrical Information IndexTable of ContentsContents: Preface Foreword to Students 1. Introduction 2. Private Goods Without Externalities 3. Externalities 4. Public Goods 5. Public Utilities 6. Uncertainty and Asymmetrical Information Index
£31.30
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Industrial Organisation of High-Technology
Book SynopsisWhat do Goggle, Facebook, mobile phones and creative commons have in common? The answer is: economics! Stefano Comino and Fabio Manenti have written a crisp and thorough treatment of the economics of information and communications technologies. This valuable book fills a real gap in the market.'- Professor Tommaso Valletti, Imperial College Business School'I enjoyed reading this book immensely. So will students, as they will be able to see lucidly the economics behind their inseparable electronic companions. Researchers keeping a copy at hand will have a rich reference source of the ways in which good economic theory has captured the behaviour of sophisticated firms and their customer.'- Gianni De Fraja, The University of Nottingham, UKThis text rigorously blends theory with real-world applications to study the industrial organization of the ICT sector. Each of the self-contained chapters, which can be studied in isolation, contains theoretical models that are presented in a clear and accessible way. Throughout, a series of useful boxes complements and elucidates the theories with additional empirical/anecdotal evidence. This text will be of great interest to advanced undergraduate students with a background in microeconomics and game theory, particularly those taking courses in industrial organization, innovation economics and the economics of networks.The authors address the most important issues and are able to explore and explain complex theories and concepts in a clear, logical and coherent manner.Some of the topics covered include:- the economics of innovation- digital markets- network externalities- two-sided networks- imitation, open source and file sharing- antitrust in high-tech sectors.Contents: 1. Industrial Organisation of High-Tech Markets 2. Digital Markets 3. Network Externalities 4. Two-Sided Networks 5. Access and Interconnection in Telecommunications 6. Cumulative Innovation in Dynamic Industries 7. Imitation, Open Source and File Sharing 8. Antitrust in High-Tech Sectors References IndexTrade Review‘What do Google, Facebook, mobile phones and creative commons have in common? The answer is: economics! Stefano Comino and Fabio Manenti have written a crisp and thorough treatment of the economics of information and communications technologies. This valuable book fills a real gap in the market.’ -- Tommaso Valletti, Imperial College Business School, UK‘I enjoyed reading this book immensely. So will students, as they will be able to see lucidly the economics behind their inseparable electronic companions. Researchers keeping a copy at hand will have a rich reference source of the ways in which good economic theory has captured the behaviour of sophisticated firms and their customer.’ -- Gianni De Fraja, The University of Nottingham, UKTable of ContentsContents: 1. Industrial Organisation of High-Tech Markets 2. Digital Markets 3. Network Externalities 4. Two-Sided Networks 5. Access and Interconnection in Telecommunications 6. Cumulative Innovation in Dynamic Industries 7. Imitation, Open Source and File Sharing 8. Antitrust in High-Tech Sectors References Index
£102.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Free to Fail: Creative Destruction Revisited
Book SynopsisThis challenging book tackles one of the most fundamental questions in economics: Why are commercial organizations more efficient than organizations in the public domain?It is generally accepted that the traditional answer (the fact that commercial organizations maximize profits) does not necessarily hold true. Finding a solution to this anomaly, as this book attempts to do, should therefore be a prime concern in economics. The authors believe the answer lies in the fact that even in a completely stable environment, all organizations will eventually fail irreparably. Organizations operating in the market are more efficient because, once in decline, they are 'free to fail' and allowed to be disassembled or even replaced. Public organizations that fail are more often than not protected and allowed to continue even though their efficiency is questionable.This fascinating and thought-provoking book will provide a stimulating read for academics and students with an interest in economics, business and management and public policy.Contents:Preface 1. Introduction 2. Key Concepts 3. The Historic Debate 4. Profit Maximization is Only Part of the Answer 5. Organizational Mortality and its Fruits 6. Causes of Organizational Failure 7. Uncontrollability 8. Empirical Evidence 9. The Soft Constraint Syndrome 10. When Left to its Own Devices 11. Necrosis and Apoptosis 12. Why Public Organizations? Appendix: The Dutch Affair or the Destructive Power of Organizational Warfare References IndexTrade ReviewFree to Fail offers a thought-provoking perspective on what happens to organizations, and introduces a new organizational failure theory of ''uncontrollability''. Uncontrollability theory furnishes a novel and alternative reason to profit maximization for why private sector organizations tend to be more efficient than public sector organizations. Free to Fail is thought-provoking and fun to read, and can be warmly recommended to anyone interested in learning about how organizations fail and the broader social and economic implications of organizational mortality.' --Simon C. Parker, University of Western Ontario, Canada'Free to Fail provides an exceptionally rigorous analysis of many extant theories of organizational failure, persuasively demonstrating that organizational control - or the inherent and inevitable lack thereof - is the most proximate and important source of demise.' --David Lowery, Pennsylvania State University, USTable of ContentsContents: Preface 1. Introduction 2. Key Concepts 3. The Historic Debate 4. Profit Maximization is Only Part of the Answer 5. Organizational Mortality and its Fruits 6. Causes of Organizational Failure 7. Uncontrollability 8. Empirical Evidence 9. The Soft Constraint Syndrome 10. When Left to its Own Devices 11. Necrosis and Apoptosis 12. Why Public Organizations? Appendix: The Dutch Affair or the Destructive Power of Organizational Warfare References Index
£84.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Microfoundations Reconsidered: The Relationship
Book SynopsisMost macroeconomists agree that we live in the age of microfoundations. The recent worldwide financial crisis may have emboldened critics of this microfoundational orthodoxy, but it remains the dominant view that macroeconomic models must go beyond supply and demand functions to the level of individual decision-making, taking into account the general dynamic environment where agents live. Microfoundations Reconsidered seeks to reassess how the relationship of micro and macroeconomics evolved over time. The highly regarded contributors to the book argue that the standard narrative of microfoundations is likely to be unreliable. They therefore re-examine the history of the relationship of microeconomics and macroeconomics, starting from their emergence as self-consciously distinct fields within economics in the early 1930s. They seek to go beyond the conventional history that is often told and written by practicing economists. From different perspectives they challenge the association of microfoundations with Robert Lucas and rational expectations and offer both a more complete and a deeper reading of the relationship between micro and macroeconomics. Microfoundations Reconsidered is a valuable addition to the macroeconomic research literature. It is ideally suited to students, scholars, researchers, and practitioners with an interest in macro and microeconomics and the history of economics. Contributors: M. De Vroey, P. Garcia Duarte, D.W. Hands, K.D. Hoover, R. Leonard, G.T. Lima, P.E. MirowskiTrade Review‘. . . this book is very well done. The coverage is in-depth and serious, coming from several different angles methodologically and historically. All the essays are thoughtful and well informed, the net result, indeed, to make clear the foundations of the microfoundations-to-macro approach and its various forms and complications. Deeply informative and mot worthy of serious attention and consideration in this well-edited and -written book.' -- J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., Journal of the History of Economic ThoughtTable of ContentsContents: Foreword John B. Davis Introduction: Privileging Micro Over Macro? A History of Conflicting Positions Pedro Garcia Duarte and Gilberto Tadeu Lima 1. Microfoundational Programs Kevin D. Hoover 2. From Foundational Critique to Fictitious Players: The Curious Odyssey of Oskar Morgenstern Robert Leonard 3. The Rise and Fall of Walrasian Microeconomics: The Keynesian Effect D. Wade Hands 4. The Cowles Commission as an Anti-Keynesian Stronghold 1943–54 Philip E. Mirowski 5. Microfoundations: A Decisive Dividing Line between Keynesian and New Classical Macroeconomics? Michel De Vroey 6. Not Going Away? Microfoundations in the Making of a New Consensus in Macroeconomics Pedro Garcia Duarte Index
£29.95
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd The Microfoundations Delusion: Metaphor and Dogma
Book SynopsisIn this challenging book, John King makes a sustained and comprehensive attack on the dogma that macroeconomic theory must have 'rigorous microfoundations'. He draws on both the philosophy of science and the history of economic thought to demonstrate the dangers of foundational metaphors and the defects of micro-reduction as a methodological principle. Strong criticism of the microfoundations dogma is documented in great detail, from some mainstream and many heterodox economists and also from economic methodologists, social theorists and evolutionary biologists. The author argues for the relative autonomy of macroeconomics as a distinct 'special science', cooperating with but most definitely not reducible to microeconomics. The Microfoundations Delusion will prove a stimulating and thought-provoking read for scholars, students and researchers in the fields of economics, heterodox economics and history of economic thought.Trade Review'This excellent book documents the creation of what has become the first commandment of orthodox macroeconomics: that microeconomic theory provides its foundation because this is the most secure form of economic knowledge. By contrast, John King shows conclusively that microeconomics cannot play such a role when assessed by the criteria of logic, or of science, or of economics itself. Indeed, he goes further and demonstrates that the microfoundations dogma detracts from knowledge about how economies actually operate, and instead generates patently false conclusions. Moreover, the dogma is shown to have blinded orthodox economists from even seeing the possibility of typical macroeconomic crises, and has disarmed them in formulating policies that would eliminate actual crises. The book therefore deals with a topic at the very heart of the present debacle in the world economy.' --Michael Howard, University of Waterloo, Canada'A generation ago Dudley Dillard wrote a famous article on the ''barter illusion in classical and neoclassical economics''. Now John King has gone a step further and written about the microfoundations delusion. The illusion has been with us for a very long time, the delusion is of more recent vintage. Together they have blocked a basic understanding of macroeconomic and monetary phenomena at a time when they are most urgently needed. This is a book that had to be written, and we are fortunate that it is John King who has written it. Essential reading for our times.' --John Smithin, York University, Canada'King's book, apart from its rather contentious conclusion that there is no inherent hierarchy between micro and macro, covers, every issue relevant to the debate majestically and in great detail. It is this reviewer s sense that, should the profession choose to engage with this book in a substantial and sustained way, these methodological questions which have lurked underneath the surface of economic discourse since at least Keynes s time can finally and once and for all be resolved.' --Philip Pilkington, Review of Keynesian EconomicsTable of ContentsContents: 1. Introduction Part I: Microfoundations and the Philosophy of Science 2. Microfoundations as a (Bad) Metaphor 3. Microfoundations as Micro-reduction 4. Two Case Studies: Biology and Social Science Part II: Microfoundations in the History of Economics and Other Social Sciences 5. ‘Microfoundations’ in the Literature of Economics, Part I: 1936–1975 6. ‘Microfoundations’ in the Literature of Economics, Part II: 1975–2012 7. Crossing the Border: ‘Microfoundations’ in the Other Social Sciences Part III: Dissenting Voices 8. The Dissenters, Part I: The Post Keynesians 9. The Dissenters, Part II: Mainstreamers, Austrians and Institutionalists 10. The Economic Methodologists and Microfoundations 11. Conclusion References Index
£31.30
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Building Competitive Gas Markets in the EU:
Book SynopsisForeword by Walter BoltzThis highly unique book focuses on market design issues common to most EU gas markets, particularly in the context of closer integration. It explores in detail the characteristics and requirements of national gas markets in Europe, which are constructed as virtual hubs based on entry/exit schemes as a requirement of European law.The expert contributors analyze gas supply and demand patterns in the EU, showing that both have changed following the introduction of liquefied natural gas on the supply side and the growth of gas-fired power plants on the demand side. The repeated interactions between the transmission operators' activity and the gas commodity markets are addressed, as is the design of commercial networks in EU markets. The contributors also question whether the relationship between commercial and physical networks, in terms of the 'new' flexibility requirements of users, actually works. By way of conclusion, two proposals for the EU gas target model are presented, both of which tackle the fundamental issues raised in this book, as well as the organization of short-term transactions and the mechanisms for investment in vital new long-life infrastructure needed to integrate EU markets.This volume will be of great interest to practitioners, as well as academics, researchers and students in the fields of energy economics and industrial economics. Both European and non-European energy companies and regulatory authorities looking for an independent and analytical overview of European gas markets will also find this book to be a highly valuable resource.Contents: Foreword by Walter Boltz Introduction Part I: The New European Gas Market: Increased Flexibility in Both Demand and Supply 1. Introduction to Part I 2. Gas Demand: The Role of Gas-fired Power Plants 3. Gas Supply: The Role of Liquefied Natural Gas by Sophia Ruester Part II: The Role Played by Networks Regulation 4. Introduction to Part II 5. Opening a Market for Gas Flexibility? Part III: EU Regulation in the Context of the EU Target Model 6. Introduction to Part III 7. A Vision for the EU Gas Target Model: MECO-S 8. An American Model for the EU Gas Market? by Sergio Ascari Conclusions Bibliography IndexTrade Review‘The book represents a valuable work for scholars and students who are interested to better understand the European gas markets and regulations as well as existing debates about gas market models. The book balances general ideas and concepts with rather detailed description of speci?c regulatory mechanisms.’ -- Andrei V. Belyi, Journal of World Energy Law & BusinessTable of ContentsForeword by Walter Boltz Contents: Foreword by Walter Boltz Introduction Part I: The New European Gas Market: Increased Flexibility in Both Demand and Supply 1. Introduction to Part I 2. Gas Demand: The Role of Gas-fired Power Plants 3. Gas Supply: The Role of Liquefied Natural Gas by Sophia Ruester Part II: The Role Played by Networks Regulation 4. Introduction to Part II 5. Opening a Market for Gas Flexibility? Part III: EU Regulation in the Context of the EU Target Model 6. Introduction to Part III 7. A Vision for the EU Gas Target Model: MECO-S 8. An American Model for the EU Gas Market? by Sergio Ascari Conclusions Bibliography Index
£105.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Knowledge-Intensive Entrepreneurship in Low-Tech
Book SynopsisThe normal enterprise, contrary to widespread prejudice, can do well out of intense knowledge, without bothering with snobbish high-tech delusions. In this respect, the present book deals with all the questions you might have been afraid to ask. It offers explanation, policy and practical conclusions in an international perspective. It is a compelling read!'- Arndt Sorge, Professor Emeritus, WZB, GermanyThis book contributes to the discussion about the relevance of knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship for industrial innovation in the context of traditional low-technology industries.There is a widespread assumption that low-tech industries offer limited opportunities for entrepreneurial activity due to their mature character. Yet there are indications that the phenomenon is finally emerging in these traditional sectors. This detailed book contributes to the ongoing political debate on relevant policy measures to promote future industrial innovation. It extends awareness of the relevance of low-tech industries for future economic and societal development, linking both scientific and political perspectives. Detailed chapters identify the typical patterns, prerequisites and impacts of knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship, as well as the distribution of entrepreneurial activities in low-tech sectors. The authors conclude with policy recommendations to promote such activities.This book will appeal to social scientists, economists and students of innovation and entrepreneurship studies. Policy-makers and company representatives will also find much of interest in this book, with its surprising insights into a field that has been so far neglected in the scientific as well as the policy-oriented debate.Contributors: Y.D. Caloghirou, T.F. Fernandes, M.M. Godinho, A. Havas, H. Hirsch-Kreinsen, G. Karagouni, I. Kastelli, R.P. Mamede, A. Protogerou, I. Schwinge, A. Tsakanikas, A.Y. YudanovTrade Review'Despite their minimal application of research and development, industries such as manufacturing, food, and publishing occupy an important role in production expansion and employment opportunities. The editors of Knowledge-Intensive Entrepreneurship in Low-Tech Industries point out the alarming gap that characterizes today's research in regard to industrial innovation and transformation. The book provides detailed studies that explain KIE activities at multiple levels as it emphasizes the origins, characteristics, strategies, organization, and performance of such activities. . . the book should raise significant interest among researchers, scholars, advisors and policy makers who are interested in the revival of manufacturing sectors in the developing world.' -- Chaza Fares Abdul, Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship‘The normal enterprise, contrary to widespread prejudice, can do well out of intense knowledge, without bothering with snobbish high-tech delusions. In this respect, the present book deals with all the questions you might have been afraid to ask. It offers explanation, policy and practical conclusions in an international perspective. It is a compelling read!’ -- Arndt Sorge, Professor Emeritus, WZB, GermanyTable of ContentsContents: Introduction 1. Knowledge-intensive Entrepreneurship in Low-tech Industries Hartmut Hirsch-Kreinsen and Isabel Schwinge PART I: CHARACTERISTICS, PATTERNS AND IMPACT 2. Exploring Knowledge-intensive Entrepreneurship in High-tech and Low-tech Manufacturing Sectors: Differences and Similarities Yannis D. Caloghirou, Aimilia Protogerou and Aggelos Tsakanikas 3. Patterns of Knowledge-intensive Entrepreneurship in Low-tech Industries Hartmut Hirsch-Kreinsen 4. The Impact of Knowledge-intensive Entrepreneurship on the Growth and Competitiveness of European Traditional Industries Ioanna Kastelli and Yannis D. Caloghirou PART II: STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS 5. Patterns and Determinants of Trademark Use in Portugal Ricardo P. Mamede, Teresa F. Fernandes and Manuel M. Godinho 6. High-growth LMT Firms and the Evolution of the Russian Economy Andrei Y. Yudanov 7. The Relevance of the ‘Dynamic Capabilities’ Perspective in Low-tech Sectors Aimilia Protogerou, Yannis D. Caloghirou and Glykeria Karagouni 8. Readjusting the Perspective on LMT Firms in Product Supply Chains in Light of Knowledge-intensive Activity Isabel Schwinge PART III: POLICY ISSUES 9. Trapped by the High-tech Myth: The Need and Chances for a New Policy Rationale Attila Havas 10. Policy Measures for the Promotion of Knowledge-intensive Entrepreneurship in Low-tech Industries Hartmut Hirsch-Kreinsen and Isabel Schwinge Index
£100.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Industrial Organisation of High-Technology
Book SynopsisWhat do Goggle, Facebook, mobile phones and creative commons have in common? The answer is: economics! Stefano Comino and Fabio Manenti have written a crisp and thorough treatment of the economics of information and communications technologies. This valuable book fills a real gap in the market.'- Professor Tommaso Valletti, Imperial College Business School'I enjoyed reading this book immensely. So will students, as they will be able to see lucidly the economics behind their inseparable electronic companions. Researchers keeping a copy at hand will have a rich reference source of the ways in which good economic theory has captured the behaviour of sophisticated firms and their customer.'- Gianni De Fraja, The University of Nottingham, UKThis text rigorously blends theory with real-world applications to study the industrial organization of the ICT sector. Each of the self-contained chapters, which can be studied in isolation, contains theoretical models that are presented in a clear and accessible way. Throughout, a series of useful boxes complements and elucidates the theories with additional empirical/anecdotal evidence. This text will be of great interest to advanced undergraduate students with a background in microeconomics and game theory, particularly those taking courses in industrial organization, innovation economics and the economics of networks.The authors address the most important issues and are able to explore and explain complex theories and concepts in a clear, logical and coherent manner.Some of the topics covered include:- the economics of innovation- digital markets- network externalities- two-sided networks- imitation, open source and file sharing- antitrust in high-tech sectors.Contents: 1. Industrial Organisation of High-Tech Markets 2. Digital Markets 3. Network Externalities 4. Two-Sided Networks 5. Access and Interconnection in Telecommunications 6. Cumulative Innovation in Dynamic Industries 7. Imitation, Open Source and File Sharing 8. Antitrust in High-Tech Sectors References IndexTrade Review‘What do Google, Facebook, mobile phones and creative commons have in common? The answer is: economics! Stefano Comino and Fabio Manenti have written a crisp and thorough treatment of the economics of information and communications technologies. This valuable book fills a real gap in the market.’ -- Tommaso Valletti, Imperial College Business School, UK‘I enjoyed reading this book immensely. So will students, as they will be able to see lucidly the economics behind their inseparable electronic companions. Researchers keeping a copy at hand will have a rich reference source of the ways in which good economic theory has captured the behaviour of sophisticated firms and their customer.’ -- Gianni De Fraja, The University of Nottingham, UKTable of ContentsContents: 1. Industrial Organisation of High-Tech Markets 2. Digital Markets 3. Network Externalities 4. Two-Sided Networks 5. Access and Interconnection in Telecommunications 6. Cumulative Innovation in Dynamic Industries 7. Imitation, Open Source and File Sharing 8. Antitrust in High-Tech Sectors References Index
£37.95
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Disequilibrium Sports Economics: Competitive
Book SynopsisAndreff and his contributors bring a strong dose of reality to the economic modelling of sports leagues. Disequilibrium Sports Economics provides an intellectually compelling opening and a theoretically necessary antidote to the study of sports economics.'- Andrew Zimbalist, Smith College, US'This is an interesting book worth reading for every sports economist because it introduces a thought provoking approach to the growing field of sports economics. The authors show how disequilibrium economics may improve our understanding of puzzling economic phenomena in sports. I congratulate the editor and the contributors for this new book and the novel perspectives provided therein!'- Helmut M. Dietl, University of Zurich, Switzerland'I felt great intellectual excitement after getting acquainted with this volume. The high quality papers by Wladimir Andreff and his co-authors are more significant than the topic indicated modestly by the title; they may not only urge economists of sport to reconsider their earlier theories, but may also provide inspiration and a new momentum to the wide research program on disequilibrium and the soft budget constraint.'- János Kornai, Harvard University, US and Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary'This book sounds like a theoretical breakthrough towards a new approach in sports economics that generates important insights into the issue of financial fair play in football.'- Andrea Traverso, Head of Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play, UEFA'This path-breaking volume contains novel analysis of problems of critical importance to sports clubs, leagues, fans and academics interested in sports.'- Robert Simmons, Lancaster University Management School, UKFor decades, sports economics has been set within the framework of equilibrium economics, in particular when modelling team sport leagues. Based on a conviction that this does not reflect real life, this book addresses a gap in the literature and opens up a new research area by applying concepts drawn from disequilibrium economics. It is divided into two parts, the first of which focuses on economic disequilibrium in sports markets and competitive imbalance in sporting contests. The second part concentrates on soft budget constraints and their consequences for club governance and management.This pioneering book is the first to tackle non-mainstream economics in sport and offers a first approach to disequilibrium sports economics. Providing a new metric of competitive balance and opening up new avenues of future research, this is essential reading for economists and those researching sport across many disciplines.Contributors: W. Andreff, E. Franck, J.-P. Gayant, N. Le Pape, R.D. Macdonald, K. Nielsen, R.K. Storm, G.N. Tuck, D. van Reeth, A.R. WhittenTrade Review‘Disequilibrium Sports Economics: Competitive Imbalance and Budget Constraints? ?introduces a new research area in sport management.? ? . . . it touches on important topics surrounding team-sport leagues.? ?The book certainly provides not only a sport-economic aspect but also a communication/media aspect of sport. Sport management faculty and students could use? ?the book as excellent supplemental reading.’ -- International Journal of Sport Communication?‘Andreff and his contributors bring a strong dose of reality to the economic modelling of sports leagues. Disequilibrium Sports Economics provides an intellectually compelling opening and a theoretically necessary antidote to the study of sports economics.’ -- Andrew Zimbalist, Smith College, US‘This is an interesting book worth reading for every sports economist because it introduces a thought provoking approach to the growing field of sports economics. The authors show how disequilibrium economics may improve our understanding of puzzling economic phenomena in sports. I congratulate the editor and the contributors for this new book and the novel perspectives provided therein!’ -- Helmut M. Dietl, University of Zurich, Switzerland'I felt great intellectual excitement after getting acquainted with this volume. The high quality papers by Wladimir Andreff and his co-authors are more significant than the topic indicated modestly by the title; they may not only urge economists of sport to reconsider their earlier theories, but may also provide inspiration and a new momentum to the wide research program on disequilibrium and the soft budget constraint.' -- János Kornai, Harvard University, US and Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary'This book sounds like a theoretical breakthrough towards a new approach in sports economics that generates important insights into the issue of financial fair play in football.' -- Andrea Traverso, Head of Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play, UEFA'This path-breaking volume contains novel analysis of problems of critical importance to sports clubs, leagues, fans and academics interested in sports.' -- Robert Simmons, Lancaster University Management School, UK‘As a whole, the book provides an original and realistic view that can and perhaps even must shape the future of sports economics.’ -- Nicolas Scelles, Journal of Economics and Political EconomyTable of ContentsContents: 1. A New Research Area: Disequilibrium Sports Economics Wladimir Andreff PART I ECONOMIC DISEQUILIBRIUM AND COMPETITIVE IMBALANCE 2. An Attempt at Disequilibrium Modelling a Team Sports League Wladimir Andreff 3. Management Reference Points for Sporting Leagues: Simulating League Expansion and the Effect of Alternative Player Drafting Regulations Geoff N. Tuck, Robert D. Macdonald and Athol R. Whitten 4. The Metrics of Competitive Imbalance Jean-Pascal Gayant and Nicolas Le Pape 5. Disequilibrium on the Sports Programmes Market: The Gender Imbalance in TV Coverage and TV Viewership of the 2012 Olympic Games Daam van Reeth PART II TEAMS AND LEAGUES WITH SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 6. Soft Budget Constraints in European and US leagues: Similarities and Differences Rasmus K. Storm and Klaus Nielsen 7. Governance of Professional Team Sports Clubs: Agency Problem and Soft Budget Constraint Wladimir Andreff 8. Regulation in Leagues with Clubs’ Soft Budget Constraints: The Effect of the New UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations on Managerial Incentives and Suspense Egon Franck Index
£105.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd The Economics of E-Commerce
Book SynopsisThis research review, written by two pioneers of e-commerce, discusses thirty of the most important papers written in the fields of economics, marketing and strategy. Topics covered include evaluation of the benefit to consumers of competition and product variety online, examination of auctions and reputational feedback mechanisms designed to mitigate informational asymmetries in online markets, and the debate on digital property rights including privacy, piracy and the open source movement. The review provides a thoughtful and accessible consideration of the subject of e-commerce, invaluable to scholars and practitioners alike.Table of ContentsContents Introduction Michael R. Baye and John Morgan PART I PLATFORMS AS STRATEGIC ACTORS 1. Michael R. Baye and John Morgan (2001), ‘Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets’, American Economic Review, 91 (3), June, 454–74 2. Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2003), ‘Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1 (4), June, 990–1029 3. Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien (2003), ‘Chicken and Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers’, RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (2), Summer, 309–28 4. Mark Armstrong (2006), ‘Competition in Two-Sided Markets’, RAND Journal of Economics, 37 (3), Autumn, 668–91 5. Andrei Hagiu (2009), ‘Two-Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing Structures’, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 18 (4), Winter, 1011–43 6. Gerard J. Tellis, Eden Yin and Rakesh Niraj (2009), ‘Does Quality Win? Network Effects Versus Quality in High-Tech Markets’, Journal of Marketing Research, XLVI (2), April, 135–49 PART II IS E-COMMERCE FRICTIONLESS? PRICE DISPERSION AND OBFUSCATION ONLINE 7. Erik Brynjolfsson and Michael D. Smith (2000), ‘Frictionless Commerce? A Comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers’, Management Science, 46 (4), April, 563–85 8. Michael R. Baye, John Morgan and Patrick Scholten (2004), ‘Price Dispersion in the Small and in the Large: Evidence from an Internet Price Comparison Site’, Journal of Industrial Economics, LII (4), December, 463–96 9. Michael R. Baye, J. Rupert J. Gatti, Paul Kattuman and John Morgan (2009), ‘Clicks, Discontinuities, and Firm Demand Online’, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 18 (4), Winter, 935–75 10. Glenn Ellison and Sara Fisher Ellison (2009), ‘Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet’, Econometrica, 77 (2), March, 427–52 11. Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson (2006), ‘Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121 (2), May, 505–40 12. Jennifer Brown, Tanjim Hossain and John Morgan (2010), ‘Shrouded Attributes and Information Suppression: Evidence from the Field’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125 (2), May, 859–76 PART III DOES E-COMMERCE BENEFIT CONSUMERS? INFORMATION, PRODUCT VARIETY, AND COMPETITION 13. Fiona Scott Morton, Florian Zettelmeyer and Jorge Silva-Risso (2001), ‘Internet Car Retailing’, Journal of Industrial Economics, XLIX (4), December, 501–19 14. Jeffrey R. Brown and Austan Goolsbee (2002), ‘Does the Internet Make Markets More Competitive? Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry’, Journal of Political Economy, 110 (3), June, 481–507 15. Erik Brynjolfsson, Yu (Jeffrey) Hu and Michael D. Smith (2003), ‘Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the Value of Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers’, Management Science, 49 (11), November, 1580–96 16. Chris Forman, Anindya Ghose and Avi Goldfarb (2009), ‘Competition Between Local and Electronic Markets: How the Benefit of Buying Online Depends on Where You Live’, Management Science, 55 (1), January, 47–57 PART IV ONLINE AUCTIONS FOR PRODUCTS AND ADVERTISING 17. Hal R. Varian (2007), ‘Position Auctions’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25 (6), December, 1163–78 18. Benjamin Edelman and Michael Schwarz (2010), ‘Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions’, American Economic Review, 100 (2), May, 597–602 19. Patrick Bajari and Ali Hortaçsu (2003), ‘The Winner’s Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions’, RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (2), Summer, 329–55 PART V MITIGATING INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES: REPUTATION, RECOMMENDATION, AND FEEDBACK MECHANISMS 20. Paul Resnick, Richard Zeckhauser, John Swanson and Kate Lockwood (2006), ‘The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment’, Experimental Economics, 9 (2), June, 79–101 21. Daniel Houser and John Wooders (2006), ‘Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay’, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 15 (2), Summer, 353–69 22. Gary E. Bolton, Elena Katok and Axel Ockenfels (2004), ‘How Effective Are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation’, Management Science, 50 (11), November, 1587–1602 23. Chrysanthos Dellarocas (2003), ‘The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms’, Management Science, 49 (10), October, 1407–24 24. Yan Chen, F. Maxwell Harper, Joseph Konstan and Sherry Xin Li (2010), ‘Social Comparisons and Contributions to Online Communities: A Field Experiment on MovieLens’, American Economic Review, 100 (4), September, 1358–98 25. Judith A. Chevalier and Dina Mayzlin (2006), ‘The Effect of Word of Mouth on Sales: Online Book Reviews’ Journal of Marketing Research, XLIII (3), August, 345–54 PART VI BATTLES FOR DIGITAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PRIVACY, PIRACY, AND THE OPEN SOURCE MOVEMENT 26. Rafael Rob and Joel Waldfogel (2006), ‘Piracy on the High C’s: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students’, Journal of Law and Economics, XLIX (1), April, 29–62 27. Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Koleman Strumpf (2007), ‘The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Political Economy, 115 (1), February, 1–42 28. Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz (2006), ‘Privacy, Property Rights and Efficiency: The Economics of Privacy as Secrecy’, Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 4 (3), September, 209–39 29. Avi Goldfarb and Catherine E. Tucker (2011), ‘Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising’, Management Science, 57 (1), January, 57–71 30. Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole (2002), ‘Some Simple Economics of Open Source’, Journal of Industrial Economics, L (2), June, 197–234 Index
£343.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial
Book SynopsisIndustrial organization studies how markets allocate resources, specifically when there are few agents or when there are frictions that render the price-taking paradigm unsuitable. Game theory explores situations in which agents interact strategically and provides a useful foundation for studying many traditional industrial organization topics.The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main tools of game theory that are used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, and learning and information sharing models.Technical yet accessible, this comprehensive resource will be required reading for both established researchers as well as graduate or advanced undergraduate students in industrial economics and game theory.Contributors incude: R. Amir, A. Attar, G.I. Bischi, F. Bloch, L. Corchón, S. Currarini, C. d'Aspremont, F. Feri, J. Gabszewicz, M. Jensen, L. Julien, F. Lamantia, I. Macho-Stadler, M. Marini, E. Maskin, D. Perez-Castrillo, C. Pimienta, D. Radi, R.A. Ritz, K. Ritzberger, O. Tarola, J. Thisse, A. Urbano, P. Ushchev, X. Vives, J. ZhaoTrade Review'With these two volumes, Professors Corchon and Marini have provided an invaluable public good to our profession. Corchon and Marini have gathered leading scholars to present a broad and deep overview of the definitive impact that game theory had and still continues to have on the field of industrial organization over the recent years. Any serious researcher willing to take stock of advances in the field should certainly consider to study the material covered in these volumes, from the more fundamental issues in Volume 1 to the more applied topics presented in Volume 2.' --David Martimort, Paris School of Economics, France'The publication of this Handbook, bringing together game theory and industrial organization, is an occasion worth celebrating. . . . I am truly delighted that there is now a Handbook devoted to this transformative partnership.' --From the foreword by Eric Maskin'Game theoretic methods are central in the study of oligopoly markets. The surveys in this Handbook provide a broad introduction to the relevant game theory topics and their applications in oligopoly theory. There is an emphasis on recent developments, such as lattice theory and supermodular games. The Handbook will be a valuable resource for researchers and students.' --Robert Porter, Northwestern University, USTable of ContentsContents: Foreword by Eric Maskin 1. Introduction Luis C. Corchón and Marco A. Marini PART I BASIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2. Strategic complementarities in oligopoly Xavier Vives 3. On the Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies and the theory of supermodular games Rabah Amir 4. Aggregative games Martin Kaae Jensen 5. Monopolistic competition without apology Jacques-François Thisse and Philip Ushchev 6. Oligopoly and product differentiation Jean J. Gabszewicz and Ornella Tarola 7. Oligopolistic competition and welfare Robert A. Ritz PART II DYNAMIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 8. Dynamic games Klaus Ritzberger 9. Strategic refinements Carlos Pimienta 10. Stackelberg games Ludovic A. Julien 11. Entry games and free entry equilibria Michele Polo 12. Evolutionary oligopoly games with heterogeneous adaptive players Gian Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Davide Radi PART III GAMES OF COLLUSION IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 13. Coalitions and networks in oligopolies Francis Bloch 14. TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperation Jingang Zhao PART IV INFORMATION GAMES 15. Trading under asymmetric information: positive and normative implications Andrea Attar and Claude d’Aspremont 16. Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions Inés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez‐Castrillo 17. Learning in markets Amparo Urbano 18. Information sharing in oligopoly Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri Index
£233.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Handbook of Experimental Game Theory
Book SynopsisThe Handbook of Experimental Game Theory offers a comprehensive analysis of the field, discussing foundational topics that are at the core of applied game theory. It highlights the nuances that scientific experiments have delivered to our understanding of strategic interactions among decision makers. Leading experts explore methodological considerations and games of complete and incomplete information to offer new directions for research in experimental game theory. Chapters demonstrate transformative behavioral research focused on classic topics in game theory such as cooperation and coordination games. Taking a scientific approach to the study of game theory, this innovative Handbook provides an insight into laboratory and field experiments that test game theoretic propositions and suggests new ways of modeling strategic behavior. It takes a forward-thinking position, addressing the challenges inherent in innovations surrounding the measurement of strategic behavior using experimental methods. This Handbook will prove to be a valuable resource for scholars and students who are looking to gain a broader understanding of experimental game theory and how to contribute to its advancement. It will also be of particular interest to researchers in experimental and behavioral economics.Trade Review'This Handbook is a must-have resource for experimental economists and game theorists. It consists of authoritative contributions from top researchers in the areas it covers. The topics range from methodology to surveys of important and active research in experimental game theory. The Handbook is both rigorous in its treatment of the topics as well as accessible to readers not familiar with the areas of coverage.' --Charles Noussair, University of Arizona, US'Every game theorist and experimental economist should have this book and use it to analyze data, design experiments, and understand their results.' --Elizabeth Hoffman, Iowa State University, USTable of ContentsContents: Introduction to the Handbook of Experimental Game Theory 1 C. Mónica Capra, Rachel T.A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon and Tanya S. Rosenblat PART I A SAMPLING OF METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS 1 Stochastic game theory for social science: a primer on quantal response equilibrium 8 Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt and Thomas R. Palfrey 2 The experimetrics of depth-of-reasoning models 48 Peter G. Moffatt 3 The process of choice in games 69 Giorgio Coricelli, Luca Polonio and Alexander Vostroknutov 4 Games with continuous-time experimental protocols 95 Alexander L. Brown and Daniel G. Stephenson 5 Bargaining in the field 125 Marco Castillo and Ragan Petrie PART II EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION 6 Recent advances in experimental coordination games 149 David J. Cooper and Roberto A. Weber 7 Public goods, norms and cooperation 184 Marie Claire Villeval 8 Cooperation among strangers with and without a monetary system 213 Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari 9 Game-theoretic accounts of social norms: the role of normative expectations 241 Cristina Bicchieri and Alessandro Sontuoso 10 Strategies used by non-human primates in dynamic games 256 Mackenzie F. Webster, Julia Watzek and Sarah F. Brosnan 11 Reciprocity in games with unknown types 271 Garret Ridinger and Michael McBride 12 Behavioral rules 289 Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Johannes Buckenmaier PART III EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 13 Strategic information transmission: a survey of experiments and theoretical foundations 311 Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim 14 Communication and information in games of collective decision: a survey of experimental results 348 César Martinelli and Thomas R. Palfrey 15 Voting game experiments with incomplete information: a survey 376 Jens Großer 16 Experiments in market design 399 Siqi Pan Index
£214.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial
Book SynopsisIndustrial organization studies how markets allocate resources, specifically when there are few agents or when there are frictions that render the price-taking paradigm unsuitable. Game theory explores situations in which agents interact strategically and provides a useful foundation for studying many traditional industrial organization topics.The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main tools of game theory that are used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, and learning and information sharing models.Technical yet accessible, this comprehensive resource will be required reading for both established researchers as well as graduate or advanced undergraduate students in industrial economics and game theory.Contributors incude: R. Amir, A. Attar, G.I. Bischi, F. Bloch, L. Corchón, S. Currarini, C. d'Aspremont, F. Feri, J. Gabszewicz, M. Jensen, L. Julien, F. Lamantia, I. Macho-Stadler, M. Marini, E. Maskin, D. Perez-Castrillo, C. Pimienta, D. Radi, R.A. Ritz, K. Ritzberger, O. Tarola, J. Thisse, A. Urbano, P. Ushchev, X. Vives, J. ZhaoTrade Review'With these two volumes, Professors Corchon and Marini have provided an invaluable public good to our profession. Corchon and Marini have gathered leading scholars to present a broad and deep overview of the definitive impact that game theory had and still continues to have on the field of industrial organization over the recent years. Any serious researcher willing to take stock of advances in the field should certainly consider to study the material covered in these volumes, from the more fundamental issues in Volume 1 to the more applied topics presented in Volume 2.' --David Martimort, Paris School of Economics, France'The publication of this Handbook, bringing together game theory and industrial organization, is an occasion worth celebrating. . . . I am truly delighted that there is now a Handbook devoted to this transformative partnership.' --From the foreword by Eric Maskin'Game theoretic methods are central in the study of oligopoly markets. The surveys in this Handbook provide a broad introduction to the relevant game theory topics and their applications in oligopoly theory. There is an emphasis on recent developments, such as lattice theory and supermodular games. The Handbook will be a valuable resource for researchers and students.' --Robert Porter, Northwestern University, USTable of ContentsContents: Foreword by Eric Maskin 1. Introduction Luis C. Corchón and Marco A. Marini PART I BASIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2. Strategic complementarities in oligopoly Xavier Vives 3. On the Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies and the theory of supermodular games Rabah Amir 4. Aggregative games Martin Kaae Jensen 5. Monopolistic competition without apology Jacques-François Thisse and Philip Ushchev 6. Oligopoly and product differentiation Jean J. Gabszewicz and Ornella Tarola 7. Oligopolistic competition and welfare Robert A. Ritz PART II DYNAMIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 8. Dynamic games Klaus Ritzberger 9. Strategic refinements Carlos Pimienta 10. Stackelberg games Ludovic A. Julien 11. Entry games and free entry equilibria Michele Polo 12. Evolutionary oligopoly games with heterogeneous adaptive players Gian Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Davide Radi PART III GAMES OF COLLUSION IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 13. Coalitions and networks in oligopolies Francis Bloch 14. TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperation Jingang Zhao PART IV INFORMATION GAMES 15. Trading under asymmetric information: positive and normative implications Andrea Attar and Claude d’Aspremont 16. Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions Inés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez‐Castrillo 17. Learning in markets Amparo Urbano 18. Information sharing in oligopoly Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri Index
£47.45
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd The Economic Theory of Incentives
Book SynopsisThis comprehensive research review recaps major literary contributions to the economic theory of incentives. These carefully selected papers, both classic and contemporary, analyse collective decision problems in the context of asymmetric information, moral hazard and incomplete contracting. This review is an essential tool for any serious scholar and student in the field. Table of ContentsContents: Introduction David Martimort PART I COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION A. Public Goods and the Free Riding Problem 1. Claude d’Aspremont and Louis-André Gérard-Varet (1979), ‘Incentives and Incomplete Information’, Journal of Public Economics, 11 (1), February, 25–45 2. Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1977), ’Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods’, Econometrica, 45 (2), March, 427–38 3. Theodore Groves (1973), ‘Incentives in Teams’, Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 617–31 4. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1979), ‘A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms’, in Jean-Jacques Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences: Studies in Public Economics Volume 2, Part IV, Chapter 16, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, New York, NY, USA and Oxford, UK: North-Holland Publishing Company, 289–308 5. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1980), ‘A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms’, Econometrica, 48 (6), September, 1507–20 6. George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite (1990), ‘Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents’, Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 351–67 B. Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle 7. Allan Gibbard (1973), ‘Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result’, Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 587–601 8. Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond and Eric Maskin (1979), ‘The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility’, Review of Economic Studies, 46 (2), April, 185–216 9. Roger B. Myerson (1979), ‘Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem’, Econometrica, 47 (1), January, 61–73 10. Roger B. Myerson (1982), ‘Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems’, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10 (1), June, 67–81 C. Full Implementation 11. Joel S. Demski and David Sappington (1984), ‘Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents’, Journal of Economic Theory, 33 (1), June 152–71 12. Eric Maskin (1999), ‘Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality’, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 23–38 13. Eric Maskin and John Moore (1999), ‘Implementation and Renegotiation’, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 39–56 14. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), ‘Subgame Perfect Implementation’, Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 1191–1220 15. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1990), ‘Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization’, Econometrica, 58 (5), September, 1083–99 16. Thomas R. Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava (1989), ‘Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies’, Econometrica, 57 (1), January, 115–34 17. Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1990), ‘Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms’, Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 453–75 D. Interim Efficiency 18. Bengt Holmström and Roger B. Myerson (1983), ‘Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information’, Econometrica, 51 (6), November, 1799–1819 19. John O. Ledyard and Thomas R. Palfrey (1999), ‘A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods’, Econometrica, 67 (2), March, 435–48 E. Auctions 20. Jacques Crémer and Richard P. McLean (1988), ‘Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions’, Econometrica, 56 (6), November, 1247–57 21. Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu (2001), ‘Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations’, Econometrica, 69 (5), September, 1237–59 22. Eric Maskin and John Riley (1989), ‘Optimal Multi-unit Auctions’, in Frank Hahn (ed.), The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games, Chapter 14, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 312–35 23. Roger B. Myerson (1981), ‘Optimal Auction Design’, Mathematics of Operations Research, 6 (1), February, 58–73 24. John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson (1981), ‘Optimal Auctions’, American Economic Review, 71 (3), June, 381–92 F. Robust Mechanism Design 25. Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris (2005), ‘Robust Mechanism Design’, Econometrica, 73 (6), November, 1771–1813 26. Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu and William R. Zame (2006), ‘The Limits of Ex Post Implementation’, Econometrica, 74 (3), May, 585–610 27. Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1992), ‘Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules’, Journal of Economic Theory, 56 (2), April, 378–99 28. Zvika Neeman (2004), ‘The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design’, Journal of Economic Theory, 117 (1), July, 55–77 29. Robert Wilson (1987), ‘Game-Theoretic Analyses of Trading Processes’, in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, Chapter 2, Cambridge, UK, New York, NY, USA and Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press, 33–70 G. The Coase Theorem under Asymmetric Information: Scope and Value 30. Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite (1983), ‘Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading’, Journal of Economic Theory, 29 (2), April, 265–81 31. Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer (1987), ‘Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently’, Econometrica, 55 (3), May, 615–32, 1493 (Erratum) 32. Steven R. Williams (1999), ‘A Characterization of Efficient, Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms’, Economic Theory, 14 (1), July, 155–8 PART II COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS UNDER MORAL HAZARD A. Moral Hazard in Teams 33. Bengt Holmström (1982), ‘Moral Hazard in Teams’, Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (2), Autumn, 324–40 34. Patrick Legros and Steven A. Matthews (1993), ‘Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships’, Review of Economic Studies, 60 (3), July, 599–611 35. Eric Rasmusen (1987), ‘Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams’, RAND Journal of Economics, 18 (3), Autumn, 428–35 36. David Rahman (2012), ‘But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?’, American Economic Review, 102 (6), October, 2767–97 B. The Firm as a Hierarchy: Relative or Joint Performance Evaluations? 37. Yeon-Koo Che and Seung-Weon Yoo (2001), ‘Optimal Incentives for Teams’, American Economic Review, 91 (3), June, 525–41 38. Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), ‘Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts’, Journal of Political Economy, 89 (5), October, 841–64 39. Hideshi Itoh (1991), ‘Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations’, Econometrica, 59 (3), May, 611–36 40. Dilip Mookherjee (1984), ‘Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents’, Review of Economic Studies, LI (3), July, 433–46 41. Barry J. Nalebuff and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1983), ‘Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition’, Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (1), Spring, 21–43 42. Ching-To Ma (1988), ‘Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents’, Review of Economic Studies, LV (4), October, 555–71 Volume II Contents: Introduction An introduction by the editor appears in Volume I PART I COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS: INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING AND THE NON-VERIFIABILITY PARADIGM A. Property Rights, Authority and Capital Structure 1. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1992), ‘An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting’, Review of Economic Studies, 59 (3), July, 473–94 2. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), ‘Formal and Real Authority in Organizations’, Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1), February, 1–29 3. Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan Reichelstein (1996), ‘Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment’, American Economic Review, 86 (3), June, 478–501 4. Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (1994), ‘A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (4), November, 1027–54 5. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’, Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691–719 6. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), ‘Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm’, Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6), December, 1119–58 [40] 7. Jean Tirole (1986), ‘Procurement and Renegotiation’, Journal of Political Economy, 94 (2), April, 235–59 B. The Foundations of Incomplete Contracts 8. Ilya Segal (1999), ‘Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts’, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 57–82 9. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (1999), ‘Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts’, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 83–114 C. Relational Contracts and Subjective Evaluations 10. Jonathan Levin (2003), ‘Relational Incentive Contracts’, American Economic Review, 93 (3), June, 835–57 11. W. Bentley MacLeod and James M. Malcomson (1989), ‘Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment’, Econometrica, 57 (2), March, 447–80 12. W. Bentley MacLeod (2003), ‘Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation’, American Economic Review, 93 (1), March, 216–40 PART II COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS: THE MULTI-CONTRACTING ORGANIZATION A. Collusion: When Agents Share Information and Coordinate Actions 13. Hideshi Itoh (1993), ‘Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing’, Journal of Economic Theory, 60 (2), August, 410–27 14. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1999), ‘Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior’, RAND Journal of Economics, 30 (2), Summer, 232–62 15. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1991), ‘The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (4), November, 1089–1127 16. Jean Tirole (1986), ‘Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (2), Fall, 181–214 17. Hal R. Varian (1990), ‘Monitoring Agents With Other Agents’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (1), March, 153–74 B. Collusion with Asymmetric and Soft Information 18. Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim (2006), ‘Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation’, Econometrica, 74 (4), July, 1063–1107 19. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1997), ‘Collusion under Asymmetric Information’, Econometrica, 65 (4), July, 875–911 C. Hierarchies and Decentralization 20. Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjöström (1998), ‘Decentralization and Collusion’, Journal of Economic Theory, 83 (2), December, 196–232 21. David P. Baron and David Besanko (1992), ‘Information, Control, and Organizational Structure’, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1 (2), Summer, 237–75 22. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1998), ‘Collusion and Delegation’, RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (2), Summer, 280–305 23. Nahum D. Melumad, Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1995), ‘Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts’, RAND Journal of Economics: Symposium on the Economics of Organization, 26 (4), Winter, 654–72 24. Dilip Mookherjee and Masatoshi Tsumagari (2004), ‘The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of Delegation and Intermediation’, Econometrica, 72 (4), July, 1179–1219 D. Multilateral Contracting and Common Agency 25. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986), ‘Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CI (1), February, 1–31 26. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986), ‘Common Agency’, Econometrica, 54 (4), July, 923–42 27. David Martimort and Lars Stole (2002), ‘The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games’, Econometrica, 70 (4), July, 1659–73 28. David Martimort and Lars Stole (2009), ‘Market Participation in Delegated and Intrinsic Common-Agency Games’, RAND Journal of Economics, 40 (1), Spring, 78–102 29. Ilya Segal (1999), ‘Contracting with Externalities’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIV (2), May, 337–88 E. Endogenous Common Agency 30. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998), ‘Exclusive Dealing’, Journal of Political Economy, 106 (1), February, 64–103 31. David Martimort (1996), ‘Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory’, RAND Journal of Economics, 27 (1), Spring, 1–31 Index
£756.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd The Economics of Sports Betting
Book SynopsisThis unique book examines how sports betting markets function. Charting recent international developments, expert contributors consider how both bookmakers and stakeholders view these changes, their prime areas of concern and the potential methods for addressing them. Providing a rigorous economic analysis throughout, this book examines the informational efficiency of betting markets and the prevalence of corruption and illegal betting in sports. Against this background, chapters explore pertinent questions such as: should gambling markets be privatized? Is the `hot hand' hypothesis real or a myth? Are the `many' smarter than the `few' in estimating betting odds? How are prices set in fixed odds betting markets? Chapters also review important policy concerns such as the health implications posed by the potential link between the accelerating popularity of sports betting and the decline in sports participation. Academics and students studying economics, sports economics and, more specifically, sports betting will find this book an engaging companion. Contemporary and up to date, it will also appeal to stakeholders looking to widen their professional insight.Contributors include: B. Buraimo, X. Che, S. Dobson, A. Feddersen, D. Forrest, J. García, J. Goddard, K. Grote, B. Humphreys, V. Matheson, R. Paul, D. Peel, L. Pérez, P. Rodríguez, J. Ruseski, R. Simmons, P. Westmoreland, A. Weinbach, R. Wheeler, J. YangTable of ContentsContents: Introduction 1. Consumer Spending on Spectator Sports, Physical Activity, and Sports Betting: Evidence from Canada Brad R. Humphreys, Jane E. Ruseski and Jie Yang 2. Should Gambling Markets be Privatized? An Examination of State Lotteries in the United States Kent R. Grote and Victor A. Matheson 3. Price Setting and Competition in Fixed Odds Betting Markets Xiaogang Che, Arne Feddersen and Brad R. Humphreys 4. Evaluating Probabilities for a Football In-play Betting Market Stephen Dobson and John Goddard 5. Forecasting Football Match Results: Are the Many Smarter Than the Few? Jaume García, Levi Pérez and Plácido Rodríguez 6. New Empirical Evidence on the Tote-SP Anomaly and its Implications for Models of Risky Choice in Gambling Markets Babatunde Buraimo, David Peel and Robert Simmons 7. Market Efficiency and the Favorite-longshot Bias: Evidence from Handball Betting Markets Arne Feddersen 8. Hot Arms and the Hot Hand: Bettor and Sportsbook Reaction to Team and Pitcher Streaks in Major League Baseball Rodney Paul and Andrew Weinbach 9. Investigating the “Hot hand” Hypothesis: An Application to European Football Rob Simmons and Rhys Wheeler 10. Sports Corruption and Developments in Betting Markets David Forrest Index
£94.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Institutions and Evolution of Capitalism: Essays
Book SynopsisGeoff Hodgson has made substantial contributions to institutional and evolutionary economics, economic methodology, the history of economic thought and social theory. To mark his seminal work, this book features original contributions by world-leading scholars from fields that have played a significant role in influencing his thinking or represent key debates to which he has contributed. Building on some of the central philosophical and methodological foundations underlying Hodgson's thinking, the book is organized around the recurring themes of institutions, evolution and capitalism. The contributors explore key connections between philosophy, the history of economic thought, and institutional and evolutionary economics in the light of Hodgson's often path-breaking work. A vital read for institutional, evolutionary and heterodox economists, this book sheds new light on Hodgson's position in these fields. Drawing together critical insights, this is also an important book for economics scholars looking to improve their understanding of current theory. Contributors include: M.C. Becker, C. Camic, J.B. Davis, S. Deakin, K. Dopfer, G. Dosi, S. Dow, F. Gagliardi, D. Gindis, J. Groenewegen, G.M. Hodgson, T. Knudsen, R.N. Langlois, T. Lawson, L. Marengo, C. Ménard, J.S. Metcalfe, P. Mirowski, A. Nuvolari, U. Pagano, J. Potts, J.W. Stoelhorst, A. Tylecote, V.J. Vanberg, J. VromenTrade Review'We are in an era when fundamental debates about the nature of the economy and economics are not mere academic curiosities but an urgent necessity for society. Long-dominant theories have crumbled and major challenges loom. Bold new thinking is required and few have been bolder than Geoffrey Hodgson. This volume, by a distinguished group of scholars, gives new insights into Hodgson's decades-long body of work and will surely spark new ideas and debate. The economy is an evolutionary system and someday future historians will say ''Hodgson was right.''' --Eric Beinhocker, University of Oxford, UK and author of The Origin of Wealth'This impressive collection is a fitting tribute to Geoff Hodgson, with substantial contributions from senior colleagues covering the many areas in economics in which he has worked over the course of a long and successful career.' --Jochen Runde, University of Cambridge, UK'Geoffrey Hodgson has for some time been one of the most creative and provocative writers arguing for a more evolutionary economics that paid more attention to the institutions driving and molding economic change. This collection of essays in his honor is of broad scope and high quality. They provide a pleasurable, informative read.' --Richard R. Nelson, Columbia University, USTable of ContentsContents: PART I INTRODUCTION 1 Institutions and evolution of capitalism in Geoff Hodgson’s work 2 Francesca Gagliardi and David Gindis PART II FOUNDATIONS 2 Geoff Hodgson on pluralism and historical specificity 14 Sheila C. Dow 3 Mathematical modelling in economics: seeking a rationale 29 Tony Lawson 4 Dissembling nature, elusive economy 44 Philip Mirowski 5 The rest of the resume: Veblen’s teaching and service activities 62 Charles Camic 6 Hodgson, cumulative causation and reflexive economic agents 78 John B. Davis PART III INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 7 Bridging Original and New Institutional Economics? 93 John Groenewegen 8 Dimensionalizing institutions 110 Claude Ménard 9 Juridical ontology and the theory of the firm 127 Simon Deakin 10 The corporation is not a nexus of contracts: it’s an iPhone 142 Richard N. Langlois 11 Property, possession and knowledge 157 Ugo Pagano 12 Near misses – a capitalist aborted take-off and a no-show: the United Provinces and Ming China 178 Andrew Tylecote 13 Institutions are neither autistic maximizers nor flocks of birds: self-organization, power and learning in human organizations 194 Giovanni Dosi, Luigi Marengo and Alessandro Nuvolari PART IV EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 14 Industry and Trade : Marshall’s magnificent dynamics 215 J. Stanley Metcalfe 15 Generalized Darwinism, the nature of selection and market efficiency 231 J.W. Stoelhorst 16 Cultural evolution, group selection and downward causation 250 Viktor J. Vanberg 17 Generalized Darwinism, routines and morality 264 Jack Vromen 18 The ubiquity of habits and routines and their contribution to management theory 282 Markus C. Becker 19 The role of selection processes in organizational evolution 299 Thorbjørn Knudsen 20 Why is evolutionary economics not an empirical science? 314 Kurt Dopfer and Jason Potts PART V GEOFF HODGSON ON GEOFF HODGSON 21 A conversation with Geoff Hodgson 328 Francesca Gagliardi, David Gindis and Geoffrey M. Hodgson Index 353
£122.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd The Evolution of the Theory of the Firm
Book SynopsisThis stimulating research review analyses how the theory of the firm evolved from several core concepts and building blocks that underpin this important area of economics. It discusses a variety of perspectives from leading scholars in the field, including the basic elements of: risk and uncertainty; information and knowledge; bounded rationality and decision making; motives and incentives; resources and capabilities; and transactions. The review goes on to examine how the various elements are integrated into the modern Theory of the Firm with the notion of organization coming increasingly to the fore. It focuses on norms; rules and routines; the entrepreneur; governance; hierarchies; co-operation, teams and networks; innovation and appropriability. This comprehensive review will be an invaluable reference tool for all researchers and students with an interest in the modern theory of the firm, highlighting how it needs to evolve further to address the important management and policy issues of our time.Trade Review‘From Coase to Williamson to Hart and Holmström, the theory of the firm has not only evolved but also been duly celebrated. But these ideas have important applications besides firms (e.g., Ostrom on polycentric governance, to name just one) and the formalization of these ideas during this evolution has, as always, been a double-edged sword - sharpening logic and testing, while narrowing causal mechanisms and behavioral assumptions. Teece and Kay do a wonderful job curating the wide range of ideas, approaches, and applications that may fall by the wayside if future researchers learn only from those most celebrated thus far. One might guess that the future evolution of the theory of the firm is more likely to have roots in these volumes than in the canon to date.’ -- Robert Gibbons, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USTable of ContentsContents: Acknowledgements Introduction David J. Teece and Neil M. Kay PART I OVERVIEWS 1. Nicolai J. Foss, Henrik Lando and Steen Thomsen (2000), ‘The Theory of the Firm’, in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume III: The Regulation of Contracts, Article No. 5610, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 631–58 2. Fritz Machlup (1967), ‘Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial’, American Economic Review, LVII (1), March, 1–33 3. Oliver Hart (1989), ‘An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm’, Columbia Law Review: Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 (7), November, 1757–74 4. Harold Demsetz (1988), ‘The Theory of the Firm Revisited’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (1), Spring, 141–61 5. Brian J. Loasby (1971), ‘Hypothesis and Paradigm in the Theory of the Firm’, Economic Journal, 81 (324), December, 863–85 PART II RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 6. Frank H. Knight ([1921] 1964), ‘The Meaning of Risk and Uncertainty’, in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Part Three, Chapter VII, New York, NY, USA: Augustus M. Kelley, 197–232 7. John Maynard Keynes (1936), ‘The State of Long-Term Expectation’, in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Book IV, Chapter 12, New York, NY, USA: Harcourt, Brace and World, 147–64 8. Armen A. Alchian (1950), ‘Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory’, Journal of Political Economy, 58 (3), June, 211–21 9. Richard N. Langlois and Metin M. Cosgel (1993), ‘Frank Knight on Risk, Uncertainty, and the Firm: A New Interpretation’, Economic Inquiry, XXXI (3), July, 456–65 10. Kenneth J. Arrow (1982), ‘Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics’, Economic Inquiry, XX (1), January, 1–9 11. David Teece, Margaret Peteraf and Sohvi Leih (2016), ‘Dynamic Capabilities and Organizational Agility: Risk, Uncertainty, and Strategy in the Innovation Economy’, California Management Review, 58 (4), Summer, 13–35 PART III INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE 12. Michael Polanyi ([1966] 2009), ‘Tacit Knowing’, in The Tacit Dimension, with a new foreword by Amartya Sen, Chapter 1, Chicago, IL, USA and London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 3–25 13. Kenneth J. Arrow (1962), ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’, in Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research and Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council (eds), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, Part VI, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press and New York, NY, USA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 609–26 14. F. A. Hayek (1945), ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, American Economic Review, XXXV (4), September, 519–30 15. Ikujiro Nonaka, Ryoko Toyama and Akiya Nagata (2000), ‘A Firm as a Knowledge-creating Entity: A New Perspective on the Theory of the Firm’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 9 (1), March, 1–20 16. David J. Teece (1981), ‘The Multinational Enterprise: Market Failure and Market Power Considerations’, Sloan Management Review, 22 (3), Spring, 3–17 17. Bruce Kogut and Udo Zander (1993), ‘Knowledge of the Firm and the Evolutionary Theory of the Multinational Corporation’, Journal of International Business Studies, 24 (4), December, 625–45 PART IV BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND DECISION-MAKING 18. Herbert A. Simon (1972), ‘Theories of Bounded Rationality’, in C. B. McGuire and Roy Radner (eds), Decision and Organization: A Volume in Honor of Jacob Marschak, Chapter 8, Amsterdam, the Netherlands: North-Holland Publishing Company, 161–76 19. Richard M. Cyert and James G. March ([1963] 1992), ‘A Summary of Basic Concepts in the Behavioral Theory of the Firm’, in A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, 2nd edn, Chapter 7, Cambridge, MA, USA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 161–76 20. Brian J. Loasby (1967), ‘Long-Range Formal Planning in Perspective’, Journal of Management Studies, 4 (3), October, 300–308 21. Linda Argote and Henrich R. Greve (2007), ‘A Behavioral Theory of the Firm – 40 Years and Counting: Introduction and Impact’, Organization Science, 18 (3), May–June, 337–49 22. Oliver Hart (1990), ‘Is “Bounded Rationality” an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (4), December, 696–702 23. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1981), ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice’, Science, 211 (4481), 30th January, 453–58 PART V MOTIVES AND INCENTIVES 24. Dale T. Miller (1999), ‘The Norm of Self-Interest’, American Psychologist, 54 (12), December, 1053–60 25. Michael C. Jensen (1994), ‘Self-Interest, Altruism, Incentives, and Agency Theory’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7 (2), Summer, 40–45 26. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), ‘Opportunism and its Critics’, Managerial and Decision Economics, 14 (2), March–April, 97–107 27. Charles W. L. Hill (1990), ‘Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: Implications for Transaction Cost Theory’, Academy of Management Review, 15 (3), July, 500–13 28. Michael L. Barnett and Robert M. Salomon (2012), ‘Does it Pay to be Really Good? Addressing the Shape of the Relationship between Social and Financial Performance’, Strategic Management Journal, 33 (11), November, 1304–20 29. Alexander Pepper and Julie Gore (2015), ‘Behavioral Agency Theory: New Foundations for Theorizing About Executive Compensation’, Journal of Management, 41 (4), May, 1045–68 PART VI RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES 30. Edith T. Penrose (1960), ‘The Growth of the Firm – A Case Study: The Hercules Powder Company’, Business History Review, 34 (1), Spring, 1–23 31. Kathleen R. Conner (1991), ‘A Historical Comparison of Resource-Based Theory and Five Schools of Thought Within Industrial Organization Economics: Do We Have a New Theory of the Firm?’, Journal of Management, 17 (1), March, 121–54 32. Jeroen Kraaijenbrink, J.-C. Spender and Aard J. Groen (2010), ‘The Resource-Based View: A Review and Assessment of Its Critiques’, Journal of Management, 36 (1), January, 349–72 33. David J. Teece, Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen (1997), ‘Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management’, Strategic Management Journal, 18 (7), August, 509–33 34. David J. Teece (2014), ‘The Foundations of Enterprise Performance: Dynamic and Ordinary Capabilities in an (Economic) Theory of Firms’, Academy of Management Perspectives: Symposium, 28 (4), November, 328–52 35. David J. Teece (2019), ‘A Capability Theory of the Firm: An Economics and (Strategic) Management Perspective’, New Zealand Economic Papers, 53 (1), 1–43 PART VII TRANSACTIONS 36. John R. Commons (1932), ‘The Problem of Correlating Law Economics and Ethics’, Wisconsin Law Review, 8, 3–26 37. Ian R. Macneil (1978), ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law’, Northwestern University Law Review, 72 (6), 854–905 38. Oliver E. Williamson (1981), ‘The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach’, American Journal of Sociology, 87 (3), November, 548–77 39. Sumantra Ghoshal and Peter Moran (1996), ‘Bad for Practice: A Critique of the Transaction Cost Theory’, Academy of Management Review, 21 (1), January, 13–47 40. Neil M. Kay (2015), ‘Coase and the Contribution of “The Nature of the Firm”’, Managerial and Decision Economics, Special Issue: Coase and the Theory of the Firm, 36 (1), January, 44–54 41. David J. Teece (1980), ‘Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1 (3), September, 223–47 42. David J. Teece (1982), ‘Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3 (1), March, 39–63 43. Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece (1982), ‘Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry’, Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (1), Spring, 206–13 44. David J. Teece (1986), ‘Transactions Cost Economics and the Multinational Enterprise: An Assessment’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7 (1), March, 21–45 Index Volume II Contents Acknowledgements Introduction An introduction to both volumes by the editors appears in Volume I PART I NORMS, RULES AND ROUTINES 1. Douglass C. North (1986), ‘The New Institutional Economics’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics: 3rd Symposium on The New Institutional Economics, 142 (1), March, 230–37 2. Oliver Hart (2001), ‘Norms and the Theory of the Firm’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Symposium: Norms and Corporate Law, 149 (6), June, 1701–15 3. Markus C. Becker (2005), ‘The Concept of Routines: Some Clarifications’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 29 (2), March, 249–62 4. Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter (1982), ‘Organizational Capabilities and Behavior’, in An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Part II, Chapter 5, Cambridge, MA, USA and London, UK: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 96–136, references PART II THE ENTREPRENEUR 5. Joseph A. Schumpeter ([1934] 1983), ‘Entrepreneurial Profit’, in The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, trans. by Redvers Opie, with a new introduction by John E. Elliott, Chapter IV, New Brunswick, NJ, USA and London UK: Transaction Publishers, 128–56 6. Joseph A. Schumpeter ([1942] 1962), ‘Crumbling Walls’, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Part II, Chapter XII, New York, NY, and Evanston, IL, USA: Harper and Row Publishers, 131–42 7. Edith Tilton Penrose (1959), ‘The Productive Opportunity of the Firm and the “Entrepreneur”’, in The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Chapter III, New York, NY, USA: John Wiley and Sons, 31–42 8. Richard N. Langlois (2007), ‘The Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the Entrepreneurial Firm’, Journal of Management Studies, Special Issue: The Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm, 44 (7), November, 1107–24 9. Mark Casson (2005), ‘Entrepreneurship and the Theory of the Firm’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58 (2), October, 327–48 10. B. J. Loasby (1982), ‘The Entrepreneur in Economic Theory’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 29 (3), November, 235–45 11. Sharon A. Alvarez and Jay B. Barney (2007), ‘The Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm’, Journal of Management Studies, Special Issue: The Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm, 44 (7), November, 1057–63 12. David J. Teece (2016), ‘Dynamic Capabilities and Entrepreneurial Management in Large Organizations: Toward a Theory of the (Entrepreneurial) Firm’, European Economic Review, 86, July, 202–16 PART III GOVERNANCE 13. Alfred Marshall ([1890] 1920), ‘Industrial Organization, Continued. Business Management’, in Principles of Economics: An Introductory Volume, 8th edn, Book IV, Chapter XII, London, UK: Macmillan and Co., 291–313 14. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means ([1932] 1933), ‘The Divergence of Interest between Ownership and Control’, in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Book I, Chapter VI, New York, NY, USA: The Macmillan Company, 119–25 15. Harold Demsetz (1983), ‘The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm’, Journal of Law and Economics: Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution, XXVI (2), June, 375–90 16. Oliver E. Williamson (2002), ‘The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 (3), Summer, 171–95 17. Thomas Donaldson and Lee E. Preston (1995), ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications’, Academy of Management Review, 20 (1), January, 65–91 18. Albert O. Hirschman (1980), ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent Contributions’, Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly: Health and Society, 58 (3), Summer, 430–53 19. David J. Teece (2012), ‘Management and Governance of the Business Enterprise: Agency, Contracting, and Capabilities Perspectives’, in Dennis C. Mueller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Capitalism, Part III, Chapter 8, New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press, 220–49 PART IV HIERARCHIES 20. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. ([1962] 1990), ‘Conclusion – Chapters in the History of the Great Industrial Enterprise’, in Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise, Cambridge, MA, USA and London, UK: MIT Press, 383–96, notes 21. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (1991), ‘The Functions of the HQ Unit in the Multibusiness Firm’, Strategic Management Journal, Special Issue: Fundamental Research Issues in Strategy and Economics, 12 (S2), Winter, 31–50 22. Oliver E. Williamson (1975), ‘The Multidivisional Structure’, in Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, Chapter 8, New York, NY, USA: The Free Press, 132–54, references PART V CO–OPERATION, TEAMS AND NETWORKS 23. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’, American Economic Review, 62 (5), December, 777–95 24. William G. Ouchi (1980), ‘Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 25 (1), March, 129–41 25. Candace Jones, William S. Hesterly and Stephen P. Borgatti (1997), ‘A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms’, Academy of Management Review, 22 (4), October, 911–45 26. J. Carlos Jarillo (1988), ‘On Strategic Networks’, Strategic Management Journal, 9 (1), January–February, 31–41 27. Walter W. Powell (1987), ‘Hybrid Organizational Arrangements: New Form or Transitional Development?’, California Management Review, 30 (1), Fall, 67–87 28. Sumantra Ghoshal and Christopher A. Bartlett (1990), ‘The Multinational Corporation as an Interorganizational Network’, Academy of Management Review, 15 (4), October, 603–25 PART VI INNOVATION AND APPROPRIABILITY 29. Thorstein Veblen (1898), ‘Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 12 (4), July, 373–97 30. Joseph A. Schumpeter ([1942] 1962), ‘The Process of Creative Destruction’, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Part II, Chapter VII, New York, NY, and Evanston, IL, USA: Harper and Row Publishers, 81–86 31. W. Brian Arthur (1989), ‘Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events’, Economic Journal, 99 (394), March, 116–31 32. Giovanni Dosi (2013), ‘Innovation, Evolution, and Economics: Where We Are and Where We Should Go’, in Jan Fagerberg, Ben R. Martin and Esben Sloth Andersen (eds), Innovation Studies: Evolution and Future Challenges, Part I, Chapter 5, New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press, 111–33 33. David J. Teece (1986), ‘Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy’, Research Policy, 15 (6), December, 285–305 34. David J. Teece (2006), ‘Reflections on “Profiting from Innovation”’, Research Policy, 35 (8), October, 1131–46 35. David J. Teece (2010), ‘Technological Innovation and the Theory of the Firm: The Role of Enterprise-Level Knowledge, Complementaries, and (Dynamic) Capabilities’, in Bronwyn H. Hall and Nathan Rosenberg (eds), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Volume I, Part III, Chapter 16, Amsterdam, the Netherlands: North-Holland Publishing Company, 679–730 36. Sidney G. Winter (2006), ‘The Logic of Appropriability: From Schumpeter to Arrow to Teece’, Research Policy, 35 (8), October, 1100–106 PART VII FUTURE DIRECTIONS 37. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1988), ‘Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present, and Future’, Canadian Journal of Economics, XXI (3), August, 444–58 38. Christos N. Pitelis and David J. Teece (2009), ‘The (New) Nature and Essence of the Firm’, European Management Review, 6 (1), Spring, 5–15 39. Pierre Garrouste and Stéphane Saussier (2005), ‘Looking for a Theory of the Firm: Future Challenges’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58 (2), October, 178–99 Index
£692.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd New Directions in Productivity Measurement and
Book SynopsisThis book explores novel research perspectives at the intersection of environmental/natural resource economics and productivity analysis, emphasizing the link between productivity and efficiency measurement, and environmental impacts. The purpose of the book is to present new approaches and methods for measuring environmentally adjusted productivity and efficiency, and for incorporating natural resources in standard national accounting practices. These methods are applicable in many contexts, including air and water pollution, climate change, green accounting, and environmental regulation. The contributions, written by distinguished leaders in the field, provide an up-to-date assessment of the state of the art in environmentally adjusted productivity and efficiency analysis. A review of the rapidly expanding literature is included and complemented by international case studies. The book's forward-looking ideas and new theories and methods trace future directions in this exciting and topical research area. This is an essential tool for researchers and scholars, including postgraduate students, working in the area of international and environmental accounting, and productivity and efficiency analysis. The book will also have a broad appeal for various professionals including statisticians, national accountants and policymakers.Contributors include: M. Akter, T. Ancev, M.A.S. Azad, Á. Bellver-Domingo, H.K. Edmonds, M. Eigenraam, R.G. Färe, K.J. Fox, S. Grosskopf, A. Hailu, F. Hernández-Sancho, V.-N. Hoang, N. Hughes, W. Ingram, H. Jahan, B. Lamizana-Diallo, K. Lawson, L.Y.T. Lee, C.A.K. Lovell, J.E. Lovell, C. Ma, C. Obst, C.A. Pasurka, Jr., C. WilsonTrade Review'The international community has signed up to the Sustainable Development Goals and economic measurement has to better gauge how the economy and the environment interact. Productivity is a core economic indicator. Yet, in its traditional set-up, it takes no account of environmental services provided to the economy, such as natural resource flows or emission sink services. This book brings together the latest research to account for these environmental services and does so in an authoritative way. An excellent overview of the theoretical foundations blends with extensive references to the literature and many empirical examples.' --Paul Schreyer, OECD, France'Consistent growth of productivity is key to improving standards of living, but not if it comes at the expense of environmental quality. This important and timely book provides a compact yet rigorous survey of methods for measuring environmentally adjusted productivity with several chapters demonstrating methodological advances. Empirical applications range from total factor productivity in a large panel of OECD countries, to productivity of shrimp farming in Bangladesh, and crop-farming in southern Australia where deteriorating weather conditions had masked productivity growth.' --Alan Randall, The Ohio State University, US and the University of Sydney, AustraliaTable of ContentsContents: 1. Introduction Tiho Ancev, M.A. Samad Azad and Francesc Hernández Sancho 2. Environmentally Adjusted Productivity and Efficiency: A Review of Concepts, Methods and Empirical Work Tiho Ancev, M.A. Samad Azad and Mahmuda Akter 3. Modeling Pollution Abatement Technologies as a Network Rolf G. Färe, Shawna Grosskopf, Carl A. Pasurka, Jr. 4. Efficiency Analysis in Uncertain Operating Environments: The Problem with Outliers Kevin J. Fox and Lisa Y.T. Lee 5. Assessing Stream Health With Respect to Ecological Connectivity H.K. Edmonds, J.E. Lovell and C.A.K. Lovell 6. Accounting for nutrient pollution in measuring agricultural total factor productivity: A study of OECD economies Viet-Ngu Hoang and Clevo Wilson 7. Incorporating the Environment in Agricultural Productivity: Applying Advances in International Environmental Accounting Carl Obst and Mark Eigenraam 8. Climate Adjusted Productivity in Australian Cropping Farms Neal Hughes and Kenton Lawson 9. Environmentally Adjusted Efficiency of Municipal Water Suppliers Fransec Hernández-Sancho and Águeda Bellver-Domingo 10. Valuing Environmental and Health Impacts from No Action in Wastewater Management Francesc Hernández-Sancho, Birguy Lamizana-Diallo and William Ingram 11. Estimating the Cost of Carbon Abatement for China Atakelty Hailu and Chunbo Ma 12. Environmentally adjusted efficiency of shrimp farming in Bangladesh Hasneen Jahan and Tiho Ancev Index
£109.00
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Recent Developments in the Economics of
Book SynopsisThis volume presents a compilation of key papers chronicling the evolution of the economics of information into the economics of knowledge. It traces the unfolding of the fertile ambiguity and ambivalence of the notion of information with the identification and eventual separation of its two basic, quite distinct meanings: knowledge and signals. It documents the progressive understanding that it is not only necessary to search, screen and understand signals, but also to assess and select them so as to distinguish between true, false and fake ones. The capability to process signals and transform them into actual information stems from the stock of competence and knowledge that individuals and organizations possess and mobilize. The success of information economics paves the way to the economics of knowledge and this review will be an indispensable research tool for all those working and studying in the field. Table of ContentsContents: Acknowledgements Introduction From the Economics of Information to the Economics of Knowledge Cristiano Antonelli PART I THE STATE OF THE ART 1. Michael Spence (2002), ‘Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets’, American Economic Review, 92 (3), June, 434–59 2. George A. Akerlof (2002), ’Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior’, American Economic Review, 92 (3), June, 411–33 3. Joseph E. Stiglitz (2002), ‘Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics’, American Economic Review, 92 (3), June, 460–501 PART II APPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 4. John G. Riley (2001), ‘Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling’, Journal of Economic Literature, XXXIX (2), June, 432–78 5. Kenneth J. Arrow (1996), ‘The Economics of Information: An Exposition’, Empirica, 23 (2), June, 119–28 6. W. Bentley MacLeod (2007), ‘Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement’, Journal of Economic Literature, XLV (3), September, 595–628 7. Bengt Holmström (1999), ‘Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective’, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 169–82 8. Jeffrey C. Ely and Juuso Välimäki (2003), ‘Bad Reputation’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVIII (3), August, 785–814 9. Johannes Hörner (2002), ‘Reputation and Competition’, American Economic Review, 92 (3), June, 644–63 10. Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (2005), ‘Modes of Communication’, Journal of Political Economy, 113 (6), December, 1217–38 11. Richard Rogerson, Robert Shimer and Randall Wright (2005), ‘Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey’, Journal of Economic Literature, XLIII (4), December, 959–88 12. Dean Karlan, Markus Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat and Adam Szeidl (2009), ‘Trust and Social Collateral’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (3), August, 1307–61 13. Abhijit V. Banerjee (1992), ‘A Simple Model of Herd Behavior’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVII (3), August, 797–817 14. Yannis M. Ioannides and Linda Datcher Loury (2004), ‘Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality’, Journal of Economic Literature, XLII (4), December, 1056–93 15. Matthew O. Jackson (2014), ‘Networks in the Understanding of Economic Behaviors’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28 (4), Fall, 3–22 16. H. Peyton Young (2009), ‘Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning’, American Economic Review, 99 (5), December, 1899–924 17. Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer and Ivo Welch (1992), ‘A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades’, Journal of Political Economy, 100 (5), October, 992–1026 18. Roland Benabou and Guy Laroque (1992), ‘Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVII (3), August, 921–58 PART III TOWARDS THE ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE 19. Joseph E. Stiglitz (2000), ‘The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (4), November, 1441–78 20. Kenneth J. Arrow (1969), ‘Classificatory Notes on the Production and Transmission of Technological Knowledge’, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 59 (2), May, 29–35 21. Larry Samuelson (2004), ‘Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis’, Journal of Economic Literature, XLII (2), June, 367–403 22. Bo Carlsson and Gunnar Eliasson (1994), ‘The Nature and Importance of Economic Competence’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 3 (3), 687–711 23. Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont (1994), ‘The Firm as a Communication Network’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIX (4), November, 809–39 24. Luis Garicano (2000), ‘Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production’, Journal of Political Economy, 108 (5), October, 874–904 25. Alice Lam (2000), ‘Tacit Knowledge, Organizational Learning and Societal Institutions: An Integrated Framework’, Organization Studies, 21 (3), May, 487–513 26. Luis Garicano and Yanhui Wu (2012), ‘Knowledge, Communication, and Organizational Capabilities’, Organization Science, 23 (5), September–October, 1382–97 27. Robin Cowan and Nicolas Jonard (2004), ‘Network Structure and the Diffusion of Knowledge’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28 (8), June, 1557–75 28. Richard Blundell and Thomas M. Stoker (2005), ‘Heterogeneity and Aggregation’, Journal of Economic Literature, XLIII (2), June, 347–91 29. Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx and Tom Wilkening (2015), ‘A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers’, Journal of Economic Literature, 53 (4), December, 857–97 30. Simone Landini, Mauro Gallegati and Joseph E. Stiglitz (2015), ‘Economies with Heterogeneous Interacting Learning Agents’, Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination: Special Issue in Honor of Masanao Aoki, 10 (1), April, 91–118 31. Alan Kirman (1997), ‘The Economy as an Evolving Network’, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 7 (4), December, 339–53 32. Alan Kirman (2011), ‘Learning in Agent-based Models’, Eastern Economic Journal: Symposium on Agent-based Computational Economics, 37 (1), Winter, 20–27 33. David Colander, Peter Howitt, Alan Kirman, Axel Leijonhufvud and Perry Mehrling (2008), ‘Beyond DSGE Models: Toward an Empirically Based Macroeconomics’, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 98 (2), May, 236–40 Index
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