Description
Book SynopsisThis book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. In providing the most complete and robust defence of causal decision theory the book will be of interest to a broad range of readers.
Trade Review"The author writes in a style that is on the one hand entertaining and lighthearted and on the other hand highly technical in its analysis of axiomatic foundations. Readers who are interested in theoretical, prescriptive decision making from a philosophical perspective will find this a valuable book." Journal of Mathematical Psychology
"This book makes a significant contribution to the standard decision theory." Chrisw Swoyer Univ. of Oklahoma
Table of ContentsPreface; Introduction: a chance to reconsider; 1. Prudential rationality as expected utility maximization; 2. Decision problems; 3. Savage's theory; 4. Evidential decision theory; 5. Causal decision theory; 6. A general theory of conditional beliefs; 7. A representation theorem for causal decision theory; 8. Where things stand; Notes; References.
