Description
Book SynopsisGull chicks beg for food from their parents. Peacocks spread their tails to attract potential mates. Meerkats alert family members of the approach of predators. But are these sometimes dishonest? This book probes such question by reviewing the empirical data and game theory models available, and by asking how well theory matches data.
Trade Review"William Searcy and Stephen Nowicki provide a fascinating perspective on the honesty of signals in animal communication systems... [A] comprehensive yet concise review of what we currently know concerning signal reliability in animals, enriched with many in-depth examples."--Katherine E. LeVan and Noah Wilson-Rich, Science "The book is well written and informative... Searcy and Nowicki are well-known experts in the field of animal communication and sexual selection, and they provide a thorough and careful overview of this important, but often under-discussed, topic."--R. Andrew Hayes, Austral Ecology "The book is a fascinating evaluation of the present state of reliability and deception in animal signaling systems. It would make a perfect, albeit somewhat controversial, focus for an honors biology or graduate seminar course on animal communication."--H.Jane Brockmann, BioScience
Table of ContentsFigures, Boxes, and Table ix Acknowledgments xiii Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Definitions 2 Some History 6 Categories of Signal Costs 13 Alternative Explanations for Reliability 16 Deception Redux 17 Evolutionary Interests of Signalers and Receivers 20 Chapter 2: Signaling When Interests Overlap 24 Signaling Between Relatives: Theory 24 Begging 36 Alarms 53 Food Calls 68 Individually Directed Skepticism 73 Conclusions 77 Chapter 3: Signaling When Interests Diverge 78 Mating Signals: Theory 78 Carotenoid Pigmentation 86 Songs in Oscine Birds 97 Tail Length in Birds 123 Conclusions 131 Chapter 4: Signaling When Interests Oppose 134 Signaling in Aggressive Contexts: Theory 134 Postural Displays of Aggression in Birds 141 Badges of Status 147 Weapon Displays in Crustaceans 160 Dominant Frequency in Calls of Frogs and Toads 169 Conclusions 178 Chapter 5: Honesty and Deception in Communication Networks 181 Third-Party Receivers 182 "Eavesdropping" versus "Interception" 183 Eavesdropping in Signaling Interactions 185 Third-Party Receivers and Reliability 203 Conclusions 206 Chapter 6: Conclusions 207 Reliability 208 Alternatives to the Handicap Mechanism 214 Deceit 218 The Balance of Reliability and Deceit 223 References 225 Author Index 257 Subject Index 263
