Description
Book SynopsisComputation permeates our world, but a satisfactory philosophical theory of what it is has been lacking. Gualtiero Piccinini presents a mechanistic account of what makes a physical system a computing system. He argues that computation does not entail representation or information-processing, although information-processing entails computation.
Trade Reviewthe mechanistic account of physical computation is the best that we currently have . . . Physical Computation is eminently readable and well presented, with a clear structure and helpful introduction . . . It provides a thorough . . . introduction to the philosophical issues associated with computation in the physical sense and would serve as a good basis for a postgraduate or upper-level undergraduate course on the subject. Piccinini delivers a comprehensive summary of previous work on physical computation, alongside the definitive presentation of his mechanistic account, and I have no doubt that this book will become a valuable resource for future work on the topic. * Joe Dewhurst, Philosophical Psychology *
Table of ContentsAcknowledgements Introduction 1: Towards an Account of Physical Computation 2: Mapping Accounts 3: Semantic Accounts 4: Pancomputationalism 5: From Functional Analysis to Mechanistic Explanation 6: The Ontology of Functional Mechanisms 7: The Mechanistic Account 8: Primitive Components of Computing Mechanisms 9: Complex Components of Computing Mechanisms 10: Digital Calculators 11: Digital Computers 12: Analog Computers 13: Parallel Computers and Neural Networks 14: Information Processing 15: The Bold Physical Church-Turing Thesis 16: The Modest Physical Church-Turing Thesis Epilogue: The Nature of Computation Appendix: Computability Bibliography Index
