Description
Book SynopsisDavid Lewis (1941-2001) was a celebrated and influential figure in analytic philosophy. When Lewis died, he left behind a large body of unpublished notes, manuscripts, and letters. This volume contains two longer manuscripts which Lewis had originally intended to turn into books, and thirty-one shorter items. The longer manuscripts are ''The Paradoxes of Time Travel'', his David Gavin Young Lectures at the University of Adelaide, and ''Confirmation Theory'', which is based on a graduate course on probability and logic that he gave at UCLA. Lewis''s described his purposes in ''The Paradoxes of Time Travel'' as being, `(1) to solve a philosophical problem hitherto largely ignored or casually mis-solved by philosophers []; (2) to introduce the layman to various topics in metaphysics, since our problem turns out to connect with many more familiar ones; and (3) to show of several of my favorite doctrines and methods in metaphysics''. By contrast, ''Confirmation Theory'' is a technical work
Table of ContentsFrederique Janssen-Lauret and Fraser MacBride: Editors' Introduction Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Fraser MacBride : An Intellectual Biography Of The Young David Lewis Part I: Longer Manuscripts The Paradoxes of Time Travel: The Gavin David Young Lectures at the University of Adelaide (1971) 1: Time Travel without Hyperkinesis 2: Mapping Exercise 3: Personal Identity and Personal Time 4: Reversed Causation 5: Changing the Past: Failure 6: Changing the Past: Success References Confirmation Theory (1969) 0: Intensional Semantics 1: Probability Measures 2: Rational Belief: Statistics 3: Rational Belief: Kinematics 4: Scientific Method 5: Principles of Indierence 6: Carnap's lm-system: One Family 7: Carnap's lm-system: Many Families 8: Hintikka's lm-pa-system Confirmation Theory Bibliography Part II: Short Posthumously Published Papers (1965-2001) 1: Particular and General Causal Claims (c. 1965-66) 2: On the Nature of Certain Nonidentities: A Reply to Montague (1968) 3: Reply to Sommers (1969) 4: Contagion without Rigidity (1971) 5: Counterfactual Probability (1971) 6: Reply to Davidson (1972) 7: Insatiable Quantifiers (1972) 8: Counterfactual and Objective Probability (1973) 9: Counterpart Theory Mk. II (1974) 10: To the Thursday Logic Seminar (1976) 11: Reply to Pollock (1979) 12: Supervenience of Chances (1979) 13: Reply to Adams (1979) 14: From Phenomenal to Epiphenomenal (1981) 15: The Monty Hall Problem (c. 1982) 16: Richter's Problem (1983) 17: Russian Roulette (1984) 18: Mass and Value (1985) 19: De Se Detectivism (1986) 20: A Fifth Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics (c. 1987) 21: Acceptance Speech for the Behrman Award (1991) 22: Reply to Cresswell (1991) 23: Exclusion (1991) 24: Modal Demifictionalism (1994) 25: Merlin and Morgana (1999) 26: Reply to Martin's reply (1999) 27: Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability (2001) 28: Divine Evil (2001) 29: Double Explanation by Double Having (2001) 30: Jack Is Unprovable (2001) 31: You Can't Win (2001)
