Description

Book Synopsis


Trade Review
This creative and well-researched book convincingly shows that relatively weak states can coerce stronger superpowers by threatening to build nuclear weapons. It teaches us that having the mere capacity to make nuclear weapons—known as 'nuclear latency'—can shape international relations. Volpe's book is essential reading for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, coercion, or crisis bargaining. * Matthew Fuhrmann, Professor of Political Science and Presidential Impact Fellow, Texas A&M University *
Tristan Volpe has written a fascinating book exploring how states use the potential to acquire nuclear weapons, known as nuclear latency, to gain influence in international politics. He theorizes the existence of a Goldilocks Zone where states with just enough nuclear latency can both issue threats and make assurances, and tests his theory across a wide range of case studies, from Japan to Iran. The in-depth cases are interesting, well-written, and strongly support his argument. I highly recommend this to those interested in international politics, and especially in issues surrounding nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons. * Michael C. Horowitz, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania *
Leveraging Latency reminds us that even hypothetical military capabilities can be used as bargaining power. But as Volpe elegantly explains, countries must perform a delicate balancing act to extract real concessions from military potential. His rich case studies illuminate the strategic logic of nuclear latency, revealing the hidden dilemmas and tradeoffs of bargaining over nuclear programs. Students of coercive diplomacy and nuclear proliferation will find this book indispensable. * Todd S. Sechser, Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds, Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy, University of Virginia *

Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: A Theory of Compellence with Nuclear Latency Chapter 3: Japan Chapter 4: West Germany Chapter 5: North Korea Chapter 6: Iran Chapter 7: Conclusion Notes References Index

Leveraging Latency How the Weak Compel the Strong

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A Hardback by Tristan A. Volpe

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    View other formats and editions of Leveraging Latency How the Weak Compel the Strong by Tristan A. Volpe

    Publisher: Oxford University Press Inc
    Publication Date: 31/03/2023
    ISBN13: 9780197669532, 978-0197669532
    ISBN10: 0197669530

    Description

    Book Synopsis


    Trade Review
    This creative and well-researched book convincingly shows that relatively weak states can coerce stronger superpowers by threatening to build nuclear weapons. It teaches us that having the mere capacity to make nuclear weapons—known as 'nuclear latency'—can shape international relations. Volpe's book is essential reading for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, coercion, or crisis bargaining. * Matthew Fuhrmann, Professor of Political Science and Presidential Impact Fellow, Texas A&M University *
    Tristan Volpe has written a fascinating book exploring how states use the potential to acquire nuclear weapons, known as nuclear latency, to gain influence in international politics. He theorizes the existence of a Goldilocks Zone where states with just enough nuclear latency can both issue threats and make assurances, and tests his theory across a wide range of case studies, from Japan to Iran. The in-depth cases are interesting, well-written, and strongly support his argument. I highly recommend this to those interested in international politics, and especially in issues surrounding nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons. * Michael C. Horowitz, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania *
    Leveraging Latency reminds us that even hypothetical military capabilities can be used as bargaining power. But as Volpe elegantly explains, countries must perform a delicate balancing act to extract real concessions from military potential. His rich case studies illuminate the strategic logic of nuclear latency, revealing the hidden dilemmas and tradeoffs of bargaining over nuclear programs. Students of coercive diplomacy and nuclear proliferation will find this book indispensable. * Todd S. Sechser, Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds, Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy, University of Virginia *

    Table of Contents
    Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: A Theory of Compellence with Nuclear Latency Chapter 3: Japan Chapter 4: West Germany Chapter 5: North Korea Chapter 6: Iran Chapter 7: Conclusion Notes References Index

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