Description
Book SynopsisThis book provides a comprehensive economic analysis of the internal working of organizations. Its attention to the role of information costs in influencing the breadth of discretion that members of an organization have, and the nature and effectiveness of the constraints that can be put upon them, leads to many important hypotheses about organizational behavior.
Table of Contents1. Introduction; 2. Definitions and determinants of employees' discretion over an organization's resources and production; 3. Employees' resource diversions and employers' imposition of resource responsibility; 4. Short-run resource allocation under fixed budgets; 5. Short-run resource allocation in response to demand: the cases of an employee, a private corporation, and a private nonprofit organization; 6. Legislative demand and short-run price and output of the public organization; 7. Employees' investment behaviour and implications for suborganization; 8. Equilibrium behaviour of public and private organizations in the first long run; 9. The demand and supply of nonmarket resource allocation; 10. A brief summary and proposed directions for further work.
