Description
Book SynopsisThe formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses the developments in this theory. It uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly, and also applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets.
Trade Review"This is a well written book on an important topic. Everyone should run out and buy a copy." --GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR "Osborne and Rubenstein's authoritative book represents a landmark in the evolution of bargaining theory. Future research in the field will undoubtedly take the ideas presented in this book as a starting point. Accordingly, it should be read and digested by anyone with a serious interest in formal models of the bargaining process." --CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Table of ContentsIntroduction. Bargaining Theory: The Axiomatic Approach. Nash's Solution. The Strategic Approach. A Model of Alternating Offers. The Relation between the Axiomatic and Strategic Approaches. A Strategic Model of Bargaining between Incompletely Informed Players. Models of Decentralized Trade: First Approach Using the Nash Solution. Strategic Bargaining in a Steady State Market. Strategic Bargaining in a Market with One-Time Entry. The Role of the Trading Procedure. The Role of Anonymity. References. Index.
