Description
Book SynopsisFocuses on corporate governance, defined as the system of controls that helps corporations and other organizations effectively manage, administer, and direct economic resources. This title includes papers that deal with the role played by boards of directors, impact of ownership, executive compensation, and investor protection.
Table of ContentsManagerial Power in the Design of Executive Compensation: Evidence from Japan. Market-Value-Maximizing Ownership Structure when Investor Protection is Weak. Corporate Governance and Performance of Banking Firms: Evidence from Asian Emerging Markets. On the Duty of Care of Institutional Investors: Evidence on Participation of Mutual Fund Managers in Shareholder Meetings in Israel. Good Managers Invest More and Pay Less Dividends: A Model Of Dividend Policy. Corporate Downsizing and CEO Compensation. The External Monitoring Bodies’ View of the Board Independence in the New Public Family Firms. Ownership Structure, Financial Rent and Performance: Evidence from the Malaysian Manufacturing Sector. Board of Director Configurations in Mutual Fund Sponsors: Early Evidence of Board-Level Performance. Expropriation, Weak Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance: Chinese Evidence. Black–Scholes–Merton, Liquidity, and the Valuation of Executive Stock Options. Unobserved Heterogeneity and the Term-Structure of Default. Financial Sector Development and Sustainable Economic Growth in Regionally Co-Integrated Emerging Markets. The Long-Term Risk Effects of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) on the Financial Services Industry. How do Small Firms in Developing Countries Raise Capital? Evidence from a Large-Scale Survey of Kenyan Micro and Small-Scale Enterprises. United States Venture Capital Financial Contracting: Foreign Securities. Operational Hedges and Foreign-Exchange Exposure: The Experience of U.S. MNCs During the Asian Financial Crisis. Share Repurchases in New Zealand. List of Contributors.
