Description
Book SynopsisOffers evidence on Congress' influence on presidential war powers. This book concludes that presidents are systematically less likely to exercise military force when their partisan opponents retain control of Congress.
Trade ReviewCo-Winner of the 2008 Richard E. Neustadt Award, Presidency Research Section of the American Political Science Association Winner of the 2007 D. B. Hardeman Prize, Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation "[The authors] argue that when it comes to 'wars of choice,' Congress's partisan composition influences whether the U.S. sends troops abroad, how likely the nation is to respond to a foreign crisis with force, and how long the decision to respond takes...To understand how Congress wields its influence during the lead-up to war, Howell surveyed the range of congressional actions--hearings, investigations, nonbinding resolutions, public criticisms. In the final section of the book, he connect[s] those activities to foreign-affairs media coverage."--Laura Stuart, Chicago Magazine "Howell and Pevehouse's research is an excellent addition to a stream of literature that has left woefully unconsidered the effects of domestic politics in general and the institution of Congress in particular on the international relations process... Their book shows that Congress can, and apparently does, have substantial effects on how the president crafts foreign policy. Future scholars would be well advised to continue to walk down the path paved by this well crafted addition to the American foreign policy literature."--Walt Jatkowski, APSA Booknotes "Taken in its entirety, the outstanding scholarship presented in While Dangers Gather offers critical insight into the domestic politics of war and provides an interesting case in favor of divided government as an apparent check on presidents' proclivity to engage in war."--Jeffrey S. Peake, Presidential Studies Quarterly "The book is refreshingly straightforward in presentation."--Michael D. Ramsey, Review of Politics
Table of ContentsList of Figures vii List of Tables ix Preface xi Acknowledgments xxv Part One: Background and Theory 1 Chapter 1: Possibilities of Congressional Influence 3 Chapter 2: Conditions that Abet Congressional Influence 33 Part Two: Testing Claims about Congressional Influence 51 Chapter 3: Trends in Military Deployments 53 Chapter 4: Responding to "Opportunities" to Use Military Force (with Douglas L. Kriner) 75 Chapter 5: Studies in Domestic Politics and the Use of Force 114 Part Three: One Causal Pathway 153 Chapter 6: Congress and the Media (with Douglas L. Kriner) 155 Chapter 7: The Media and Public Opinion 192 Chapter 8: Conclusion 222 Appendix A: Tables Relating to Chapter 3 243 Appendix B: Text and Tables Relating to Chapter 4 245 Appendix C: Table Relating to Chapter 6 259 Appendix D: Table Relating to Chapter 7 260 Notes 263 References 307 Index 323
