Description
Book SynopsisExamines opinions by constitutional courts in liberal democracies to better understand the logic and nature of constitutional review. This book argues that the constitutional judge's role is nothing like that of the legislator or chief executive, or even the ordinary judge.
Trade Review"Robertson offers the field of comparative judicial politics a thoughtful, carefully researched book that confronts conventional wisdom on constitutional courts and jurists... An exceptional book."--Choice "The book is fascinating for some of its arguments in relation to the position of judges in liberal democracies and will be of interest to scholars of both law and politics."--Kawu Bala, Political Studies Review "The Judge as Political Theorist contains an interesting and well-presented argument that re-imagines the job of judges who render decisions on constitutional matters... [G]enerally his conclusions make intuitive sense and are supported by tangible evidence. Furthermore, at a systematic level, Robertson's portrayal of various constitutional courts choosing alternative approaches to solve a shared set of general political problems fits nicely with theories trying to explain the unique position of the court as a non-political actor that must make inherently political decisions that define the role of government in society."--Matt Hartz, Journal of International Law and Politics
Table of ContentsPreface ix Chapter One: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review 1 Chapter Two: Germany: Dignity and Democracy 40 Chapter Three: Eastern Europe: (Re)Establishing the Rule of Law 83 Chapter Four: France: Purely Abstract Review 143 Chapter Five: Canada: Imposing Rights on the Common Law 187 Chapter Six: South Africa: Defining a New Society 226 Chapter Seven: Tests of Unconstitutionality and Discrimination 281 Chapter Eight: Conclusions: Constitutional Jurists as Political Theorists 347 Cases Cited 385 Bibliography 393 Index 407
