Description
Book SynopsisThis is the first study of the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918 based extensively on key German records presumed to be lost forever after Potsdam was bombed in 1944.
In 1997, David T. Zabecki discovered translated copies of these files in a collection of old instructional material at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He presents his findings here for the first time, with a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, to offer a wealth of fresh insights to the German Offensives of 1918.
David T. Zabecki clearly demonstrates how the German failure to exploit the vulnerabilities in the BEF's rail system led to the failure of the first two offensives, and how inadequacies in the German rail system determined the outcome of the last three offensives. This is a window into the mind of the German General Staff of World War I, with thorough analysis of the German planning and decision making processes during th
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"Zabecki ... has earned a reputation as an outstanding military historian. An essential read for students of the Great War, and an important one for those interested in military operations since its end." - The NYMAS Review, The New York Military Affairs Symposium
Table of Contents1. Why do we Still Bother with World War I? 2. The Operational Art 3. The Tactical Realities of 1918 4. The Strategic Reality 5. The Operational Decision: 11 November 1917 to 21 January 1918 6. Operations MICHAEL and MARS 7. Operation GEORGETTE 8. Operations BLÜCHER, GOERZ, and YORCK 9. Operations GNEISSENAU and HAMMERSCHLAG 10. Operation MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS 11. Operations HAGEN and KURFÜRST 12. Conclusions
