Description
Book SynopsisA collection of original research papers by a number of industrial organization economists active in the field of Research and Development theory and policy. It covers patent policy, the effects of market structure and the internal organization of the firm on R&D incentives and technical progress, and R&D cooperation and technological spillovers.
Table of ContentsChapter 1 Rent Dissipation in R&D Races. Chapter 2 Innovation, Duplication, and the Contract Theory of Patents. Chapter 3 On Patent Licensing. Chapter 4 Spillovers, Stable R&D Cooperations, and Social Welfare. Chapter 5 Strategic R&D with Uncertainty. Chapter 6 Coopting “Decisive” Technical Advances. Chapter 7 Efficiency of Joint Enterprises with Internal Bargaining. Chapter 8 Equilibrium Research Joint Ventures. Chapter 9 Product and Process Innovation in Differential Games with Managerial Firms. Chapter 10 Delegation in an R&D Game with Spillovers. List of Contributors. The Editors' Preface. Contents. Subject Index. Volume Editors. Volume Editors. Copyright page.
