Description
Book SynopsisExplores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. The book argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies.
Trade Review“This book is an outstanding contribution to the field. It informs our understanding of a variety of understudied features of authoritarian rule, including the reasons why fraud varies across autocracies, why dictatorships have different electoral rules, the tradeoffs dictatorships must consider in their election strategies, and the consequences their choices have for authoritarian survival.”— Erica Frantz, Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University
“Masaaki Higashijima’s book is an ambitious an important contribution to the study of electoral authoritarianism. Marshalling detailed cross-national comparisons and rich case studies, the book expands on the dilemmas that autocracies face with regard to elections and the key role of popular mobilization. The book provides new perspectives into an autocrat’s decision about how much to manipulate elections, and importantly about when electoral manipulation strengthens autocracy rather than undermines it.”— Yonatan L. Morse, University of Connecticut
Table of Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Abbreviations
- Note on Translation and Transliteration
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Part I: Puzzles and Arguments
- Chapter 1: Introduction
- Chapter 2: A Theory of Autocratic Elections
- Part II: Cross-National Explorations
- Chapter 3: Blatant Electoral Fraud
- Chapter 4: Institutional Manipulation
- Chapter 5: Economic Maneuvering
- Chapter 6: Backfiring at the Ballot Box
- Part III: Comparative Case Studies
- Chapter 7: From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering: Nazarbaev’s Kazakhstan
- Chapter 8: From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown: Akaev’s Kyrgyzstan
- Chapter 9: Conclusion
- References
- Appendix
