Description
Book SynopsisIn a history that spans the eighteenth century to the present, Michael J. Green follows the development of U.S. strategic thinking toward East Asia. Green finds one overarching concern: that a rival power might use the Pacific to isolate and threaten the U.S. and prevent the ocean from becoming a conduit for the westward flow of trade and values.
Trade ReviewMichael Green's magisterial study is a timely and insightful reminder of the deep and long-standing ties between East Asia and the United States, and the complex interplay between our economic and security interests, and our values, a dynamic which has shaped US policy for two and a half centuries. It is an indispensable point of reference for students and policy makers seeking to understand a critical region where history casts a long shadow, notwithstanding the extraordinary changes of recent years. -- James Steinberg, Syracuse University and former deputy secretary of state With impeccable research and lucid prose, Michael Green provides a first-rate account of the deep historical roots of American grand strategy toward Asia. It is essential for understanding American policy toward a crucial region. -- Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor, Harvard University, and author of Is the American Century Over? Already a renowned Japan expert, Green combines his regional knowledge with a capacious strategic mind and historical sensibility. This is one of the most impressive books I have ever read. It is consistently original, providing on every page fresh insights immersed in a compelling narrative arc, and it is destined to be a lodestar among scholarship on history, strategy, and statecraft. -- William Inboden, Chair, Clements Center for National Security, The University of Texas, Austin Important and comprehensive study of America's relations with the region. -- Gordon G. Chang New York Times Book Review Green set about filling [a] gap in the literature and he has succeeded triumphantly. His book is likely to become the standard work on the subject. -- Gideon Rachman Financial Times
Table of ContentsNote on Korean, Chinese, and Japanese Terms Acknowledgments Introduction I. The Rise of the United States 1. "A Theatre for the Exercise of the Most Ambitious Intellect": Seeds of Strategy, 1784-1860 2. "How Sublime the Pacific Part Assigned to Us": Precursors to Expansion, 1861-1898 3. "I Wish to See the United States the Dominant Power on the Shores of the Pacific": Grand Strategy in the Era of Theodore Roosevelt II. The Rise of Japan 4. "Leave the Door Open, Rehabilitate China, and Satisfy Japan": Defining the Open Door, 1909-1927 5. "Between Non-resistance and Coercion": The Open Door Closes, 1928-1941 6. "We Have Got to Dominate the Pacific": Grand Strategy and the War Against Japan III. The Rise of the Soviets 7. "The Overall Effect Is to Enlarge Our Strategic Frontier": Defining Containment in the Pacific, 1945-1960 8. "Anyone Who Isn't Confused Really Doesn't Understand the Situation": Asia Strategy and Escalation in Vietnam, 1961-1968 9. "An Even Balance": Nixon and Kissinger's Redefinition of Containment in Asia, 1969-1975 10. "The President Cannot Make Any Weak Moves": Jimmy Carter and the Return of the China Card, 1977-1980 11. "To Contain and Over Time Reverse": Ronald Reagan, 1980-1989 IV. The Rise of China 12. "The Key to Our Security and Our Prosperity Lies in the Vitality of Those Relationships": George H. W. Bush and the Unipolar Moment, 1989-1992 13. "Engage and Balance": Bill Clinton and the Unexpected Return of Great-Power Politics 14. "A Balance of Power That Favors Freedom": Strategic Surprise and the Asia Policy of George W. Bush 15. "The Pivot": Barack Obama and the Struggle to Rebalance Asia Conclusion: The Historical Case for Asia Strategy Notes Index Illustrations
