Description
Book SynopsisContrary to what news reports might suggest, the majority of politicians behave ethically and are never subject to investigations. This title argues that members of Congress behave ethnically not because of the fear of punishment but because of their concern for their reputations. It draws parallels between politicians and businesses.
Trade Review"A number of important issues ... are carefully explored in this rich and important analysis."--Gary W. Copeland, Perspectives on Politics
Table of ContentsList of Figures and Tables ix Acknowledgments xi Introduction 1 Chapter 1 What is Opportunism and How Do We Control It? 15 Chapter 2 How Reputations Control Cheating in Economics and Politics 38 Chapter 3 Problems in the Market for Legislators 55 Chapter 4 Hypotheses, Measurement, and Data 71 Chapter 5 Constraining Opportunism through Self-Policing 85 Chapter 6 Reputational Capital and Job Security; or, If Trustworthy Legislators Are at a Premium, Are They Paid One? 103 Chapter 7 Weaknesses in Reputational Controls 124 Conclusion 139 Appendix 1 Most Important Characteristic for Legislator to Possess: Examples of Category Content 151 Appendix 2 Examples of Categories of Employment 153 Appendix 3 Codes for Identifying Faithful Agents 154 Appendix 4 Lifetime Judicial Appointments: 1965-1996 156 Appendix 5 Examples of Prestigious Post-Elective Employment Positions 157 Appendix 6 Electoral Defeat and Post-Elective Employment for Senators in the Analysis 158 Notes 159 References 169 Name Index 177 Subject Index 179
