Description
Book SynopsisDrawing on research in anthropology, psychology, and a host of other disciplines, this book argues that cross-cultural variation raises serious problems for theories that propose universally applicable conditions for moral responsibility. It develops a way of thinking about responsibility that takes cultural diversity into account.
Trade Review"This is a penetrating and far-reaching book."--Julian Baggini, Financial Times "[T]his is a keenly argued yet surprisingly accessible book that presents a provocative thesis that should not be ignored."--Choice "There is much to like about Relative Justice. It pursues and interesting line of reasoning in a literature literally littered with rehashed arguments and stubborn dialectics."--Matt King, Philosopher's Magazine
Table of Contents*FrontMatter, pg. i*Contents, pg. ix*Acknowledgments, pg. xi*Introduction, pg. 1*Chapter One. The Appeal to Intuition, pg. 9*Chapter Two. Moral Responsibility and the Culture of Honor, pg. 33*Chapter Three. Shame Cultures, Collectivist Societies, Original Sin, And Pharaoh's Hardened Heart, pg. 63*Chapter Four. Can the Variation Be Explained Away?, pg. 84*Chapter Five. Where Do We Go from Here?, pg. 111*Chapter Six. A Metaskeptical Analysis of Libertarianism and Compatibilism, pg. 133*Chapter Seven. A Very Tentative Metaskeptical Endorsement of Eliminativism about Moral Responsibility, pg. 173*Notes, pg. 203*Bibliography, pg. 213*Index, pg. 223
