Description
Book SynopsisCompetition policy aims to prevent anticompetitive agreements and mergers, limiting the abusive exercise of market power. The formulation and application of this policy presents significant challenges, which include showing that proposed mergers are anticompetitive, proving that firms are members of cartels and defending apparently restrictive vertical agreements.
For this insightful volume the editor has selected key papers which illustrate how far we have come towards meeting these challenges. They provide comprehensive developmental coverage of the theory that underpins and justifies competition policy, and of the econometric tests that demonstrate its effects and violations.
This timely book will be an invaluable resource to researchers and practitioners alike with an interest in this important subject.
Trade Review‘. . . the collection of critical writings on recent developments in monopoly and competition provide an in-depth look at the core areas of competition in their current form and examines some of the emerging issues. Mr Norman has compiled a comprehensive set of both economic policy and econometric articles that provide the reader with modern developments in competition law and policy which are increasingly globally relevant as more and more jurisdictions join in outlawing anti-competitive conduct.’Table of ContentsContents: Acknowledgements Introduction George Norman PART I SETTING THE SCENE: THE CASE FOR ANTITRUST POLICY 1. Jonathan B. Baker (2003), ‘The Case for Antitrust Enforcement’ 2. John Vickers (2005), ‘Abuse of Market Power’ PART II THEORY OF PRICE FIXING 3. Barbara McCutcheon (1997), ‘Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?’ 4. David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullen (2001), ‘Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case’ 5. Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell (2001), ‘Optimal Collusion with Private Information’ 6. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (2005), ‘Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority’ PART III THE IMPACT OF PRICE FIXING 7. Robert H. Porter and J. Douglas Zona (1999), ‘Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding’ 8. John E. Kwoka, Jr. (1997), ‘The Price Effects of Bidding Conspiracies: Evidence from Real Estate Auction “Knockouts”’ 9. John M. Connor (2001), ‘“Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995’ 10. Lawrence J. White (2001), ‘Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?’ PART IV CARTELS 11. George Symeonidis (2002), ‘Cartel Stability with Multiproduct Firms’ 12. Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow (2006), ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’ 13. Massimo Motta and Michele Polo (2003), ‘Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution’ PART V HORIZONTAL MERGERS 14. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990), ‘Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis’ 15. David Spector (2003), ‘Horizontal Mergers, Entry, and Efficiency Defences’ 16. Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore, Jonathan B. Baker, Suzanne Gleason and Daniel S. Hosken (2006), ‘Empirical Methods in Merger Analysis: Econometric Analysis of Pricing in FTC v. Staples’ 17. Dario Focarelli and Fabio Panetta (2003), ‘Are Mergers Beneficial to Consumers? Evidence from the Market for Bank Deposits’ PART VI VERTICAL MERGERS AND FORECLOSURE 18. Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), ‘Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure’ 19. Yongmin Chen (2001), ‘On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects’ 20. Margaret E. Slade (1998), ‘Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?’ PART VII VERTICAL RESTAINTS 21. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998), ‘Exclusive Dealing’ 22. Michael D. Whinston (2001), ‘Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don’t Know’ 23. Tim R. Sass (2005), ‘The Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing: Evidence from the U.S. Beer Industry’ PART VIII OTHER ABUSIVE PRACTICES 24. Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills (2001), ‘Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory’ 25. Barry Nalebuff (2004), ‘Bundling as an Entry Barrier’ 26. Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), ‘The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries’ 27. Leemore S. Dafny (2005), ‘Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets’ Name Index
