Description
Book SynopsisIn this illuminating guide to the criteria of rational theorizing, Michael Shepanski identifies, defends and applies W. V. Quine's epistemic norms the norms that best explain Quine's decisions to accept some theories and not others. Parts I and II set out the doctrines of this epistemology, demonstrating their potential for philosophical application. Part III is a case study in which Shepanski develops a theory of the propositional attitudes by the method of formalizing inferences to behaviour. He presents critiques of popular alternative views, including foundationalism, the centrality of knowledge and Quine's own epistemological naturalism. By reassessing Quine's normative epistemology, Shepanski advances our understanding of Quine's philosophy whilst providing a guide for our own theorizing.
Trade ReviewStarting from a clear exposition of Quine's views, Shepanski develops an elegant and useful epistemology of his own. Written with personality and rigor, this is an enjoyable and intriguing read. * Paul Gregory, Professor of Philosophy, Washington and Lee University, USA *
Table of ContentsPreface Acknowledgements
Part I. Undogmatic Empiricism 1. Wanted: A Normative Epistemology in Working Order 2. Epistemological Dissociative Disorder 3. Empiricism Without (Even Mentioning) the Dogmas 4. Conservatism is not a Third Norm 5. Sufficient Logical Explicitness is Norm Zero
Part II. Application to Philosophy 6. Touching Base 7. The Armchair 8. Adapting to Predicate Logic
Part III. Case Study: Propositional Attitude Ascriptions 9. Destination and Horizon 10. Sententialism 11. From Sententialism to Russellianism 12. Sententialism with Non-Designating Names
Part IV. Paths Not Taken 13. The “Two Dogmas” Argument 14. Naturalized Epistemology 15. Attitudes to Sets of
Possibilia 16. The Mythical Given 17. Epistemology as the Theory of Knowledge Notes Bibliography Index
