Description
Book SynopsisW. V. Quine’s occasional references to his ‘pragmatism’ have often been interpreted as suggesting a possible link to the American Pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey. Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction argues that the influence of pragmatism on Quine’s philosophy is more accurately traced to his teacher C.I. Lewis and his conceptual pragmatism from Mind and the World Order, and his later An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. Quine’s epistemological views share many affinities with Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism, where knowledge is conceived as a conceptual framework pragmatically revised in light of what future experience reveals. Robert Sinclair further defends and elaborates on this claim by showing how Lewis’s influence can be seen in several key episodes in Quine’s philosophical development. This correspondence highlights a forgotten element of the epistemological backdrop to Quine’s mid-century criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction, and Sinclair further argues that it provides the central epistemological framework for the form and content of Quine’s later naturalized conception of epistemology.
Trade ReviewIn presenting a historical overview of Quine’s philosophical response to Lewis’ conceptual pragmatism, Sinclair offers a fresh perspective on the interplay between pragmatism and analytic philosophy in the mid-twentieth century. This work broadens our knowledge about Quine’s development, deepens our understanding of his objections to the analytic-synthetic distinction, and sheds new light on his naturalized epistemology. Sinclair’s book, in sum, is a must read for all Quine scholars and a valuable recourse for historians of analytic philosophy.
-- Sander Verhaegh, Tilburg University
In Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, Robert Sinclair traces the often underappreciated influence of C.I. Lewis and his conceptual pragmatism on Quine’s early development. Starting with his graduate work, Sinclair details Quine’s growing discomfort with Lewis’s reliance on both the analytic-synthetic distinction and phenomenalism. While Quine was at first hopeful about analyticity, Sinclair shows how the exchanges with Lewis and Quine’s commitment to Lewis’s own style of pragmatism contribute to Quine’s rejection of the epistemological significance of the analytic-synthetic distinction and to his eventual move to naturalized epistemology. Emphasizing Lewis’s influence clarifies Quine’s claim to a more thorough pragmatism by taking us beyond just the typical focus on Carnap’s role. Further, tracing continuities between Lewis and Quine, Sinclair sheds useful light on the genesis and structure of Quine’s mature naturalism. Writing with clarity and a deft command of primary and secondary literature, Sinclair deepens and broadens our perspective on Quine’s development and a crucial period in the history of analytic philosophy.
-- Paul Gregory, Washington and Lee University
Table of ContentsAcknowledgments
Introduction: Quine and Conceptual Pragmatism
Chapter 1: Themes from Mind and the World Order: The Pragmatic A Priori, Analyticity and the Empirical Given
Chapter 2: Harvard Graduate School and Quine’s Early Pragmatism
Chapter 3: Quine’s Critical Transition: From the Carnap Lectures to Truth by Convention
Chapter 4: Ongoing Philosophical Struggles and Lewis’s An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation
Chapter 5: The Penn-Harvard Triangle and Two Dogmas of Empiricism
Chapter 6: After Two Dogmas: From Pragmatism to Naturalized Epistemology
Bibliography
About the Author
