Description

Book Synopsis
Pathological Counterinsurgency critically examines the relationship between elections and counterinsurgency success in third party campaigns supported by the United States. From Vietnam to El Salvador to Iraq and Afghanistan, many policymakers and academics believed that democratization would drive increased legitimacy and improved performance in governments waging a counterinsurgency campaign. Elections were expected to help overcome existing deficiencies, thus allowing governments supported by the United States to win the hearts and minds of its populace, undermining the appeal of insurgency. However, in each of these cases, campaigning in and winning elections did not increase the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent government or alter conditions of entrenched rent seeking and weak institutions that made states allied to the United States vulnerable to insurgency. Ultimately, elections played a limited role in creating the conditions needed for counterinsurgency success. Instead, de

Trade Review
This illuminating and timely work reveals the limited ability of an outside power such as the USG to instill legitimacy in a weak government by encouraging elections during a counterinsurgency campaign. Greene exposes the flawed assumptions inherent in the equation of genuine democratic reform with an externally imposed electoral process—especially in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. As Greene reminds us, there is a terrible price to be paid for magical thinking about the power of elections to turn the tide against entrenched insurgencies. This book should be required reading for Trump’s foreign policy advisors, especially as they consider next steps in the Middle East. -- Vivian S. Walker, Central European University
Professor Greene's fundamental insight on the necessary yet insufficient nature of elections in successful counterinsurgencies is a crucial one. In each of his case studies, he demonstrates how too great a concern with the fact of an election has crowded out clear thinking about the fundamental prerequisites for holding an election, and for requirements for transparency and constraint of the victors. His book should be on the shelf of anyone hoping to avoid the errors of the recent and not-so-recent past. -- Thomas Wingfield, National Defense University
Pathological Counterinsurgency is an invaluable guide for those seeking to understand third-party counterinsurgency campaigns. Greene addresses the critical question of whether elections promote a host country’s legitimacy and performance. With implications for counterinsurgency, stability operations, and foreign interventions, Pathological Counterinsurgency should be required reading for those designing and implementing US foreign policy today. -- Peter G. Thompson, National Defense University

Table of Contents
Acknowledgments Introduction: Understanding Pathological Counterinsurgency Chapter 1: Legitimacy and Democratization in Counterinsurgency Chapter 2: Building Legitimacy: Theory vs. Practice Chapter 3: Democratization, Elections and Counterinsurgency in Theory and Policy Chapter 4: Vietnam Chapter 5: El Salvador Chapter 6: Iraq Chapter 7: Afghanistan Chapter 8: Malaya, Colombia, and the Limits of Third Party Campaigns Conclusion: The Limits of Elections in Counterinsurgency Bibliography About the Author

Pathological Counterinsurgency

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A Hardback by Samuel R. Greene

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    View other formats and editions of Pathological Counterinsurgency by Samuel R. Greene

    Publisher: Lexington Books
    Publication Date: 1/18/2018 12:03:00 AM
    ISBN13: 9781498538183, 978-1498538183
    ISBN10: 1498538185

    Description

    Book Synopsis
    Pathological Counterinsurgency critically examines the relationship between elections and counterinsurgency success in third party campaigns supported by the United States. From Vietnam to El Salvador to Iraq and Afghanistan, many policymakers and academics believed that democratization would drive increased legitimacy and improved performance in governments waging a counterinsurgency campaign. Elections were expected to help overcome existing deficiencies, thus allowing governments supported by the United States to win the hearts and minds of its populace, undermining the appeal of insurgency. However, in each of these cases, campaigning in and winning elections did not increase the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent government or alter conditions of entrenched rent seeking and weak institutions that made states allied to the United States vulnerable to insurgency. Ultimately, elections played a limited role in creating the conditions needed for counterinsurgency success. Instead, de

    Trade Review
    This illuminating and timely work reveals the limited ability of an outside power such as the USG to instill legitimacy in a weak government by encouraging elections during a counterinsurgency campaign. Greene exposes the flawed assumptions inherent in the equation of genuine democratic reform with an externally imposed electoral process—especially in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. As Greene reminds us, there is a terrible price to be paid for magical thinking about the power of elections to turn the tide against entrenched insurgencies. This book should be required reading for Trump’s foreign policy advisors, especially as they consider next steps in the Middle East. -- Vivian S. Walker, Central European University
    Professor Greene's fundamental insight on the necessary yet insufficient nature of elections in successful counterinsurgencies is a crucial one. In each of his case studies, he demonstrates how too great a concern with the fact of an election has crowded out clear thinking about the fundamental prerequisites for holding an election, and for requirements for transparency and constraint of the victors. His book should be on the shelf of anyone hoping to avoid the errors of the recent and not-so-recent past. -- Thomas Wingfield, National Defense University
    Pathological Counterinsurgency is an invaluable guide for those seeking to understand third-party counterinsurgency campaigns. Greene addresses the critical question of whether elections promote a host country’s legitimacy and performance. With implications for counterinsurgency, stability operations, and foreign interventions, Pathological Counterinsurgency should be required reading for those designing and implementing US foreign policy today. -- Peter G. Thompson, National Defense University

    Table of Contents
    Acknowledgments Introduction: Understanding Pathological Counterinsurgency Chapter 1: Legitimacy and Democratization in Counterinsurgency Chapter 2: Building Legitimacy: Theory vs. Practice Chapter 3: Democratization, Elections and Counterinsurgency in Theory and Policy Chapter 4: Vietnam Chapter 5: El Salvador Chapter 6: Iraq Chapter 7: Afghanistan Chapter 8: Malaya, Colombia, and the Limits of Third Party Campaigns Conclusion: The Limits of Elections in Counterinsurgency Bibliography About the Author

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