Description
Historians and diplomats often claim that each international negotiation is a unique event. In contrast, negotiation theory, building on several academic disciplines, argues that international bargaining is characterized by recurrent patterns that can be generalized and formalized.
In the context of that debate, this book addresses whether international economic negotiations differ from other types of negotiation and examines what might be typical and, possibly, special about economic negotiation. It also studies the extent to which economic theory as opposed to negotiation theory can explain the outcome of international economic negotiations. Using the framework of a comparative case study, the authors look at the most important economic issues that are traditionally at stake: trade, money, finance, macroeconomic affairs and direct investment. The cases represent government-to-government, business-to-business and business-to-government negotiations and are described by those who were either personally involved in the negotiations or were close observers.
This excellent book will be of great interest to students and scholars of international economics, international business, management and game theory.
