Description
Book SynopsisThis book considers the myriad of critics of international criminal law concerning normative concepts of legitimacy, sovereignty, responsibility, punishment, economics, politics, evidence, and fairness. This is the first book to provide a thorough defense of international criminal tribunals, especially the International Criminal Court, from critics of diverse perspectives and disciplines.
Trade Review'Since the field's rebirth two decades ago in The Hague, the legal analysis of international criminal justice has exploded. But with this powerful and probing intervention, May and Fyfe demonstrate that it is philosophical concepts that best legitimate and critique the current practice of international tribunals. With this compelling and urgent book, a true philosophy of international criminal law has now arrived.' Jens David Ohlin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Cornell Law School
'The authors' analysis of the various critiques yields both normative arguments about the value of international criminal tribunals and suggestions about how the institutions can be improved. In advancing their normative claims and supporting their prescriptive suggestions, the authors draw on a deep well of philosophical and theoretical concepts, including legitimacy, fairness, effectiveness, and efficiency. The result is a book that not only canvases and addresses the broad array of critiques leveled at international criminal tribunals but adds significantly to the rather scant literature on the philosophical justifications for international criminal justice.' Margaret M. deGuzman, Ethics & International Affairs
Table of ContentsIntroduction; 1. Legitimacy; 2. Sovereignty; 3. Punishment; 4. Responsibility; 5. Economics; 6. Politics; 7. Evidence; 8. Fairness; 9. Concluding remarks.
