Description
Book SynopsisThe past two decades has witnessed unprecedented changes in the corporate governance landscape in Europe, the US and Asia. Across many countries, activist investors have pursued engagements with management of target companies. More recently, the role of the hostile activist shareholder has been taken up by a set of hedge funds. Hedge fund activism is characterized by mergers and corporate restructuring, replacement of management and board members, proxy voting, and lobbying of management. These investors target and research companies, take large positions in `their stock, criticize their business plans and governance practices, and confront their managers, demanding action enhancing shareholder value. This book analyses the impact of activists on the companies that they invest, the effects on shareholders and on activists funds themselves. Chapters examine such topic as investors'' strategic approaches, the financial returns they produce, and the regulatory frameworks within which they
Trade ReviewBratton and McCaherys edited volume addresses todays most fundamental question regarding the governance of dispersed-ownership corporations: have private equity and activist hedge funds solved the problem of the separation of ownership from control? This remarkable collection of essays by the worlds leading corporate governance scholars will play a critical role in shaping the discussion in both academic and policy circles for many years to come. * Merritt B. Fox, Michael E. Patterson Professor of Law, NASDAQ Professor for Law and Economics of Capital Markets, Columbia University Law School *
Hedge funds and private equity funds are the active governance agents of late. Bratton and McCahery have put together a collection of highly informative essays examining many aspects of the governance model adopted by these institutional investors: tactics, performance, economic consequences, as well as the regulatory framework in which they operate. The volume must be recommended to anyone interested in corporate governance. * Mike Burkart, Gösta Olson Professor of Finance, Stockholm School of Economics *
Hedge fund activism and private equity have become central for corporate governance in recent years. This books collects impressive papers from some of the most prominent academics in the field, which is now richer for the editors and authors efforts. * Mark J. Roe, David Berg Professor of Law, Harvard Law School *
Table of ContentsPART I. THE DISEMPOWERED SHAREHOLDER ; PART II. HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM ; A. PATTERNS AND POLICY QUESTIONS - DARK SIDES AND LIGHT SIDES ; B. OWNERSHIP STAKES, OPERATING RESULTS, AND FINANCIAL RETURNS ; C. STRATEGIC HOLDING VERSUS COLLECTIVE INTEREST: EMPTY VOTING AND BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION ; PART III. PRIVATE EQUITY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ; A. STRUCTURE AND MOTIVATION ; B. HOW HAS PRIVATE EQUITY PERFORMED? ; PART IV. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ; A. STRUCTURAL TREATMENT OF HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY: INVESTOR PROTECTION AND SYSTEMIC RISK ; B. REGULATION AND THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM ; C. LAW REFORM: THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION
