Description
Book SynopsisThis highly relevant study provides an incisive analysis of a critical phase in recent East Asian financial history, exploring the underlying causes of the financial crisis that struck Indonesia during the second half of 1997.
Matsumoto's extensive commercial experience in Indonesian finance during these critical years, allows him to skilfully argue that the roots of the crisis lay in the period of capital liberalization undertaken during the boom years from 1994 to 1997 which encouraged the development of fragile and unstable financial structures, involving increased corporate leverage, reliance on external debt, and the introduction of riskier and more complicated financial instruments and transactions.
In-depth fieldwork data and four detailed case studies illuminate the microeconomic foundations of the crisis, showing how Indonesian capitalists sought to liquidate their Indonesian assets without losing control of their corporate empires, by taking advantage of incre
Table of Contents
Introduction 1. Indonesia’s External Debt Problem in the 1990s 2. Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis - Interpretation and Critical Adjustments for the Asian Context 3. Methods and Databases for Empirical Studies 4. The Financial Positions of the Indonesian Corporate Sector in the 1990s 5. The Analysis of Offshore Syndicated Debt for Indonesian Borrowers during the Finance Boom in the 1990s 6. Case Study 1 – The Salim Group’s Financial Activities in the 1990s 7. Case Study 2 – The Lippo Group’s Financial Activities in the 1990s 8. Case Study 3 – The Sinar Mas Group’s Financial Activities in the 1990s 9. Case Study 4 – The Gajah Tunggal Group’s Financial Activities in the 1990s 10. The Collapse of Cash Flow Chains 11. Conclusions
