Description
Book SynopsisAll representative democracies must balance democratic accountability against the competent implementation of complex statutes. Achieving this balance in administrative law will be aided by drawing on insights from economics and political economy. This important volume collects the best work in this area and is of significance for scholars of public law and economics around the world. The editor's authoritative selection of papers, anchored in the American system of administrative law, mixes theoretical, legal, and empirical studies by leading interdisciplinary scholars. It thus provides an up-to-date introduction to modern work in the economics of administrative law.
Trade Review'Professor Rose-Ackerman, a leading American figure in the subject of this collection, and a person well-acquainted with the law and economics of administration abroad as well as in the United States, has assembled much of the canonical literature in this highly useful collection of articles. American law schools are increasingly concluding that consideration of the regulatory and administrative state is at the heart of the foundational curriculum for the twenty-first century, and that the social science issues these articles address are as important to that consideration as any technical legal matters. Reaching across the intersections of law,economics and political science, this collection is an important building block for any library wishing to provide its users with the important resources.' -- Peter L. Strauss, Columbia Law School, US
Table of ContentsContents: Acknowledgements Introduction Susan Rose-Ackerman PART I THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DELEGATION TO AGENCIES A Why Delegate? 1. Morris P. Fiorina and Roger G. Noll (1978), ‘Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy: Institutional Design in the Public Sector’ 2. Morris P. Fiorina (1986), ‘Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power’ 3. David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran (1994), ‘Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion’ 4. B. Dan Wood and John Bohte (2004), ‘Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design’ B Congressional Oversight and “Stacking the Deck” 5. Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz (1984), ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms’ 6. Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast (1987), ‘Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control’ 7. R. Douglas Arnold (1987), ‘Political Control of Administrative Officials’ 8. Jeffrey S. Hill and James E. Brazier (1991), ‘Constraining Administrative Decisions: A Critical Examination of the Structure and Process Hypothesis’ 9. David B. Spence (1999), ‘Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies’ C Agency Discretion and Government Institutions 10. John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan (1990), ‘Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy’ 11. Kathleen Bawn (1995), ‘Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About Administrative Procedures’ 12. Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Pablo T. Spiller and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999), ‘An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures’ PART II BUREAUCRACY AND THE PRESIDENT: POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND POLICY ANALYSIS IN AGENCY ACTIONS A Politics and Agency Rulemaking 13. James T. Hamilton and Christopher H. Schroeder (1994), ‘Strategic Regulators and the Choice of Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste’ 14. Scott R. Furlong and Cornelius M. Kerwin (2005), ‘Interest Group Participation in Rule Making: A Decade of Change’ 15. Jerry L. Mashaw (1985), ‘Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions’ B The Politics and Policy of Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Role of the President 16. Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper, George C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn, Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R. Portney, Milton Russell, Richard Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, Robert N. Stavins (1996), ‘Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?’ 17. Robert W. Hahn and Robert E. Litan (2005), ‘Counting Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons for the US and Europe’ 18. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1988), ‘Progressive Law and Economics – And the New Administrative Law’ 19. Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart (1988), ‘Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives’ PART III JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE REGULATORY STATE 20. Stephen Breyer (1986), ‘Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy’ 21. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn (1992), ‘Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State’ 22. Peter L. Strauss and Andrew R. Rutten (1992), ‘The Game of Politics and Law: A Response to Eskridge and Ferejohn’ 23. Emerson H. Tiller and Pablo T. Spiller (1999), ‘Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law’ 24. Brandice Canes-Wrone (2003), ‘Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts’ PART IV COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 25. Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell (1994), ‘The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems’ 26. John D. Huber and Nolan McCarty (2004), ‘Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform’ 27. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1994), ‘American Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany a Model?’ Name Index
