Description
Book SynopsisPension funds own significant shares of the world's largest corporations. However, the beneficiaries of pensions often have little or no say in corporate governance. This book speaks to this imbalance by exploring different ways to make capital accountable to labour, offering suggestions for improving corporate responsibility.
Trade Review"Professor Davis has a rare combination of expertise - labor law, corporate law, trust law, securities law, and pension law... This book provides a clear explanation of many important legal concepts from vastly different fields and brings them together in a way that is compelling... I hope policy makers listen to Professor Davis because... the manuscript addresses one of the most important economic/social/political issues of our time. - Marleen O'Connor, Stetson University College of Law"
Table of ContentsIntroduction
1 Corporate Investment by Employee Pension Funds: A Deal with the Devil?
2 Pension Fund Assets and Plan Members: A Question of Ownership?
3 The Duties of Pension Fund Managers towards Plan Members with Respect to the Governance of Investee Corporations
4 Corporate Law’s Opportunities and Limitations for Pension Fund Corporate Governance Activity
5 The Enhancing and Constraining Effects of Securities Regulation on Corporate Governance by Pension Funds
6 Designing Democratic Corporate Governance Accountability Options
7 Conclusion: Pension Funds Must Be Accountable to Plan Members for Using Corporate Governance to Enhance Corporate Environmental, Social, and Governance Performance
Notes
Bibliography
Index
