Description

Book Synopsis
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today.

Trade Review
"The volume succeeds in crystallizing many of the contentious issues in the field, whilst developing the conceptual landscape and identifying new issues. This is a compelling publication that is thoughtfully constructed and is essential reading for anyone with an interest in the contemporary debates in philosophy of mind." (Philosophical Psychology, 14 December 2011)

"This book gives the reader a vivid sense of the philosophy of mind as a living activity. The chapters of this book provide an excellent introduction to ongoing debates about consciousness, intentionality, and physicalism. At the same time, many of the chapters make important contributions to the subject in their own right."
David Chalmers, Australian National University



Table of Contents

Notes on Contributors ix

Introduction
Jonathan Cohen xii

PART I MENTAL CONTENT 1

Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3

1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions
Gabriel Segal 5

2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content
Sarah Sawyer 20

Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 35

3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent
Anthony Brueckner 37

4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent
Michael McKinsey 53

Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 67

5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology
Georges Rey 69

6 Normativism Defended
Ralph Wedgwood 85

Is There Non-Conceptual Content? 103

7 The Revenge of the Given
Jerry Fodor 105

8 Are There Different Kinds of Content?
Richard G. Heck Jr 117

PART II PHYSICALISM 139

Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable? 141

9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism
Louise Antony 143

10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism
Paul M. Churchland 160

Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 183

11 A Priori Physicalism
Frank Jackson 185

12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism
Brian P. McLaughlin 200

Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 225

13 Causation and Mental Causation
Jaegwon Kim 227

14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough
Barry Loewer 243

PART III THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN NATURE 265

Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 267

15 Dualist Emergentism
Martine Nida-Rümelin 269

16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness
David Braddon-Mitchell 287

Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 301

17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak
Michael Tye 303

18 A Case for Qualia
Sydney Shoemaker 319

Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 333

19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual
Jesse Prinz 335

20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I)
Christopher Peacocke 358

Index 377

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

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A Hardback by Brian P. McLaughlin, Jonathan Cohen

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    View other formats and editions of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind by Brian P. McLaughlin

    Publisher: John Wiley and Sons Ltd
    Publication Date: 12/09/2007
    ISBN13: 9781405117609, 978-1405117609
    ISBN10: 1405117605

    Description

    Book Synopsis
    Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today.

    Trade Review
    "The volume succeeds in crystallizing many of the contentious issues in the field, whilst developing the conceptual landscape and identifying new issues. This is a compelling publication that is thoughtfully constructed and is essential reading for anyone with an interest in the contemporary debates in philosophy of mind." (Philosophical Psychology, 14 December 2011)

    "This book gives the reader a vivid sense of the philosophy of mind as a living activity. The chapters of this book provide an excellent introduction to ongoing debates about consciousness, intentionality, and physicalism. At the same time, many of the chapters make important contributions to the subject in their own right."
    David Chalmers, Australian National University



    Table of Contents

    Notes on Contributors ix

    Introduction
    Jonathan Cohen xii

    PART I MENTAL CONTENT 1

    Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3

    1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions
    Gabriel Segal 5

    2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content
    Sarah Sawyer 20

    Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 35

    3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent
    Anthony Brueckner 37

    4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent
    Michael McKinsey 53

    Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 67

    5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology
    Georges Rey 69

    6 Normativism Defended
    Ralph Wedgwood 85

    Is There Non-Conceptual Content? 103

    7 The Revenge of the Given
    Jerry Fodor 105

    8 Are There Different Kinds of Content?
    Richard G. Heck Jr 117

    PART II PHYSICALISM 139

    Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable? 141

    9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism
    Louise Antony 143

    10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism
    Paul M. Churchland 160

    Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 183

    11 A Priori Physicalism
    Frank Jackson 185

    12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism
    Brian P. McLaughlin 200

    Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 225

    13 Causation and Mental Causation
    Jaegwon Kim 227

    14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough
    Barry Loewer 243

    PART III THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN NATURE 265

    Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 267

    15 Dualist Emergentism
    Martine Nida-Rümelin 269

    16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness
    David Braddon-Mitchell 287

    Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 301

    17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak
    Michael Tye 303

    18 A Case for Qualia
    Sydney Shoemaker 319

    Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 333

    19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual
    Jesse Prinz 335

    20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I)
    Christopher Peacocke 358

    Index 377

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