Description
Book SynopsisThroughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. Competition
Trade Review"[H]is contribution to the debate is novel, provocative, and important."--Choice "[V]ery well documented... I highly recommend to economists and lawyers, as well as those working in competition policy issues than those in charge of its implementation."--David Encaoua, Journal of Economics "I highly recommend [Kaplow's book] to economists and lawyers, as well as those working in competition policy issues than those in charge of its implementation."--David Encaoua, Journal of Economics
Table of ContentsPreface xiii 1. Introduction 1 PART I: HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS 2. Defining the Problem 21 3. Communications 50 4. Statutory Provisions and Higher Court Interpretations 69 5. U.S. Lower Court Practice 101 6. Paradox of Proof 125 7. Oligopoly Theory and the Agreement Requirement 174 PART II: PRICE-FIXING POLICY 8. Social Welfare 217 9. Framework for Decision-Making 231 10. Detection: Market-Based Evidence 256 11. Detection: Other Types of Evidence 286 12. Liability Assessment 307 13. Sanctions 322 14. Unilateral Market Power 346 15. Additional Considerations 368 PART III: COMPARISON OF APPROACHES 16. Communications-Based Prohibition 387 17. Detection of Prohibited Communications 398 18. Further Topics 420 19. Conclusion 443 References 455 Index 475
