Search results for ""ISEAS""

The Chinese diaspora, consisting of both Chinese living overseas who are citizens of China (huaqiao), and people of Chinese descent who are citizens of foreign countries (huaren), have significantly shaped the making of modern China.China’s policy towards its diaspora is primarily governed by its national interests and foreign policy imperatives. However, the Chinese government has been careful to ensure that the huaqiao and the huaren fall into different policy domains: Chinese citizens living overseas are subject to China’s domestic policies, while Chinese descendants who are citizens of other countries come under China’s foreign affairs. Nevertheless, from the beginning, the latter continue to be regarded as kinsfolk distinct from other foreign nationals.The huaqiao-huaren distinction is often blurred in ordinary discourse and this has been a source of much misunderstanding. However, it has not been the policy of the Chinese government to blur this distinction, and it is acutely aware of the complexity of the issue and is therefore very cautious about implying any change. As such, when terms such as huaqiao-huaren are introduced in the official lexicon, they are meant to acknowledge certain historical and contemporary realities, and not to deliberately obfuscate the two categories. The use of the combined term is in fact a recognition of the clear-cut distinction between the two groups, and is meant to convey a semantic balance in which neither category is emphasized at the expense of the other.In general, since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government has treated the diaspora as an asset, rather than a liability. The sole exception was during the Cultural Revolution when returnees, or the guiqiao, were condemned as reactionary and bourgeois elements.There is therefore a fundamental continuity in China’s diaspora policy: namely, that China embraces both groups as part of a global Chinese community. Some policy shifts can be expected in future as China becomes more proactive in reaching out to its diaspora while balancing the needs and interests of Chinese abroad with the needs and interests of the Mainland.

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There are at least 80–100 business associations (such as chambers of commerce or industry-specific bodies) in Malaysia today, representing over 600,000 firms. In February–April 2020, a range of chamber leaders and officers were interviewed to record their experiences of the recent Pakatan Harapan (PH) administration, and any future lessons for business associations in post GE-14 Malaysia.Few Malaysian chambers have had experience in dealing with changes of government, creating challenges when PH took office. Most associations were able to build effective working relationships with the new administration. Compared to Barisan Nasional (BN) ministers, PH ministers emphasized greater policy rigour, more evidence-based arguments, lower tolerance for corruption, and enhanced public accountability. Criticisms of PH include an early focus by some ministers on seemingly trivial issues, an initial distrust of some parts of the public service, and an inability to have all parts of the federal government work cohesively. Some future lessons that business associations have adopted are: avoid taking a partisan stance in policy debates; be prepared for some confusion and lack of clarity in the early days of any new government; expect many existing policies to remain; build relationships with both new ministers and with senior public servants; and ensure that policy positions are well researched and evidence-based. Most associations feel comfortable in adapting to the March 2020 installation of the new Perikatan Nasional administration.Changes in government have also prompted associations to review their own internal policy capacity. Interviewees suggest that chambers may need to enhance their advocacy skills, move away from racially based structures, improve their level of public transparency, become more strategic, and improve their own internal governance and management.

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A new phase in US foreign policy, in which China is viewed as a major threat to American economic and security interests, has begun under the Trump administration. The strong anti-China sentiment is accompanied by efforts to “decouple” from China. If carried too far, they will alienate allies and friends whose cooperation the US will need in order to compete with China. In the broader American foreign policy community, there is an intense ongoing debate on how strong the push-back against China should be. Both moderates and hawks agree on the need for a “tougher” approach but differ on the degree and method of toughness. No coherent strategy has been possible partly because President Trump’s thinking does not always accord with that of his own administration and partly because it is still too early in the day to come out with well-thought-out policies to support such a major change in foreign policy direction. The ongoing adjustments to global policy and strategy will therefore continue as the security focus shifts to the Indo-Pacific region. The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept provides some signs of the broad direction policy may take but its vital economic dimension is still missing. There is greater recognition in Washington of the importance of Southeast Asia. Located in the middle of Indo-Pacific, it will be a contested zone between China and the US and its allies. The US will step up its public diplomacy to better promote its own narrative in Southeast Asia. Under the Trump administration, the importance of the South China Sea to the US has risen. The US will remain a powerful factor in Asia despite Trump and problems at home. China is not on an inevitable path of dominance given its own significant domestic challenges.

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Agricultural products are one of Vietnam's most important exports, contributing considerably to the overall export turnover of the country. Vietnam's agricultural exports are easily affected by external factors. It is overly dependent on the Chinese market, and its agricultural products do not as yet meet strict global standards. Challenges facing Vietnam's export of fruits and vegetables to the Chinese market include technical barriers, long risk assessment periods, restrictions on products exported through official quotas to the Chinese market, and frequent changes in China's policy on border crossings. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the importance of market diversification to this sector. To further develop its agricultural export sector, Vietnam needs to gather and consolidate information on import standards and guide its farmers on product quality requirements. Besides, efforts to gradually diversify its markets are essential for it to avoid being dependent on a small number of partners and markets. Vietnam's participation in international organizations such as ASEAN, APEC, WTO, and AEC exemplifies its increasingly active efforts at seeking new development opportunities. The seventeen bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements which have been signed by Vietnam partly demonstrates efforts at achieving market diversification.

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American Indo-Pacific policy will be driven by its China policy, regardless of whether there is a second-term Donald Trump administration or a first-term Joe Biden administration.The Republicans will continue to frame the major challenge as “balancing” against Chinese power and “countering” the worst aspects of Beijing’s policies. Establishment or moderate Democrats under Biden will choose the softer language of seeking a favourable “competitive coexistence” in the military, economic, political and global governance realms, and the reassertion of American leadership and moral standing.In advancing the FOIP, the current administration argues that disruptiveness and unpredictability are necessary to reverse what they see as the “normalization” of Chinese assertiveness, coercion and revisionism. They also point to the closeness of US cooperation with Japan, Australia and India and bourgeoning strategic relationships with Vietnam. A second-term Trump administration will continue to seek out “fit-for-purpose” existing institutions and relationships, or prioritize new ones.Establishment Democrats believe that the “America First” unilateralist approach is unsettling for allies and partners. In advancing a favourable “competitive coexistence” with China, Democrats will seek to expand the tools of statecraft and achieve a better balance between military/economic/political/governance approaches.Prima facie, a Biden administration might position America as a more consultative guarantor of a preferred order. However, there will be greater pressure on Southeast Asians to accept more collective responsibility to advance common objectives. This means hedging in a manner more suitable to American rather than Chinese preferences. Failing that, more emphasis might be placed on greater institutionalization of the Quad and ad hoc groupings.A Bernie Sanders administration, now an unlikely prospect, would be a disaster for US standing and power in the region, and therefore for Southeast Asia.

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The United States launched a new Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy in late 2017 after reluctantly concluding that its patient effort to engage and socialize China to the rules-based order since 1972 had failed. China’s behaviour since 2009 convinced the United States that China is a revisionist power seeking to impose an authoritarian model of governance in Asia which, if successful, would end the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific as well as endanger US security and vital trade interests.The new US FOIP strategy initiative seeks to engage like-minded nations in economic, security (both traditional and non-traditional), and political governance partnerships to construct a collaborative and scalable network of relations that will be able to respond flexibly to meet a wide range of stakeholder needs and regional contingencies across the Indo-Pacific region.The United States occupies a peak organizing role in this network and works with a hierarchy of partners distributed throughout the vast Indo-Pacific to meet the economic, security, and governance capacity needs of network members at any level. The rules-based order is the “operating system” of this network approach, and so the network itself sustains the rules-based order for its members as a collective good. FOIP is more like a club that generates rules-based order benefits for its members and as such has little in common with Cold War bloc politics and containment strategy.Bearing in mind that FOIP is only in its start-up phase and is likely to gather momentum going forward; that the elements of this network strategy are already in place; and that the United States and its main FOIP partners together have considerable material, organizational, and soft power resources, one may say that its prospects for long-term sustainability and success are not bad.

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