Search results for ""Author Mr Michael John Claringbould""

A compelling account of the failure of Imperial Japan's Operation Ro-Go, intended to take the offensive in the Solomons theater of the Pacific War, but which became Japan's first line of defense against the Allies' Rabaul raids and Bougainville landings. By the midpoint of World War II in the Pacific, Japan was on the defensive. At the end of 1943, after a year of tumultuous air combat around Rabaul and the Solomons, 173 Japanese aircraft were sent to Rabaul. The plan was for them to participate in Ro-Go Sakusen (known as Operation Ro, Ro-Go, or B) to strike Allied air power and shipping in the Solomons and to slow the American advance by severing Allied supply chains. However, instead of challenging Allied air and sea power on their own terms, the operation became unexpectedly embroiled in defensive combat and counterattacks, first to defend Rabaul from Allied air raids, and then to challenge the Allied landings at Bougainville. In one fell swoop, Operation Ro-Go was turned on its head, and transformed into a defensive battle for the Japanese. In this book, the first in English to focus on Operation Ro-Go, Michael John Claringbould uses rare Japanese primary source material to explain how the Japanese planned and fought the campaign, and corrects enduring myths often found in books that rely only on Western sources. He traces the unexpected and tremendous pressures placed on the operation’s units at Rabaul as the Japanese dealt with massive, surprise raids from Fifth Air Force bombers, and later US Navy carrier aircraft, concluding with the strategic upset of the Bougainville landings. Packed with previously unpublished photos, spectacular original illustrations, 3D recreations of specific missions, maps and explanatory diagrams, this study tells the previously untold but significant story of Japan's air war in the Solomons.

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The aerial clashes between the iconic Corsair and Zero-sen translated into a contest of speed and altitude for the former, versus the latter’s outstanding agility and range. Whilst the F4U Corsair eventually proved to be a superior fighter in Pacific operations, its introduction into combat in this theatre initially demonstrated its weaknesses. Indeed, the ‘Saint Valentine's Day Massacre’ debacle showcased exemplary Zero-sen fighter tactics, and American losses were of sufficient magnitude that further daylight missions toward Bougainville were discontinued until Allied fighter tactics could be improved. As a result, for the next two months the Corsair’s combat results were much subdued. Indeed, the F4U only became a superb fighter when both its pilots and their commanders worked out how to deploy the gull-wing design effectively. Optimum circumstances for effective engagement did not always occur, and the Zero-sen remained effective against the Corsair until February 1944 in the South Pacific, after which all IJNAF fighter units vacated Rabaul. This book closely examines these two different fighters in the Solomons/Rabaul theatre, and the unique geographic conditions which shaped their deployment and effectiveness. It contains rare photographs and digital artwork that accurately showcases and aligns combats of both types in-theatre with unprecedented accuracy. Both sides vastly over-claimed. With full access to IJNAF and US Navy/US Marine Corps records, these numbers will be presented accurately.

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This book details the exploits of the highly skilled Naval Aviators charged with achieving air supremacy over New Guinea in their A6M2/3 Zero-sens. The combat record of the Zero-sen in New Guinea has mostly been overstated, with little due being given to the constraining conditions under which the fighter operated. The air combats fought over New Guinea in 1942 between Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force (IJNAF) pilots and their Allied counterparts in P-39 Airacobras and P-40 Warhawks were often ‘trial and error’ affairs, with both belligerents being caught out by weather. This study covers the key role played by governing factors including geography and climatic conditions, and examines the modified tactics employed by IJNAF Zero-sen pilots to help them cope in-theatre through the comprehensive analysis of RAAF, USAAF and Japanese operational after action reports. Using first-hand accounts from both famous aviators and previously unknown RAAF and Japanese pilots, and specially commissioned artwork, leading South Pacific historian and author Michael John Claringbould sheds new light on the air war fought over the wilds of New Guinea during the course of 1942.

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Although New Guinea’s Thunderbolt pilots faced several different types of enemy aircraft in capricious tropical conditions, by far their most common adversary was the Nakajima Ki-43-II Hayabusa, codenamed ‘Oscar’ by the Allies. These two opposing fighters were the products of two radically different design philosophies. The Thunderbolt was heavy, fast and packed a massive punch thanks to its battery of eight 0.50-cal machine guns, while the ‘Oscar’ was the complete opposite in respect to fighter design philosophy – lightweight, nimble, manoeuvrable and lightly armed. It was, nonetheless, deadly in the hands of an experienced pilot. The Thunderbolt commenced operations in New Guinea with a series of bomber escort missions in mid-1943, and its firepower and superior speed soon saw Fifth Air Force fighter command deploying elite groups of P-47s to Wewak, on the northern coast. Flying from there, they would pick off unwary enemy aircraft during dedicated fighter patrols. The Thunderbolt pilots in New Guinea slowly wore down their Japanese counterparts by continual combat and deadly strafing attacks, but nevertheless, the Ki-43-II remained a worthy opponent deterrent up until Hollandia was abandoned by the IJAAF in April 1944. Fully illustrated throughout with artwork and rare photographs, this fascinating book examines these two vastly different fighters in the New Guinea theatre, and assesses the unique geographic conditions that shaped their deployment and effectiveness.

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