Search results for ""Author Michael Ch. Rodgers""

Long framed in terms of Christian and secularist concerns, the field of philosophy of religion has recently been attempting to expand to include a wider, more diverse variety of religious phenomena. At the same time, a growing body of literature within religious studies has called attention to the historical genealogy and limitations of the category of "religion." If "religion" is itself a modern, secular extrapolation from Christian understandings, disseminated globally through colonial encounter, does the apparently more capacious approach to philosophy of religion simply reproduce the deficiencies of the old under the guise of a false universal? The present volumeseeks to move the field in the direction of a reflexive turn, toward an examination of the philosophical implications of the concept of "religion."

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According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), religious conversion is a fundamental human right. Not all religious traditions accept this. Some allow conversion only to their religion but deny it to their own members. Some distinguish between voluntary conversion, which they accept, and organized proselytism, to which they object. Some accept it as a fact, which they regret, and others threaten converts with the death penalty for leaving the religion into which they were born. However, there are many kinds of conversion: philosophical, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and there are many kinds of religious conversion. The 32nd Conference of Philosophy of Religion at Claremont Graduate University in 2011 addressed this complex issue from religious, legal, philosophical and theological perspectives.

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The interplay between activity and passivity in religious practices in general and religious beliefs and emotions in particular is a central and controversial issue in philosophical, theological and psychological thought past and present. This conference volume is organized around Schleiermacher's central idea of the 'feeling of ultimate dependence' and Kierkegaard's existential analysis of the fundamental passivity of passion. Three studies elucidate important strands in the theological and philosophical background of these insights in Paul the Apostle, Luther, Melanchthon, Hobbes and Spinoza. Three further studies look at concrete examples of affects, emotions, or passions in religious life such as anxiety, fear of God, wonder, and pathos of faith that move the debate in distinct ways beyond Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard. All contributions do not restrict what they say to historical analyses but aim at making a contribution to contemporary debates.Contributors:Ingolf U. Dalferth, C.J. Dickson, M. Jamie Ferreira, Arne Grøn, Teri Merrick, Michael Moxter, Cornelia Richter, Robert C. Roberts, Michael Rodgers, Amy M. Schmitter, Philipp Stoellger, Thandeka

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Revelation is a central category in many religions. Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Mormonism or Unificationists are difficult if not impossible to imagine without it. For some, revelation signifies a decisive event in the past, for others it is a present reality. It plays a central role in shaping religious identities, and it is the reason for much criticism. Some follow a religion only because of its claim to divine revelation, whereas others criticize it as "hearsay upon hearsay" (Paine) on which they would never rest their belief. For some, God has put everything at risk in revelation, including his own being, exposing himself to the utter contingency of existence; for others, even the idea of revelation is an embarrassment to their understanding of a perfect and absolute God. Sometimes revelation is used to refer to a special source of information about the divine accessible only to a few, in the hand of others it becomes virtually indistinguishable from religious experience or experience in general. Sometimes revelation is understood to be self-communicating and self-authenticating, at other times revelations need mediations and mediators. In some traditions, true revelation is always personal and experienced, and past revelation must continually be made revelation again. Some religions have built elaborate institutions of priests and privileged interpreters to safeguard their revelation, control access to it and to protect the right way of interpreting and communicating it. Theologies have distinguished between natural and supernatural, general, specific and individual, personal and impersonal revelation, between revelation, inspiration and incarnation, or between revelation and divine self-revelation. But claims to revelation have also been criticized as strategies of self-immunization, which allow religions to avoid critical public debate of their views and teachings, or legitimize the position of those in power.The 33rd Conference of Philosophy of Religion at Claremont Graduate University in 2012 addressed these complex issues by concentrating on three areas of debate: I. Revelation and Reason, II. Hermeneutics of Revelation, III. Phenomenology of Revelation.

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The authors of this volume rethink our usual understanding of the relationship between faith, belief and skepticism. For some, "skeptical faith" is an oxymoron and faith and skepticism are mutually exclusive states or attitudes. Others argue that there is no proper faith without skepticism about faith. Taking John Schellenberg's recent work on the possibility of a "skeptical faith" as a starting point, the authors respond to and in some cases seek to go further than Schellenberg. In a variety of ways, the papers take up the following questions: How are we to construe the relationship between faith, belief, and skepticism if we seek to understand what is characteristic of a life of faith, or of unfaith? Is belief in God necessary for faith in God to be possible? Does one need to have sufficient reasons for believing something before one is rationally entitled to having faith in something? In short, what is the relationship between faith and belief, belief and understanding, understanding and experience, and experience and skepticism?

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