Description
Book SynopsisThis is the first scholarly account of the causes of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Full of startling revelations from Soviet communist party archives, the study advances the concept of political culture to explain crucial foreign policy decisions.
Trade Review"Stephen Morris is able to illuminate the mysteries surrounding the origins of the only extended war between communist states by skillfully reconstructing the chiliastic political culture of the decision makers. He is able to ground this analysis on solid documentation, for he is the only Western Southeast Asia specialist to have gained access to the archives of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. The result is a study that captures the passions and the mind-set of the true believers of late-stage Leninism as they played out a final drama of communism." -- Lucian Pye, Professor of Political Science Emeritus * MIT *
"Morris's study offers a careful and thorough investigation of a complex and important topic. His analysis is valuable in focusing attention on cultural and historical factors that are often ignored in contemporary international relations theory. Written in a clear and accessible style, the book should appeal not only to the Asian specialist, but also to the general reader interested in world affairs." -- William J. Duiker * Pennsylvania State University *
"Morris' vivid analysis . . . delves into the causes of the only extended war between two communist states. As the first Southeast Asian specialist to gain access to the recently opened Moscow files on the Indochinese Communist Party, Morris ably documents the paranoid style of thinking that characterized these Marxist-Leninist leaders." --
Foreign AffairsTable of ContentsAbbreviations Preface Introduction: international relations, rationality, and Marxist-Leninist political cultures Part I. The Local Genesis of the Conflict: 1. Roots of a conflict: the Vietnamese communists and the Cambodians, 1930-70 2. The public rise and secret fall of ' Militant Solidarity': Vietnamese and Cambodian communists, 1970-75 3. The foreign policy of democratic Kampuchea, 1975-78 4. The public disintergration of ' Militant Solidarity' in Indochina: Vietnam and Cambodia, 1975-78 Part II. The Internationalization of a Conflict: 5. Vietnam and the Communist world, 1930-68 6. North Vietnam's tilt toward the Soviet Union, 1968-75 7. The collapse of Vietnamese-Chinese relations 8. The emergence of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance 9. The consequences of the Vietnamese invasion Conclusion: history and theory Notes Bibliography Index.
