Description
Book SynopsisWhy is it that market instruments have not been used to their full potential in environmental policy? Using a public choice perspective, this book critically analyses the political economy of environmental policy with special emphasis on the role of powerful interest groups which have blocked the introduction of market instruments.
Drawing on new case studies of market instruments, Dr Dijkstra examines the attitudes of interest groups and how they influence environmental policy. He discusses the preferences of shareholders and workers in the polluting industry, the environmental movement and the environmental bureaucracy. He then investigates the circumstances under which market instruments will have low or no probability of being accepted, assuming that they are welfare-maximizing.
The Political Economy of Environmental Policy will be of interest to environmental and ecological economists, policymakers, political scientists and public choice scholars.
Table of ContentsContents: Foreword 1. Introduction 2. The Positive Literature on Instrument Choice 3. Effects of Instruments in an Industry Model 4. Interest Group Preferences: Other Literature 5. Survey among Dutch Interest Groups 6. Market Instruments in Practice 7. Models of Interest Group Influence 8. Noncooperative Rent Seeking 9. Cooperative Rent Seeking 10. A Two-Stage Rent Seeking Contest for Instrument Choice and Revenue Division 11. Assessment of Political Economy Models 12. Conclusion Interviews References Index
