Description
Book SynopsisWhat are the materials of conscious perceptual experience? What is going on when we are consciously aware of a visual scene, or hear sounds, or otherwise enjoy sensory experience? In this book David Papineau exposes the flaws in contemporary answers to this central philosophical question and defends a new alternative.Contemporary theories of perceptual experience all hold that conscious experiences reach out into the world beyond the mind. According to naïve realism, experiences literally incorporate perceived facts, while representationalism holds that experiences contain ordinary properties of the kind possessed by physical objects. These ideas might seem attractive at first sight, however Papineau shows that they do not stand up to examination. Instead, he argues for a purely qualitative account of sensory experience. Conscious sensory experiences are intrinsic states with no essential connection to external circumstances or represented properties. This might run counter to initial
Trade ReviewPapineau's book is effective precisely because it does not take on more than it can chew. It very well may signal the death knell for representationalism or, at the very least, force representationalists to seriously rethink their commitments. * Ekin Erkan, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences *
Table of ContentsIntroduction 1: Clearing the Ground 2: Against Representationalism 3: The Structure of Experience 4: Introspection, Adverbialism, and Rich Contents
