Description
Book SynopsisTrade ReviewJames Lebovic's The False Promise of Superiority is a real breath of fresh air that makes a vital contribution to ongoing debates about nuclear strategy, especially the nature, meaning and significance of nuclear 'superiority.' Challenging approaches to nuclear strategy that rely on capabilities rather than intentions and real-world decision-making dynamics, Lebovic makes a compelling case that nuclear strategists and policy makers should focus on what potential adversaries are likely to do as opposed to what they can do. No one interested in the future of nuclear deterrence and strategy can afford to ignore this provocative and important book. * Keith Shimko, Purdue University *
James Lebovic provides an unsparing examination of lessons learned and unlearned from debates about nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. More importantly, he demonstrates why these debates are relevant today as the United States struggles to deal with the nuclear challenges posed by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. At a time when most analyses of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability focus on the impact of emerging technologies, Lebovic focuses on the underlying logic of how deterrence works and makes a strong case that capabilities matter much less than commonly supposed. His analysis is a useful antidote to the current fascination with how artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles, and cyber weapons will revolutionize deterrence. * Gregory Koblentz, Associate Professor and director of the Biodefense Graduate Program, George Mason University *
The False Promise of Superiority is an important book that reminds readers how the faulty logics and irrationalities of the Cold War era continue to haunt the present. * Choice *
Table of ContentsConcepts and Arguments Chapter 1: The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War SECTION I: Assessing Nuclear Capability: The History and Implications of Alleged Nuclear Advantages Chapter 2: The Cold War Nuclear Force Balance: The Challenge and Promise of Asymmetry Chapter 3: Nuclear "Superiority" after the Cold War SECTION II: Coercive Tactics: Boosting Credibility to Signal a US Willingness to Act on the US "Nuclear Advantage" Chapter 4: Commitment Chapter 5: Risk Manipulation Chapter 6: Resolve and Reputation SECTION III: Case Studies Chapter 7: When Tactics Consume Strategy: Decision Making in the Cuban Missile Crisis Chapter 8: When Red Lines Consume Debate: Thwarting Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Conclusions Chapter 9: The Case for Nuclear Superiority: Assessing What We Know (and Do Not Know) about Nuclear Deterrence Notes Index
