Description

Book Synopsis

Compares the tax systems in Argentina and Chile. Examines differences in law abidance between the two countries and the effectiveness of legal enforcement.



Trade Review

“Tax compliance lies at the core of the modern state, yet we don’t know very much about it. We know even less about compliance in developing countries, where tax systems face great demands with scarce resources. This admirable book fills the gap while making a significant contribution to our understanding of taxation and political development in Latin America.”

—James E. Mahon,Williams College


“The pervasiveness of tax evasion in Latin America is often taken as a sign of institutional weakness and incomplete state formation. In this innovative and painstakingly researched book, Bergman argues instead that understanding tax evasion requires that we move beyond questions of institutional strength and state capacity to study what are in many ways more difficult questions of culture and norms. According to Bergman’s compelling argument, deep-seated cultural norms explain tax behavior better than the capacity of tax-collecting agencies or the severity of the penalties associated with tax evasion.”

—Kent Eaton,University of California, Santa Cruz


“This is a major and innovative contribution to the crucial issue of taxation in Latin America. As the author makes clear, there will hardly be sustainable economic development and strong democracies without a solution to the manifold problems that plague taxation in this region. This book should have strong appeal for a wide range of disciplinary interests.”

—Guillermo O’Donnell,University of Notre Dame


“This is a great study that provides a crucial criticism of the literature on the new institutionalism in political science. The author persuasively shows that the nature of the tax agency, or even the enforcement of rules sanctioning non-compliance, does not explain the behavior of taxpayers. . . . Others should follow in Bergman’s steps, extending this study to other policy areas and to other countries, but without losing the richness of his empirical analysis.”

—Maria Victoria Murillo Political Science Quarterly


“This is a powerful exemplar of how the movement away from simplistic ‘rational man’ models toward behavioral treatments can enrich an understanding of the economy.”

—K. P. Jameson Choice


“Bergman develops a very sophisticated argument solidly grounded in a variety of disciplines, from sociology to political science and economics. . . . [This] is an outstanding book, and it will be a key reference for anyone interested in taxation versus representation not only in the region but in other geographical areas. Indeed, I suspect that many readers in emerging markets will find that Bergman’s penetrating argument hits close to home.”

—Luigi Manzetti Latin American Politics and Society


“Bergman’s comparative research design is exemplary, and his book may be read with profit even by comparativists who do not study taxation or Latin America. It would be a good teaching text for a graduate seminar on research methods.”

—Isaac William Martin Perspectives on Politics



Table of Contents

Contents

List of Figures and Tables

Preface and Acknowledgments

Introduction

1. Compliance and Enforcement

2. Measuring Tax Compliance in Chile and Argentina

3. Taxpayers’ Perceptions of Government Enforcement

4. General Deterrence: Impunity and Sanctions in Taxation

5. Specific Deterrence and Its Effects on Individual Compliance

6. The Role of Trust, Reciprocity, and Solidarity in Tax Compliance

7. Social Mechanisms in Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance

Conclusion: Tax Compliance and the Law

Appendix A: On the Data

Appendix B: A Game Theory Approach to the Logic of Tax Compliance

Appendix C: A Simulative Game: The Effects of Enforcement

Appendix D: The State, the Law, and the Rule of Law

References

Index

Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America

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    RRP £68.95 – you save £10.34 (14%)

    Order before 4pm today for delivery by Tue 11 Aug 2026.

    A Hardback by Marcelo Bergman

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      View other formats and editions of Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America by Marcelo Bergman

      Publisher: Pennsylvania State University Press
      Publication Date: Publication Date: 19/11/2009
      ISBN13: 9780271035628, 978-0271035628
      ISBN10: 0271035625

      Description

      Book Synopsis

      Compares the tax systems in Argentina and Chile. Examines differences in law abidance between the two countries and the effectiveness of legal enforcement.



      Trade Review

      “Tax compliance lies at the core of the modern state, yet we don’t know very much about it. We know even less about compliance in developing countries, where tax systems face great demands with scarce resources. This admirable book fills the gap while making a significant contribution to our understanding of taxation and political development in Latin America.”

      —James E. Mahon,Williams College


      “The pervasiveness of tax evasion in Latin America is often taken as a sign of institutional weakness and incomplete state formation. In this innovative and painstakingly researched book, Bergman argues instead that understanding tax evasion requires that we move beyond questions of institutional strength and state capacity to study what are in many ways more difficult questions of culture and norms. According to Bergman’s compelling argument, deep-seated cultural norms explain tax behavior better than the capacity of tax-collecting agencies or the severity of the penalties associated with tax evasion.”

      —Kent Eaton,University of California, Santa Cruz


      “This is a major and innovative contribution to the crucial issue of taxation in Latin America. As the author makes clear, there will hardly be sustainable economic development and strong democracies without a solution to the manifold problems that plague taxation in this region. This book should have strong appeal for a wide range of disciplinary interests.”

      —Guillermo O’Donnell,University of Notre Dame


      “This is a great study that provides a crucial criticism of the literature on the new institutionalism in political science. The author persuasively shows that the nature of the tax agency, or even the enforcement of rules sanctioning non-compliance, does not explain the behavior of taxpayers. . . . Others should follow in Bergman’s steps, extending this study to other policy areas and to other countries, but without losing the richness of his empirical analysis.”

      —Maria Victoria Murillo Political Science Quarterly


      “This is a powerful exemplar of how the movement away from simplistic ‘rational man’ models toward behavioral treatments can enrich an understanding of the economy.”

      —K. P. Jameson Choice


      “Bergman develops a very sophisticated argument solidly grounded in a variety of disciplines, from sociology to political science and economics. . . . [This] is an outstanding book, and it will be a key reference for anyone interested in taxation versus representation not only in the region but in other geographical areas. Indeed, I suspect that many readers in emerging markets will find that Bergman’s penetrating argument hits close to home.”

      —Luigi Manzetti Latin American Politics and Society


      “Bergman’s comparative research design is exemplary, and his book may be read with profit even by comparativists who do not study taxation or Latin America. It would be a good teaching text for a graduate seminar on research methods.”

      —Isaac William Martin Perspectives on Politics



      Table of Contents

      Contents

      List of Figures and Tables

      Preface and Acknowledgments

      Introduction

      1. Compliance and Enforcement

      2. Measuring Tax Compliance in Chile and Argentina

      3. Taxpayers’ Perceptions of Government Enforcement

      4. General Deterrence: Impunity and Sanctions in Taxation

      5. Specific Deterrence and Its Effects on Individual Compliance

      6. The Role of Trust, Reciprocity, and Solidarity in Tax Compliance

      7. Social Mechanisms in Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance

      Conclusion: Tax Compliance and the Law

      Appendix A: On the Data

      Appendix B: A Game Theory Approach to the Logic of Tax Compliance

      Appendix C: A Simulative Game: The Effects of Enforcement

      Appendix D: The State, the Law, and the Rule of Law

      References

      Index

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