Description
Book SynopsisThis book offers a timely and critical evaluation of the Chicago School approach to antitrust law. Recent judgements by the United States Supreme Court (in cases such as Kodak) and the debate surrounding the Microsoft monopoly have led to the view that antitrust has entered the post-Chicago era, in which previous immoderations are tempered, and more refined and accurate analyses take precedence. This claim is made at a time when European competition policy is gradually embracing an economics-based approach. The authors discuss the economic foundations of competition policy and the different ways in which both American and European competition law does - or does not - take account of economic insights. Although the book makes no claim to provide a definitive answer to the host of questions arising from the complexities of antitrust, it does offer an important contribution to a better understanding of the many 'interfaces' between economic thinking and sound legal policy.
More than 20 years on from the initial successes of the Chicago School, this book provides a timely appraisal of developments in antitrust law. It will be an enlightening and challenging read for a host of academics, practitioners and policymakers including industrial and political economists, lawyers, regulators and corporate strategists.
Table of ContentsContents: 1. The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust Herbert Hovenkamp 2. The Difficult Reception of Economic Analysis in European Competition Law Roger Van den Bergh 3. Apreface to Post-Chicago Antitrust Jonathan B. Baker 4. Post-Chicago, Post-Seattle and the Dilemma of Globalization Eleanor M. Fox 5. The Bounds Approach to Antitrust Patrick Van Cayseele 6. Dynamic Efficiency and US Antitrust Policy Rudolph J.R. Peritz 7. ‘Obvious’ Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy: The Chicago School, the Post-Chicago School and the Courts John E. Lopatka and William H. Page 8. Second Order Oligopoly Problems with International Dimensions: Sequential Mergers, Maverick Firms and Buyer Power Michael S. Jacobs 9. Rule Fixing: An Overlooked but General Category of Collusion Robert H. Lande and Howard P. Marvel 10. Raising Consumers’ Costs as an Antitrust Problem: A Sketch of the Argument from Kodak to Microsoft (the European Proceedings) Francesco Denozza 11. How Safe is the King’s Throne? Network Externalities on Trial Roberto Pardolesi and Andrea Renda 12. The Vertical Price Fixing Controversy Antonio Cucinotta 13. The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution Restraints: Efficiency versus Rent Seeking 280 Peter C. Carstensen 14. Cooperation, Competition and Collusion Among Firms at Successive Stages Robert L. Steiner Index
