Description
Book SynopsisOriginally published in 1967. In the past half-century, Utilitarianism has fallen out of favor among professional philosophers, except in such amended forms as Ideal and Rule Utilitarianism. Professor Narveson contends that amendments and qualifications are unnecessary and misguided, and that a careful interpretation and application of the original theory, as advocated by Bentham, the Mills, and Sidgwick, obviates any need for modification. Drawing on the analytical work of such influential recent thinkers as Stevenson, Toulmin, Hare, Nowell-Smith, and Baier, the author attempts to draw a more careful and detailed picture than has previously been offered of the logical status and workings of the Principle of Utility. He then turns to the traditional objections to the theory as developed by such respected thinkers as Ross, Frankena, Hart, and Rawls and attempts to show how Utilitarianism can account for our undoubted obligations in the areas of punishment, promising, distributive justic
Table of ContentsPreface
I. Introduction: Utilitarianism and Philosophical Ethics
II. The Locigal Status of Moral Principles
III. Utility
IV. Formalism
V. Tasks and Methods
VI. The Utilitarian Theory of "Strict" Obligation
VII. Distributive Justice
VIII. Rounding Out the System
IX. Foundations
Index
