Description
Book SynopsisJaskoski looks briefly at this theory's implications for military responsiveness to government orders in democratic Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela, and in newly formed democracies more broadly.
Trade ReviewAcademically rigorous... the specialized work belongs in college and university libraries with significant holdings in comparative politics and Latin American studies. Choice
Table of ContentsAcknowledgments
Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Military Mission Performance in Latin America
Challenges to Security and Democratic Civil-Military Relations in the Andes
Explaining Military Mission Performance in Democratic Latin America
Case Selection: A Focus on the Army in Peru and Ecuador
The Data
Overview of the Analysis
2. Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Peru and Ecuador
High Constraints on Peru's Military
Low Constraints on Ecuador's Military
3. Army Mission Performance in Post-Transition Peru and Ecuador, 1980s–1990s
Sovereignty before Policing
Deviations: Contradictions in Missions and Sovereignty Neglect
Alternative Explanations
4. Mission Constraint and Neglect of Counterinsurgency: Peru since 2000
Staying in the Barracks
Insecurity in Sendero Zones
Predictions of the Legitimacy, Professionalism, and Resource Maximization Hypotheses
Army Inaction
Restrictions on Army Autonomy
Contradiction through Mission Constraint
The Source of the Senior Cohort's "Need" for Autonomy
Neglect of Counterinsurgency as a Way to Maintain Predictability for Patrols
Return to Assertive Counterinsurgency
Narrow Mission Beliefs and Minimal Police Work
5. Mission Overload and Neglect of Border Defense: Ecuador since 2000
Neglecting a Porous Border while Policing the Interior
Insecurity in Northern Ecuador
Predictions of the Legitimacy, Professionalism, and Resource Maximization Hypotheses
Assertive Policing
Overwhelming Security Responsibilities
Policing to Avoid Obsolescence
Contradiction through Mission Overload
Managing the Contradiction
The Contradiction Escalates
Alternative Explanations: Revisiting Legitimacy
6. Battalions for Hire: Private Army Contracts in Peru and Ecuador
Resource-Hungry Army Units
Local Client Influence
Limits to Client Influence
7. Comparative Perspectives on Military Mission Performance
Colombia: Tolerance of Policing amid Ongoing Insurgency
Venezuela: Mission Loss, Organizational Trauma, and Rejection of Police Work
Bolivia: Policing despite Organizational Trauma
Extreme Executive Control: Trends in Venezuela and Bolivia
Reflections on Assigning Militaries to Conduct Police Work
Appendix: Field Research Methodology
Notes
References
Index
