Description
Book SynopsisThe English philosopher Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990) is known as a conservative who rejected philosophically ambitious rationalism and the grand political ideologies of the twentieth century. This title presents an original account of Oakeshott's skepticism about foundations, an account that newly reveals the unity of his thought.
Trade Review"During a time when the fragility of things is so palpable, Aryeh Botwinick's re-engagement with the work of Michael Oakeshott is invaluable. He shows us how Oakeshott's skepticism turns sharply back upon itself, how he draws us toward a tacit dimension that is itself both real and fragile, and how, once human anger against the complexity of skepticism is overcome, this stance can provide a live medium from which a generous ethic emerges. Botwinick reads Oakeshott in relation to Hobbes, Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Heidegger, as he also periodically reads Oakeshott against himself. A timely and illuminating study."
—William E. Connolly, author of A World of Becoming"The literature on Oakeshott tends to emphasize the independence of his thought and the problem of how to classify him, a problem that Aryeh Botwinick neatly sidesteps by taking an entirely different line. Oakeshott turns out to be in agreement or dialogue with a range of other thinkers, including Nietzsche and Arendt. This is a fresh and rewarding approach that provides a new perspective on Oakeshott's thought and its significance."
—Oliver Leaman, University of KentuckyTable of ContentsPreface and Acknowledgments xi Chapter 1: Introduction: Epistemological Backdrop 1 Chapter 2: Metaphysics 29 Chapter 3: Philosophy of Religion and Philosophy of Science 49 Chapter 4: Political Theory 117 Chapter 5: Philosophy of Conversation and Philosophy of Personal Identity 132 Chapter 6: Philosophy of Law and Philosophy of History 194 Notes 223 Index 241
