Description
Book SynopsisOliver Williamson is one of the most important industrial economists of our time. He has made a major contribution to economic scholarship and remains at the forefront of research into transaction costs and the theory of the firm.
In this volume he has provided a very careful selection of what he considers to be the most important articles and papers in industrial organization. Featuring 23 articles, dating from 1937 to 1987, this collection includes papers by Kenneth J. Arrow, Ronald H. Coase, Franco Modigliani, Michael Rothschild, Herbert A. Simon, George J. Stigler and Joseph Stiglitz.
The first part presents classic articles which supplied the foundations upon which the field of industrial economics was built. The second and third parts present papers on the new economics of organization and a revitalized theory of strategic behaviour and competition. Professor Williamson submits that a new science of organisation is taking shape to which industrial economics has been both a principle contributor and beneficiary.
Now available in paperback, this important volume will be indispensable to all teachers, researchers and students concerned with modern industrial economics and the theory of the firm.
Table of ContentsCONTENTS INTRODUCTION PART I: Antecedents R. Coase (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’ A. Alchian (1950), ‘Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory’ L. McKenzie (1951), ‘Ideal Output and the Interdependence of Firms’ F. Modigliani (1958), ‘New Developments on the Oligopoly Front’ G. Stigler (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’ K. Arrow (1963), ‘Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care’ H. Simon (1962), ‘The Architecture of Complexity’ PART II: The New Economics of Organization M. Rothschild and J. Stiglitz (1976), ‘Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information’ B. Holmstrom (1982), ‘Moral Hazard in Teams’ J. Tirole (1986), ‘Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations’ G. Akerlof (1983), ‘Loyalty Filters’ O. Williamson (1979), ‘Transaction-cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations’ S. Grossman and O. Hart (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and lateral Integration’ P. Joskow (1985), ‘Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants’ B. Klein and K. Leffler (1981), ‘The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractural Performance’ PART III: Strategic Behaviour and Competition H. Demsetz (1974), ‘Two Systems if Belief about Monopoly’ A. Dixit (1980), ‘The Role of Investment in Entry-deterrence’ P. Aghion and P. Bolton (1987), ‘Contracts as a Barrier to Entry’ P. Milgrom and J. Roberts (1980), ‘Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis’ D. Kreps and R. Wilson (1982), ‘Reputation and Imperfect Information’ D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole (1984), ‘The Fat-Cat Effect, The Puppy-Dog Ploy and the Lean and Hungry Look’ W. Baumol, J. Panzar and R. Willig (1986), ‘On the Theory of Perfectly-contestable Markets’ S. Salop (1979), ‘Monoplistic Competition with Outside Goods’
