Description
Book SynopsisGame theory has emerged as a powerful new tool in environmental economics, especially in the study of transboundary pollution problems such as global warming and acid rain. This is the first book specifically concerned with this expanding field and addresses key issues in the application of game theory to environmental economics.
The book features an impressive list of leading authorities who begin by providing a concise introduction and overview of game theory concepts. They then present an examination of methodological issues, and finally apply game theory to a variety of environmental management problems. Included in the analysis are the following issues:
- cooperation versus selfish behaviour and the formation and stability of coalitions
- asymmetric information, commitment and fairness, and irreversibility and uncertainty
- international environmental externalities and international pollution control agreements
- cooperation versus free riding in international affairs
- the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, regulation of nuclear power and control of acid rain
- best choice policy instruments.
This book will be highly relevant for the growing number of undergraduate and postgraduate courses in environmental economics, environmental management and public policy. It will also be of interest both to academics researching in these areas and to practitioners in government and international agencies.
Trade Review'I hope that my review has given a fair summary of the fascinating topics that the editors have assembled. The book features good theory that is appropriate to a large audience as the contributors have made an effort to present the material in such a manner that it is within the grasp of readers who are less familiar with the application of game theory to environmental issues.' -- Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, Journal of Agricultural Economics
Table of ContentsGame theoretic modelling of environmental and resource problems - an introduction, Henk Folmer et al; co-operation versus free riding in international environmental affairs - two approaches, Henry Tulkens; dynamic resolution of inefficiency due to international environmental externalities, Mark B. Cronshaw; committment and fairness in environmental games, Tim Jeppesen and Per Andersen; acid rain and international environmental aid - transboundary air pollution between Finland, Russia and Estonia, Veijo Kaitala and Matti Pohjola; nuclear power games, Fanny Missfeldt; renegotiation-proof equilibria in a bargaining game over global emission reductions - does the instrumental framework matter?, Alfred Endres and Michael Finus; linking environmental and non-environmental problems in an international setting - the international games approach, Jardena Kroeza-Gil and Henk Folmer; strategies for environmental negotiations - issue linkage with heterogeneous countries, Michael Botteon and Carlo Carraro; environmental conflicts and interconnected games - an experimental note on institutional design, Stephan Kroll et al; environmental conflicts with asymmetric information - theory and behaviour, Terrance M. Hurley and Jason F. Shogren; international dynamic pollution control, Aart de Zeeuw; learning about global warming, Alistair Ulph; migration and the environment, Markus Haavio; strategic international trade and transboundary pollution - a dynamic model, Talitha Feenstra; going green or going abroad? environmental policy, firm location and green consumerism, Michael kuhn; a game-theoretic approach to the Roundwood market with capital stock determination, Erkki Koskela and Markku Ollikainen.
