Description
Book SynopsisIn this important book Tim Jeppesen investigates environmental regulation in a federal system and addresses the underlying question of whether regulation should be decided centrally, by EU institutions, or de-centrally, by individual member states. Whilst simple economic reasoning presumes that transboundary externalities require central solutions and local externalities need local solutions, the author finds that the real answer is much more complicated.
Part of the problem is the fact that EU institutions are complex organisations and their rationale and decision making is not always in the interests of economic efficiency alone, but is often based upon other criteria. The author demonstrates this using the example of subsidiarity, a principal which directly affects the distribution of competencies between the EU and individual member states. Although subsidiarity is supposedly underpinned by economic efficiency, he finds that it is in fact, first and foremost, a political concept shaped by EU institutions. The author goes on to examine the balance between the costs and benefits of central and de-central environmental policies, and demonstrates how an environmental regulatory authority can be allocated most efficiently among federal and state governments.
Tim Jeppesen extends the basic theoretical issues to investigate the challenging problems which arise in the actual determination of policy measures in the context of the EU. This wide-ranging study of both the conceptual and practical dimensions of environmental regulation in a federal system will be welcomed by economists, political scientists, policymakers and students.
Trade Review'. . . the book is well written and shows a delightful mix of formalism and pragmatic policy concerns. I believe the book has adequately presented the various issues in weighing the pros and cons of centralized and decentralized environmental policymaking in various environmental and institutional contexts.' -- Abay Mulatu, Papers in Regional Science
'An imaginative book that contributes significantly to the debate on regulatory federalism. The even-handed approach should appeal to a broad audience, including academics, policymakers, and the general reader interested in the optimal institutional arrangements for the provisioning of public goods.' -- John A. List, University of Maryland, College Park, US
Table of ContentsContents: Preface 1. Introduction 2. Framing Environmental Policy in the EU 3. Subsidiarity and EU Environmental Policy 4. Centralized or Decentralized European Environmental Policy? 5. Coordination of Local Pollution Control in a Federal System 6. Impacts of Pollution Control on International Trade and Capital Movements 7. Strategic Environmental Policy 8. Commitment and Fairness in Environmental Games 9. Conclusion References Appendix Index
