Description
Book SynopsisThe essence of democratic power lies in the capacity to protect individual freedom while organizing the necessary coercion associated with any form of government. Yet, as the authors of this book maintain, developing coercion in order to protect freedom, and containing coercion in order to further protect freedom, is an arduous task, and one that faces any democratic Leviathan.
The aim of this book is to explore this paradox and to analyse the intricate balance of freedom and coercion in developing states. In so doing it considers the legal and institutional conditions under which coercion and violence are admitted and/or permitted, and how these conditions should be organized in order to preserve and develop freedom as far as possible.
Democracy, Freedom and Coercion comprehensively covers both private and public law, both applied and theoretical issues, and will therefore be of great interest to students studying law and economics. It will also serve as a reference tool to those academics in the field of legal competition, especially from the perspective of European issues.
Trade Review‘Democracy, Freedom and Coercion
is a welcome addition to the public choice literature. It steps outside of the often used contractarian perspective and recognizes that all governments are ultimately based on coercion. . . the volume's chapters make important contributions that should be of interest to public choice scholars engaged in this research program.' -- Benjamin Powell, Public Choice
'The big picture here is the tension between coercion and freedom within democracy. Each essay offers a view of this big picture through a different lens: empirical, theoretical, comparative, etc.; and also offers a different focus: on the conceptualisation and measurement of power, the legitimacy of economic democracy, the identification of the developing pattern of democracy, the impact of political violence etc. But the essays combine well so that together they illuminate the big picture from a variety of perspectives. Thought provoking and challenging - an excellent read for anyone interested in the more detailed analysis of the issues that make up the big picture.' -- Alan Hamlin, University of Manchester, UK
'So much of the academic analysis of democracy focuses on agreement and ignores the fact that all government action ultimately is backed by coercion. This volume offers a thoughtful examination of the inherent tensions between liberty and coercion that are an inevitable part of democratic government.' -- Randall G. Holcombe, Florida State University, US
'States need to be strong in order to enforce private property rights; yet, this very strength can cause problems as representatives of the state can misuse it for their individual goals. This "dilemma of the strong state" has been occupying political philosophers for centuries. In this volume, to which economists but also political scientists have contributed, a number of new and unexpected variations on the topic are explored. This makes the volume an exciting read.' -- Stefan Voigt, University of Hamburg, Germany
Table of ContentsContents: Introduction Jean-Michel Josselin and Alain Marciano PART I: DOES POWER (AND THE DEMOCRATIC USE OF POWER IN PARTICULAR) NECESSARILY MEAN COERCION? 1. Variations on the Lupus et Agnus Story: In Search of the Homo Sapiens Giuseppe Euseppi and Alessandra Cepparulo 2. Freedom of Choice, Power, and the Responsibility of Decision Makers Manfred J. Holler 3. Hayek and Economic Policy (The Austrian Road to the Third Way) Enrico Colombatto PART II: IS LEGITIMATE COERCION REALLY LEGITIMATE? 4. Defining Economic Democracy: A Challenge. An Institutionalist Framework Christian Barrère 5. The Big Pattern of Democracy: A Study of the Gastil Index Martin Paldam 6. Violence and its Impact on Democracy in Colombia Giorgio Brosio and Roberto Zanola PART III: DEMOCRATIC SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ILLEGITIMATE COERCION 7. Language as Platform: A Theory of Subsidiarity and the Nation State Leonard Dudley 8. Leviathan or Geryon? Power Abuse in Democratic Societies Louis M. Imbeau 9. Political Institutions and Political Innovations: Theoretical Thoughts and Evidence on Labor Market Regulation Lars P. Feld and Jan Schnellenbach 10. Compliance in the EU Enlargement Process: Institutional Reform and the Limits of Conditionality Bernard Steunenberg and Antoaneta Dimitrova Conclusion: Hobbes and the Political Economy of Power Donald Wittman Index
