Description
In the past, economists have not always been able to agree on the idea that copyright is an efficient way of protecting cultural intellectual property. Indeed, many economists argue that copyright is not even necessary. In
Copyright and Economic Theory a rigorously extensive yet simplified economic theory of copyright piracy is presented, and used to analyse important aspects of intellectual property transactions including the royalty contract, optimal copyright law, and copyright collectives. The author also analyses important areas of discussion in copyright, such as how can it be that a certain degree of piracy is beneficial, not only socially, but also for copyright holders and producers of originals? Are linear royalty contracts optimal? How many copyright collectives should a given economy have? Would a copyright collective prefer to act as a leader or a follower in a Stackelberg duopoly?
The book analyses and contrasts existing theories concerning the economic theory of copyright, and presents a simple economic model in which copyright can be effectively studied, considering all principal areas of interest in copyright.
This book will be fascinating reading for academics in economics, law and industrial organisation as well as for legal professionals including lawyers, copyright collectives and relevant governmental organisations.
