Description
Book SynopsisThis book fills a gap in the existing literature by dealing with several issues linked to long-term contracts and the efficiency of electricity markets. These include the impact of long-term contracts and vertical integration on effective competition, generation investment in risky markets, and the challenges for competition policy principles.
On the one hand, long-term contracts may contribute to lasting generation capability by allowing for a more efficient allocation of risk. On the other hand, they can create conditions for imperfect competition and thus impair short-term efficiency. The contributors - prominent academics and policy experts with inter-disciplinary perspectives - develop fresh theoretical and practical insights on this important concern for current electricity markets.
This highly accessible book will strongly appeal to both academic and professional audiences including scholars of industrial, organizational and public sector economics, and competition and antitrust law. It will also be of value to regulatory and antitrust authorities, governmental policymakers, and consultants in electricity law and economics.
Contributors: J. Boucher, G. Brunekreeft, D. Finon, J.-M. Glachant, L. Hancher, A. de Hauteclocque, P. Longva, F. Marty, R. Meade, G. Meunier, M. Mulder, S. O'Connor, J. Pillot, F.A. Roques, Y. Smeers
Trade Review'[I]t is the combination of various approaches that make the book worth reading. As such, it contributes significantly to the ongoing discussion in Europe on long-term contracts, the role of markets, the ability of markets to deliver investments and so on. . . well worth reading.' --Kim Talus,
Oil, Gas and Energy Law IntelligenceTable of ContentsContents: Introduction Dominique Finon, Jean-Michel Glachant and Adrien de Hauteclocque PART I: LONG-TERM CONTRACTS, INVESTMENT AND LONG-TERM EFFICIENCY 1. Energy Security and Long-term Arrangements Jacqueline Boucher and Yves Smeers 2. Long-term Contracts and Technology Choices in Electricity Markets Fabien A. Roques 3. Investment and Competition in Decentralized Electricity Markets: How to Overcome Market Failure by Market Imperfections? Dominique Finon 4. Comparison of Long-term Contracts and Vertical Integration in Decentralized Electricity Markets Richard Meade and Seini O’Connor 5. Vertical Relations and Energy Networks: Selected Issues Gert Brunekreeft PART II: LONG-TERM CONTRACTS AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION 6. Imperfect Competition and Long-term Contracts in Electricity Markets: Some Lessons from Theoretical Models Guy Meunier 7. Long-term Contracts in Electricity Markets: Long-term Contracting and Risk Management from the Point of View of a Large Consumer Petter Longva 8. Competition and Long-term Contracts in the Dutch Electricity Market Machiel Mulder PART III: COMPETITION POLICY AND LONG-TERM CONTRACTS 9. Long-term Contracts and Competition Policy in European Energy Markets Adrien de Hauteclocque and Jean-Michel Glachant 10. Long-term Contracts and State Aid: A New Application of the EU State Aid Regime or a Special Case? Leigh Hancher 11. The Essential Facilities Doctrine in European Competition Policy: The Case of the Energy Sector Adrien de Hauteclocque, Frédéric Marty and Julien Pillot PART IV: CONCLUSION 12. Efficiency, Competition and Long-term Contracts in Electricity Markets: Summary and Conclusions of the Workshop Organized by the GIS LARSEN and the Loyola de Palacio Program of the European University Institute, Florence, 15–16 January 2009 Adrien de Hauteclocque Index
