Description
Book SynopsisThis book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence.
The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided.
This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policymakers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.
Trade Review'Lippi's book offers a number of very interesting extensions of the literature on central bank independence and credibility of monetary policy. The author combines a good knowledge of this topic with interesting new insights. No doubt, this book will be very useful for scholars in this rapidly developing research area.' -- Jakob de Haan, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Table of ContentsContents: Preface 1. Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility: Motivation and Overview Part I: Extensions of the Credibility Model 2. Credibility and Imperfect Monetary Control 3. Rules versus Discretion with Two Policy Instruments 4. Distributional Motives and the Inflationary Bias 5. Policy Delegation and Elections Part II: Central Bank Independence and Targets 6. On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets 7. Central Bank Independence and Conservatism Part III: Some Evidence 8. Policy Targets, Economic Performance and Central Bank Independence References Index With W. Letterie and O.H. Swank
