Description
Book SynopsisExamines the role of intellectuals in foreign policymaking. This work recounts the history of the development of ideas about strategy and foreign policy during a critical period in American history: the era of the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Trade Review"Blind Oracles ... brilliantly combines in concise yet penetrating fashion analysis and reflection on a range of intellectuals... [I]t provides a fascinating study of the role of ideas and intellectuals, the methodological approaches and interpretive frameworks associated with realism, liberalism and so forth that are not only seen as abstract formulae but provide a demonstration of how these ideas are injected into policy and used by the policy-makers on the central issues of war from the origins of the Cold War, through Cuba and on to Vietnam."--David Ryan, International Affairs "A provocative exploration of the connection between knowledge and politics that evaluates the role of intellectuals in formulating US foreign policy form 1945 to 1975, Kuklick divides his learned actors into three groups: scientifically oriented experts attached to the RAND Corporation; foreign policy academics, mostly social scientists who were associated with Richard Neustadt and Ernest May; and the university-based academics, such as McGeorge Bundy and Henry Kissinger. The value of Kuklick's analysis resides in the connections he makes between the individuals in each group; his assessment of their commitment to the theoretical principles he outlines; and his evaluation of the practical consequences of the intellectuals' approaches... Kuklick concludes that the impact of ideas on policy was often minimal, unintentional, and less significant than political considerations."--Choice "Bruce Kuklick has written an engaging and important study of the national security concepts of intellectuals and their influence on the policies of the United States during the period between the end of World War II and the Vietnam War... Kuklick ... demonstrates ... an impressive capacity to relate ideas to politics and diplomacy."--Gary R. Hess, Register of the Kentucky Historical Society "The thesis of the book can be simply stated. The foreign policy intellectuals who applied academic expertise to Cold War issues were mostly misguided... This volume is likely to provoke an interesting debate about the role of academics and social science theories in contemporary American foreign policy. In that debate, it will not be hard to know where Kuklick stands."--Robert A. Strong, Journal of American History "Kuklick's is ... an informative and persuasive account of a significant subject matter, argued with skill and eruditeness. In recounting the origins and evolutions of intellectual and strategic thought, Kuklick offers a powerful deconstruction of the individuals and organizations of the epoch."--Kaeten Mistry, 49th Parallel "Creative, ambitious, and stimulating, Blind Oracles is conceived as something more than just a straight history of ideas about international affairs. It explores not just the content of these thinkers' ideas but how the ideas played out when put into practice... [A] distinctive addition to the literature on Cold War thought."--David Greenberg, Political Science Quarterly "[T]his brief but rich study offers more insights per page than just about any other work on the Cold War of which this reader knows."--Frank Ninkovich, The Historian
Table of ContentsList of Illustrations xi Note on Citations xiii INTRODUCTION: The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge 1 CHAPTER 1: Scientific Management and War, 1910-1960 17 CHAPTER 2: Theorists of War, 1945-1953 37 CHAPTER 3: RAND in Opposition, 1946-1961 49 CHAPTER 4: Accented and Unaccented Realism, 1946-1961 72 CHAPTER 5: RAND and the Kennedy Administration, 1961-1962 95 CHAPTER 6: Cuba and Nassau, 1962 110 CHAPTER 7: Intellectuals in Power, 1961-1966 128 CHAPTER 8: The Kennedy School of Government, 1964-1971 152 CHAPTER 9: The Pentagon Papers 168 CHAPTER 10: Henry Kissinger 182 CHAPTER 11: Diplomats on Foreign Policy, 1976-2001 204 Conclusion 223 Acknowledgments and Methodological Note 231 Index 235
